Executive Summary
The Imperatives of a Credible Nuclear Agreement With Iran
Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are continuing negotiations to achieve a comprehensive nuclear agreement. Whilst the wider political context to such an agreement is of importance, the key concern at this stage of the negotiations must revolve around ensuring that any agreement guarantees Iran is left without a pathway to making nuclear weapons. As such, what follows below is concerned narrowly with elucidating the detailed considerations P5+1 negotiators have to account for in setting the parameters for a nuclear agreement with Iran. It offers a realistic, independent assessment of Iran’s pathway to the bomb and the necessary constraints that will make for an acceptable deal.
Since the negotiations are now at a juncture at which the ideal scenario of having no enrichment or heavy water research reactor programme in Iran after any deal is increasingly unlikely, it is imperative that any concession that Iran is to retain a limited well defined nuclear programme as part of an agreement must firmly rest on the following pillars:
- An effective verification regime
- Adequate irreversibility of constraints with early detection of violations
- Sufficient response time in case of violations
- Verifiable dismantlement of elements related to military dimension
Achieving these basic building blocks will necessitate a significant re-shaping and scale-back of the scope, content and parameters of Iranian activity, with many elements to consider:
No deal will be credible or durable if intensified, sustained verification is absent. The IAEA must be able to provide prompt warning of violations, determine the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations, and establish the accurate scope of Iran’s nuclear programme, including undeclared nuclear activities or facilities. It must be credibly able to provide assurances on the absence of nuclear weapons related activities in Iran. Iran must further verifiably stop its efforts to procure key proliferation-sensitive goods illegally, which will require a continuation of national and United Nation Security Council sanctions on proliferation sensitive goods for the long term.
Inspections alone are not enough however, any deal must hold Iran to a satisfactory level of irreversibility in the actions it takes to curtail its nuclear activities. Progress on the Arak nuclear reactor, for example, has proceeded apace and it is now deemed to be capable of producing sufficient weapons-grade plutonium for two nuclear weapons annually, if the reactor is completed. Iran’s suggestions to address this so far have been based on easily reversible design changes. A proliferation proof approach would be to remove the currently installed core and replace it with a smaller one that would significantly reduce the potential to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
In constructing the parameters under which Iran retains a civilian nuclear programme, the basis to operate on must also be to recognise that we do not have a full picture of the programme. Among other problems, the number of centrifuges operating in Natanz and Fordow are well known, but the IAEA has not been able to establish a full inventory of all types of centrifuges manufactured in Iran, and their current location. Therefore, the technical parameters will have to be crafted to limit ambiguities to a minimum. For example, agreeing to a higher number of centrifuges in Natanz, and compensating the attendant shortened break-out time with a smaller declared enriched uranium inventory, is not a credible solution when the total amount of uranium in Iran remains unverified, and types and inventories of centrifuges are not known.
Since centrifuges appear to have become the main unit of currency in the wider debate around the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme, notwithstanding the many considerations that follow below, it should be stated categorically that limiting Iran’s centrifuge programme to between 2,000 and 4,000 IR-1 centrifuges is consistent with Iran’s actual needs for enriched uranium for many years. Even 2,000 IR-1 centrifuges would provide Iran with sufficient enriched uranium for its existing and foreseen research reactor needs.
Throughout the long history of discussions, Iran has often offered ‘transparency’ to build international confidence about the nature of its nuclear programme. Such transparency should be understood and implemented in a meaningful and systematic way. Even in the name of ‘transparency,’ where Iran decides to ‘show’ a place previously off limits (imposed by Iran), such inspection visits can have meaning only if substantially new information and discussions take place, and explanations are provided on the scope and content of the nuclear programme. Hence openness must be clearly defined and become a legally binding undertaking in an agreement rather than be treated as goodwill visits to be granted when problems arise. Given the long lead times inherent to inspections and other actions related toverification and implementation through international fora, an agreement must also provide sufficient time to mount an effective response to major violations by Iran.
Finally, Iran’s most serious verification shortcoming remains its unwillingness to address the IAEA’s concerns about the past and possibly on-going military dimensions of its nuclear programme. Unless Iran satisfies the IAEA in this key area it is impossible for Western negotiators to conclude that all of Iran’s nuclear material is in peaceful use.
An unambiguous condition to achieving a final accord that is meaningful in terms of nuclear proliferation safeguards is that Iran must take actions that allow the IAEA to comprehensively address the concerns about a military dimension to its nuclear programme in their entirety.
Practical Parameters of a Credible Nuclear Agreement with Iran
The report that follows offers a detailed examination of the necessities a credible deal presents as set out above. Practical key parameters suggested are as follows:
The Nuclear Programme and Facilities
- Iran must provide an expanded declaration on all aspects of its past and current nuclear programme. Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment plant is to have 2000-4000 operable IR-1 centrifuges. All excess centrifuges and cascade piping are to be removed for IAEA monitored storage. Its Fordow uranium enrichment plant is to be converted to a Research and Development installation, with infrastructure related to uranium enrichment removed. Iran’s inventory of enriched uranium is to be brought below one metric ton of UF6, enriched up to 5% and the rest of enriched UF6 converted to uranium oxides, and shipped abroad for fuel manufacturing. The Arak reactor should be modified to operate as a light water research reactor by the replacement of some of the currently installed key nuclear components. Iran is required to verifiably declare all already manufactured centrifuge rotors and their components. Excess centrifuges and components will be subject to monitoring by the IAEA.
The Suspected Military Dimension of the Nuclear Programme
- Iran must allow the IAEA to address the whole picture of the military dimension concerns and decommission, dismantle or convert to non-nuclear or peaceful use in a verifiable and irreversible manner nuclear related equipment, materials, facilities and sites that contradict the provisions of the safeguards agreement or the spirit of Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It must allow long-term monitoring of any installations previously involved in nuclear weapons research to ensure that the activities are not restored as an additional requirement.
The Non-Proliferation Safeguards Framework
- Iran must ratify and implement the Additional Protocol expeditiously as well as implement Fully the verification and clarification requirements of the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council. It must meet fully its obligations under the IAEA Statutes, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, including the modified Code 3 of the Subsidiary Agreements.
- Iran must provide information on the production source material, which has not yet reached the composition and purity suitable for nuclear fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, including imports of such material. Iran will provide information on imports and domestic production of single and dual-use items listed in the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
- Iran must provide the IAEA with unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records, people, materials including source materials, which are deemed necessary by the IAEA to fulfill its requirements under the safeguards agreement, and to verify Iran’s declarations made under the items above. These are needed both to understand the scope of the nuclear programme as well as address the possible military dimensions aspects. The purpose of these measures would be to re-establish Iran’s non-proliferation records, and not to lay the basis for further punitive measures.
The full report can be downloaded below.
Heinonen, Olli. “The Iranian Nuclear Programme: Practical Parameters for a Credible Long-Term Agreement.” November 2014
The full text of this publication is available in the link below.