Libya's decision to give up its weapons programs is welcome news and highlights the value of negotiation -- even with rogue states. It also raises the possibility of a Libyan-North Korean connection. This Libyan-North Korean connection does not involve uranium or missiles. No, this connection involves trust.
Let me explain. On the day of the Libyan announcement, I chaired an off-the record meeting with North Korea¹s Ambassador to the UN, Amb. Han. The participants in this closed-door meeting were there to discuss the North Korean nuclear problem.
Over several hours, we went back and forth discussing many issues. One issue that was raised by both sides was the issue of trust. Some of the Americans in the room emphasized that any potential deal with North Korea would have to provide for strict verification. This emphasis on verification was justified, in part, by the belief that the DPRK violated the its 1994 agreement by seeking enrichment technology from our good friend Pakistan. How can we trust the North Koreans, these Americans asked, when the government has broken its commitments in the past?
But trust is not solely an American concern. The North Koreans wonder how they can trust the US to keep its word. Washington is reportedly prepared to give North Korea a security assurance -- a promise not to attack in the future. Should the North Koreans believe the US when it says it won't attack? The Bush administration has placed North Korea on the axis of evil; it has a strategy of preemption, and it has said some pretty unpleasant things about North Korea¹s leader. More to the point, perhaps, this administration has had a bad habit of walking away from commitments.
It withdrew from the ABM Treaty with Russia, attempted to revoke America's signature to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and invaded Iraq despite opposition by a majority of the UN¹s Security Council. For the North Koreans, the US demand that Pyongyang disarm first in return for a promise not to attack doesn't sound like a good idea. Why should we leave ourselves defenseless, they ask? How do we know that President Bush will not turn around and unilaterally revoke the pledge? Better, they say, for each side to take steps in tandem, like two gunfighters slowly lowering their pistols and placing them on the ground.
The Americans say that any agreement with North Korea has to be verifiable and irreversible. The North Koreans agree but want Washington's commitments to be verifiable and irreversible as well. Building the trust required to get to an agreement will be difficult, but it is not impossible. And surprisingly, this is where Libya comes in.
Libya, like North Korea, was once the focus of American ire. Until this week, it was almost unimaginable that Libya and the US would negotiate a deal that might lead to normal relations. My guess is that North Korea will be watching closely. Will the US keep its part of the bargain? Will Libya be able to reap the benefits of restraint? Will Washington welcome Tripoli into the world community, remove sanctions, and encourage economic investment? Or will it treat the Libyan agreement like it did a similar agreement between Europe and Iran, that is, with skepticism and veiled threats?
If the US proves it can be a reliable partner, even with a former rogue state like Libya, the North Koreans may conclude that an agreement is possible. No one is particularly optimistic about that happening soon, especially given that it's an election year.
Still, if at some point, Washington and Pyongyang manage to find their way to an negotiated settlement and resolve the nuclear crisis, someone may have to send a thank-you card to Tripoli.
Dr. Jim Walsh is Executive Director of the Managing the Atom Project at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
Walsh, James. “The Libyan-North Korean Connection: It's Not What You Think.” January 15, 2004