The Complex Discontent that Brings Revolution

BEIRUT -- Political scientists and other analysts will spend years studying the many dimensions of the current citizen revolt in the Arab world, including key issues like: Why did it suddenly explode onto the scene last December-January? What are the key issues that drive it? Who are the most pivotal actors? And why does it seem to topple some regimes but not others?

A central lesson that stands out in this respect is the multi-faceted nature of the complex discontent that has driven millions of Arabs to revolt.

By “complex discontent” I mean that such historic upheavals and street activism by millions of people scattered across more than a dozen Arab countries cannot be explained by one-dimensional analyses or a single main cause of people’s political eruption -- such as jobs, or police brutality, or corruption. Arabs, like all other people, can withstand degrading behavior for a long time if it is compensated for by other dimensions of their lives that seem to be improving. A family can endure poverty or lack of democracy if its future prospects seem likely to improve because their children are going to school and all family members have access to basic medical care. But when several key sources of discontent and degradation of the spirit converge, such as joblessness, poverty, police heavy-handedness, insensitive government officials -- as happened with the Tunisian vegetable seller Mohammed Bouazizi whose despair caused him to kill himself in protest -- human beings react in unpredictable but often decisive ways. A priority for those who are seriously researching the current Arab revolt is to identify the correct mix of issues and grievances that have finally pushed millions of Arab men and women to stand up and demand their rights.

A timely contribution to this discussion comes from the Abu Dhabi Gallup Center, headed by Dalia Mogahed, who has just published an important short analysis entitled, “Egypt: The Arithmetic of Revolution -- An empirical analysis of social and economic conditions in the months before the January 25 uprising,” (found here: www.abudhabigallupcenter.com)

Among the important points it makes are two that strike me as especially pertinent to grasp while analyzing the wider Arab revolt across the region. The first is that citizen discontent was steadily increasing in the past few years in Egypt while macroeconomic data showed the Egyptian economy was growing robustly. (The same condition pertained in Tunisia, not surprisingly.) Normally people’s sense of their own wellbeing correlates positively with GDP growth, but that was not the case in Egypt according to the annual Gallup polls. While national GDP grew steadily, the percentage of Egyptians classified as “thriving” declined between 2007 and 2010. (When I was in Damascus a few weeks ago discussing these issues with Syrian friends who follow public affairs closely, one of them recalled that “revolutions tend to occur when the economy is rising, not dropping.”)

The second is that no single reason, but rather a combination of political and economic concerns, pushed Egyptians over the edge of their former quiescence into open rebellion. Mogahed writes: “Egypt’s macroeconomic growth expanded the wealth of a small minority, but left many more with diminishing perceived access to this prosperity. Egyptians boasted the highest democratic aspirations of the region, but among the lowest in its actual practice. While many might have tolerated a paternal state-citizen social contract, where people accept less freedom in exchange for high-quality state-provided social services, Egyptians had neither. As Egyptian satisfaction with their personal freedom decreased, so did their contentment with state-provided necessities. This twin decline in attitudes suggests that in the eyes of many Egyptians the old regime had resembled more a prison warden than a generous if overprotective father.”

She provides compelling documentation. While many Egyptians felt left behind by the expanding economy, they also felt that government-provided social services were on the decline. For example, the percentage of Egyptians who were satisfied with public transportation systems declined from 78% in 2009 to 48% in 2010; those who said they enjoyed enough good, affordable housing declined from 39% in 2009 to around 25% in 2010. Even environmental concerns emerged among Egyptians, with 26% saying they were satisfied with efforts to preserve the environment, versus 41% in 2009.

These socio-economic declines were matched by political regressions. Those who felt satisfied with their personal freedom dropped sharply from 2005 to 2010, from 77% to 47%. Also, only 28% have confidence in the honesty of elections, and just four percent of Egyptians had expressed their opinion to a public official -- the lowest level in Gallup’s 150-country database.

Mogahed’s summary of why Egyptians removed their regime is worth keeping in mind as we follow the continuing discontent and street activism of others throughout the Arab world: “If Tunisia’s revolt provided the trigger for Egypt’s uprising, the gap between what
Egyptians expected and what they experienced provided the fuel.”