Best Analysis on the Iran Nuclear Deal

The blizzard of commentary, analysis and spin that followed the comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran has left many observers overwhelmed, myself included. To quote the Russian translation of Shakespeare’s “sound and fury,” most of this commentary seems “dust and noise.”

 In this post, I highlight the rare pieces that advance the analytic discussion – whether in the form of op-eds, testimonies, interviews, or feedback based on the Belfer Center’s recent articles and reports (I recommend the Center’s “Definitive Guide” to the Iran nuclear deal, edited by Gary Samore, which presents a balanced assessment of the agreement's strengths and weaknesses with respect to its central objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.)

Since Secretary of State Kerry and his indefatigable team concluded the nuclear agreement last month, attention has shifted from the negotiating rooms in Vienna to Congressional committees. Fulfilling its responsibility, Congress has held no less than fifteen public hearings and a host of other classified or private discussions. When Congress returns from recess on September 8, members will have nine days to cast a vote supporting or opposing the deal (they can also take no action).

Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, provided members of the Senate Armed Services Committee with a clear-eyed assessment of the choice they face. Haass explained that while “it is a flawed agreement,” the primary “issue before the Congress is not whether the agreement is good or bad but whether from this point on the United States is better or worse off with it.” He identified four serious drawbacks to rejecting the deal:

1. “It would allow Iran to resume nuclear activity in an unconstrained manner, increasing the odds the United States would be faced with a decision – possibly as soon as this year or next – as to whether to tolerate the emergence of a threshold or actual nuclear weapons state or use military force against it.”
2. “By acting unilaterally at this point, the United States would make itself rather than Iran the issue. In this vein, imposing unilateral sanctions would hurt Iran but not enough to make it alter the basics of its nuclear program.”
3. “Voting the agreement down and calling for a reopening of negotiations with the aim of producing a better agreement is not a real option as there would insufficient international support for so doing. Here, again, the United States would likely isolate itself, not Iran.”
4. “Voting down the agreement would reinforce questions and doubts around the world as to American political divisions and dysfunction. Reliability and predictability are essential attributes for a great power that must at one and the same time both reassure and deter.”

Sandy Berger, national security adviser under President Clinton, echoed Haass’ points in anop-ed in Politico Magazine. A Congressional rejection, Berger continues, would give Iran two paths:

1. “If President Rouhani can persuade Ayatollah Khamenei and others that it is the smartest course, Iran could play the ‘victim.’ Rouhani could emphasize to the world the unprecedented constraints and transparency Iran had accepted and suggest that, even though the United States had rejected the proposed deal, for now it would move forward to implement—on its terms and timeline.”
2. “The internal dynamics in Iran—ultimately driven by the opaque Supreme Leader—could tack in a more nationalistic direction, with even Rouhani needing to secure his legitimacy. This does not mean Iran would suddenly ‘race to the bomb.’ But it easily could mean that it renounces any obligations under this agreement or the earlier interim agreement, restarts its nuclear program from where it was before negotiations began two years ago and resumes adding centrifuges and enriching fuel—all the while castigating the United States for turning its back on a historic negotiated agreement.”

If Iran chooses the latter path, Prime Minister Netanyahu would face “a terrible choice”: watch Iran cross his red line or launch an attack that “is seen by the world as a war that could have been avoided,” Berger concludes.

While Netanyahu continues to be loudest voice from Jerusalem, former national security leaders in Israel have come to the same conclusion as Haass and Berger. As I wrote in the New York Times in 2012 with Brandeis’ Shai Feldman, it was these “security barons” who played a decisive role in convincing Netanyahu to back down from a military strike on Iran. The opinions of these “barons” are worth following closely and reading carefully.

Former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy wrote in the Israeli daily newspaper Yedioth Ahronoththat Congressional rejection of the nuclear deal would “erase all the concessions made by Iran,” ensuring Iran “will be free to do as it pleases.” Sanctions against Iran will “crumble,” he wrote, “as many of the world’s countries will rush to Tehran to sign profitable contracts.” He notes that American “leadership will be castrated and humiliated.” The deal has weaknesses, Halevy said in an interview with NPR – “when you negotiate, you win some, you lose some.” But, heassesses that the powers “reached an agreement that facilities other kinds of options” and therefore “yielded a period of time in which it is possible to create a different atmosphere in the Middle East.”

