The Middle Eastern Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ)- Nuclear Verification

Introduction

The establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East is a real challenge for the international community taking into consideration the absence of favorable conditions such as the mutual states recognitions as political entities with established diplomatic relations, and stability. To start with, there is no one single model for existing Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). Each existing NWFZ treaty had introduced elements, including creative legal arrangements, and unique features depending on the specificities of each zone. The current treaties of the South Pacific NWFZ, the Southeast Asian NWFZ, the African NWFZ, the Latin American NWFZ, and the Central Asian NWFZ, can be studied and applied where relevant. So, too, there exist organizations responsible for the verification of these treaties (IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO). The case of the Middle East will be more complex since the treaty is envisioned to cover all weapons of mass destruction including biological and chemical as well as their delivery vehicles. A large number of political, historical, technical, and verification issues need to be factored into the Treaty. In other words, working on a WMDFZ means the necessity to deal with all WMD aspects together. Progressing the WMDFZ further means looking at a composite picture of states’ concerns and relations in the region that just counting weapons reduction alone.

Nuclear Verification Standard

IAEA Safeguards form the basis for verification of all the five NWFZ. The IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the Additional Protocol (AP) could serve as the verification basis for a Middle Eastern Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. This would provide the IAEA, and a possible regional verification organization if it is agreed to, tools to ensure that all nuclear materials in the region are in peaceful use. In other words, there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the states in the region.

This calls for the irreversible and verifiable dismantlement of existing nuclear weapons programs need to be included. Such a verifications process requires access to sensitive information, which means that nuclear material accountancy records and reports and information on the design of facilities would differ from those of the CSA. Such information should also include, for instance records historical production of nuclear material and, eventual dismantlement of nuclear weapons related capabilities.

Experiences acquired by the Agency in the dismantlement and destruction of the nuclear explosive devices manufactured by South Africa, as well as the one acquired from Libya and Iraq from the dismantlement of their respective nuclear weapon program could serve as a basis for dismantlement of the nuclear weapons in the Middle East. In South Africa, the Agency, under the terms of the Pelindaba Treaty, the IAEA verified dismantlement and destruction of nuclear explosive devices manufactured by South Africa prior to the entry into force of the said Treaty. The dismantlement was done unilaterally by South Africa, but the IAEA verified it only after the former’s NPT safeguards agreement had entered into force.

The IAEA’s role did not only include verification of the inventory of nuclear material originating from the nuclear weapons program, but also confirming the historical production of nuclear material for the program as well. IAEA verification also extended to the dismantlement of nuclear weapons related infrastructure. Some dual use equipment was also subject to long term monitoring by the IAEA. For its part, South Africa implemented a policy of transparency by granting additional access to relevant sites, equipment and people upon request by the IAEA. These transparency visits continued several years afterwards as an additional measure to build confidence.

In the case of the IAEA verifying the dismantlement of the Iraqi nuclear program, the mandate of the IAEA was based on the resolutions of the UN Security Council. Verification of the voluntary dismantlement of the nuclear program of Libya was based on the NPT safeguards agreement and additional protocol. In all of the above cases, the expertise required, the sensitivity of information and material being handled, and prevention of proliferation, necessitated the IAEA teams being augmented by experts from the nuclear weapons states.

Methods and Procedures of Verification

The IAEA can conduct the verification and inspections jointly with the regional organization keeping in mind that the arrangements need to be made in such a way that each party can draw its conclusions independently. Routine and unannounced inspections, special inspections, and complementary access can be complemented with additional measures to build further confidence and remove any ambiguities. These could include, for example, challenge inspections, which can be triggered by treaty parties. Other confidence building measures could be publishing of nuclear material holdings, and inspection statements. Furthermore, the verification scheme could include monitoring of selected sites and capabilities to ensure that the dismantled nuclear weapons related capabilities are not reconstituted.

Organization in charge of the verification

Regional as well as multilateral support would be essential for successful implementation a WMDFZ treaty. A regional organization based on ABACC or Euratom models may not be sufficient since these organizations do not have the legal mandate to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, but are geared up to confirm the non-diversion of declared nuclear materials.

The system set up for the verification and monitoring of the dismantlement of the weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq provide some useful experiences. What exact permutation could be a viable solution for the verification of the treaty on WMDFZ in the Middle East is still to be defined. In earlier cases such as for Iraq, groups of experts in the all four fields of verification - nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery -, were reporting the results of their investigations and their conclusions to the commission (UNSCOM, and later to UNMOVIC).

Case of non-compliance

There are no specific criteria within the IAEA safeguards system to establish non-compliance. Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute requires the Director General to transmit to the IAEA Board of Governors all specific “non-compliance” reports made by the inspectors of the safeguards department. It is the for the Board, which is a political body, to find whether or not the non-compliance reported by the Secretariat does indeed constitute non-compliance under Article XII.C of the Statute, and the provisions of the CSA and, if so, when this needs to be reported to the Security Council. The Statute does again not spell out the criteria, which the Board should use to draw such conclusion. It is up to the Board’s discretion to conclude on the non-compliance of one of its member state.

Conclusion

The challenges ahead of the international community to establish a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East relies mainly on the political will and a sufficient degree of security in the region so that states no longer need to rely on WMD. Nevertheless the preparation of a road map to provide the baseline for such a Zone is needed and a number of experiences and knowledge acquired by several organizations over the years could be useful. For the IAEA, its detailed knowledge of the nuclear fuel cycle of the state’s party to the free zone, alongside its experience in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons program in South Africa, Libya and Iraq, could contribute to the establishment of a road map in preparation of a WMD free zone in the Middle East. Also other parties can support these efforts building capacities for the states and organizations of the region so that they have the necessary resources to implement the Treaty.