Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security
Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace
Summary
Can states deter adversaries in cyberspace? Analogies drawn from nuclear deterrence mislead; nuclear deterrence aims for total prevention, whereas states do not expect to prevent every cyberattack. Additionally, cyber deterrence is possible even though it can be hard to identify the source of a cyberattack. Attribution problems do not hinder three of the major forms of cyber deterrence: denial, entanglement, and normative taboos.
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For Academic Citation:
Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace," International Security, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Winter 2016/17), pp. 44–71.
The Author
Joseph S. Nye
- Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
- Member of the Board, Belfer Center
- Faculty Affiliate, Future of Diplomacy Project
Expertise:
- Weak/Failed states
- Coronavirus
- Intelligence in policymaking
- Military strategy
- International Relations
- Soft power
- U.S. foreign policy
- U.S. primacy
- History
- International development
- International Security & Defense
- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Terrorism & Counterterrorism
- Military policy
- Afghanistan war
- China & security
- Democracy
- Intelligence
- Nuclear Issues
- Dirty bombs
- Nuclear proliferation
- Nuclear security
- Nuclear terrorism
- Nuclear weapons
- U.S. nuclear issues
- Cyber Security
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- In the Spotlight
- Most Viewed
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Summary
Can states deter adversaries in cyberspace? Analogies drawn from nuclear deterrence mislead; nuclear deterrence aims for total prevention, whereas states do not expect to prevent every cyberattack. Additionally, cyber deterrence is possible even though it can be hard to identify the source of a cyberattack. Attribution problems do not hinder three of the major forms of cyber deterrence: denial, entanglement, and normative taboos.
Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace," International Security, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Winter 2016/17), pp. 44–71.
The Author
Joseph S. Nye
- Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
- Member of the Board, Belfer Center
- Faculty Affiliate, Future of Diplomacy Project
- Weak/Failed states
- Coronavirus
- Intelligence in policymaking
- Military strategy
- International Relations
- Soft power
- U.S. foreign policy
- U.S. primacy
- History
- International development
- International Security & Defense
- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Terrorism & Counterterrorism
- Military policy
- Afghanistan war
- China & security
- Democracy
- Intelligence
- Nuclear Issues
- Dirty bombs
- Nuclear proliferation
- Nuclear security
- Nuclear terrorism
- Nuclear weapons
- U.S. nuclear issues
- Cyber Security
- Recommended
- In the Spotlight
- Most Viewed
Recommended
Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy
Solving the Mystery of Henry Kissinger's Reputation
Book - Simon & Schuster
SPIES: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West
Analysis & Opinions - Project Syndicate
If Trump Returns
In the Spotlight
Most Viewed
Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy
America Is Too Scared of the Multipolar World
Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Elements of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy
