The IAEA Verifications System in Perspective

Introduction

The nightmare scenario envisioned by President John F. Kennedy in March 1963, that by the 1970s we would live in a world where as many as 25 states possessed nuclear weapons, did not materialize.1 Nonetheless, over the last two decades, a number of nuclear proliferation cases have challenged the nuclear weapons status quo. Much of the achievements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons can be attributed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and to the work of the nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nonetheless, the new cases of proliferation reveal weaknesses in the IAEA verification systems, and illustrate states’ willingness to circumvent international safeguards. These cases also highlight the need to recognize that safeguards verification is a work in progress that must adapt to evolving challenges and technology. The IAEA has taken action in a number of instances to rectify its various shortcomings, such as adopting the Model Additional Protocol, revising the Small Quantities Protocol, and advocating a more analytical safeguards culture. These and other efforts have had varied levels of support from its member states.

Timely detection, prevention, and deterrence of states’ proliferation-related activities in order to ensure the purely peaceful nature of nuclear power use should, at best, be understood as without absolute guarantee. Rather, safeguards can only strive to reduce the uncertainty factor as much as possible. Understanding this calls for the need for strengthened safeguards as well as resources. Both have not been easy to secure, and the path forward will likely face a similar trajectory. What this means is that effective international Dr. Olli Heinonen, a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, served 27 years at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

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