Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

| Spring 2015

Summary

A prominent model of nuclear proliferation posits that a powerful patron state can prevent a weaker ally from proliferating by providing it with security guarantees. The history of West Germany's pursuit of the bomb from 1954 to 1969 suggests that a patron may also need to threaten the client state with military abandonment to convince it not to acquire nuclear weapons.

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Read: Gene Gerzhoy's op-ed, "How to Manage Saudi Anger at the Iran Nuclear Deal," in the Washington Post's Monkey Cage blog.

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For Academic Citation: Gerzhoy, Gene. Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions.” Quarterly Journal: International Security, vol. 39. no. 4. (Spring 2015):
91-129
.

The Author