Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security
Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions
A prominent model of nuclear proliferation posits that a powerful patron state can prevent a weaker ally from proliferating by providing it with security guarantees. The history of West Germany's pursuit of the bomb from 1954 to 1969 suggests that a patron may also need to threaten the client state with military abandonment to convince it not to acquire nuclear weapons.
Watch: Author Chat with Gene Gerzhoy.
Read: Gene Gerzhoy's op-ed, "How to Manage Saudi Anger at the Iran Nuclear Deal," in the Washington Post's Monkey Cage blog.
Analysis & Opinions - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Paper - Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy
Analysis & Opinions - The Jerusalem Post
In the Spotlight
Report - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Press Release - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Analysis & Opinions - The Boston Globe