Dozens of former Israeli defense and security leaders echoed that sentiment in a full-page petition in Israeli newspapers. The signatories – including Ami Ayalon, former Shin Bet director; Amiram Levin, former Mossad deputy director; and Shlomo Gazit, former chief of Military Intelligence – called the agreement “an accomplished fact” and recommended Jerusalem “renew the trust between and enhance the political and security cooperation with the U.S.” In a separate interview, Ayalon said the deal is “not good, but it is the best plan currently on the table.” He called Israel’s approach to the deal “wrong.”

Amos Yadlin, the former chief of the Israeli Military Intelligence who currently leads the country’s most distinguished national security think tank, provides several recommendations for how to correct Israeli policy. Yadlin calls for the United States and Israel to enter into a side agreement defining intelligence cooperation and what constitutes a significant violation by Iran. Notably, Yadlin also argues that “Israel must refrain from intervening in the American political system.” Yadlin writes:

“If Israel opts to intervene officially by attempting to influence Congressional opinion, it can expect a twofold loss. If it succeeds in thwarting the agreement, Iran will remain closer to a nuclear bomb in the coming years, and the chances of a collapse of the sanctions regime will increase, as Israel will be accused of thwarting an agreement that was already approved by all the major powers and the UN Security Council. If Israel fails to block the agreement, its international standing and its deterrence will be damaged. In addition, the problems in working with the American administration in a constructive manner in order to prepare for the problematic scenarios will be compounded.”

Yadlin, in a separate report, assessed that military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities after year 10 “would in all probability not be much more complicated or difficult than in 2015.” I included this in my recent op-ed in The Atlantic, “9 Reasons to Support the Iran Deal.” Judah Grunstein, editor-in-chief of World Politics Review, wrote in with a cogent asterisk to this point:

“With regard to the seventh reason on the potential for military strikes against Iran's program after 2025 in the event the Iranians make a dash for a bomb: While I hesitate to disagree with General Yadlin, and agree that all the points he mentions would facilitate a strike against Iran's nuclear program, the fact that Iran will be able to arm itself starting in 2020 with foreign-made systems, including modern air defense systems and fighter planes, would certainly complicate that calculus.

I appreciate Grunstein’s point – Iran unshackled from sanctions can arm itself with sophisticated weapons from suppliers like China and Russia. Still, if I were to bet on the race between US or Israeli offensive capabilities and Iranian defensive capabilities, I would choose our team.

 As an addendum to my nine reasons, John A. Chiles emailed me a well-articulated “tenth reason” that goes to the heart of the current tension between the U.S. and Israel:

 “10.  This deal demonstrates a clear and much needed separation from the bellicose and bombastic substance and style of Netanyahu.  His machinations, sadly successful with some Members of Congress, are designed to push the US into a “let’s you and him fight” position that is contrary to both the US and Israeli practical best interests.  The Iranian people are eager for a more educated more secular society.  The US ups the chances for a more stable Middle East and, who knows, ultimately a new 60 million population trading partner. They might even buy Washington State apples!  Additionally, moderate elements (the majority?) in Israel might be encouraged to get beyond the policies of absolute suspicion and instant retaliation to a more measured dare I say Reaganesque approach to dealing with your adversaries.”

 Finally, the piece that best captures the big, strategic picture is Feldman and Ariel Levite’s “Seven Realities That Made an Iran Deal Almost Inevitable.” The piece identifies key structural factors that shape the U.S.’s strategic options in dealing with the Iranian nuclear challenge, and is a model of strategic analysis that insists on diagnosis before prescription. Feldman and Levite’s most important reality 

“is that the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the complete dismantlement of its armed forces have left Iran as the uncontested regional power in the Persian Gulf, eliminating in the process the traditional buffer between the Gulf and Levant. Iran has thus emerged by will as well as by default with a remarkable capacity to project power throughout the region, largely unopposed. With no one left to systematically check its capacity for creating mischief in the region (except for occasional and ad hoc efforts by Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States), the belief that sanctions alone could have not only brought Tehran to the negotiations table but also to capitulate and accept the dismantlement of its nuclear project is unfounded.”