Modular Nuclear Reactors Can Meet Safe, Secure, and Proliferation Resistant Energy Demands

Just before Christmas, the U.S. Senate ratified the “New START” nuclear arms reduction treaty; this will enable not only U.S.-Russian cooperation in arms reductions and verification, but also cooperation in other areas that may ultimately be more important than the arms control measures themselves.

In early December, the U.S.-Russian agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation – known as a “123 Agreement” after the relevant section of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act – went into effect with little fanfare. The 123 Agreement enables cooperation particularly on nuclear energy and related projects that had previously been stymied.

New START and the 123 are important because with more than 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons, most of the world’s weapons-usable nuclear material, and the world’s longest experience in nuclear energy, the United States and Russia bear special responsibilities for strengthening global efforts to minimize the risks and maximize the benefits of the use of nuclear energy.

Today, 30 countries have operating nuclear power plants. Nuclear firms are building dozens of new nuclear reactors around the world, and dozens of countries are considering building nuclear reactors for the first time. Large new reactor construction programs are underway in China, India, and Russia, and new reactor construction is planned in the United States for the first time in decades.

In large part, this so-called “nuclear renaissance” has been forecast to be built with today’s large, highly-complex, 1-1.6 gigawatt-electric light-water nuclear reactors. However, given their cost and size, and concern about the accumulation of weapons-useable plutonium in spent nuclear fuel, these reactors are simply not suitable for many countries and regions around the world.

A new report from Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom and the Russian Research Center’s Kurchatov Institute suggests that smaller, modular, factory-built reactors could meet the energy needs of a large portion of the world’s population, without posing undue risks, and would be inherently simpler, safer, more secure, and more proliferation-resistant.

For nuclear energy to be available to a broader portion of the global population, world-wide collaboration will be required. Russia and the United States, working with other suppliers, should establish a multinational joint venture to provide an integrated “cradle-to-grave” nuclear service, providing: modular small and medium reactors; fuel for these facilities (which might be built into the reactors from the outset); expert operators to run these facilities safely; and removal of the reactors and spent fuel at the end of their lives.

Smaller, modular reactors are a potentially important part of the nuclear future because they could potentially reduce the risk of accidents, terrorism, and proliferation. However, there are many other risks from the existing nuclear complex that need to be managed.

As nuclear energy use spreads, making sure it is safe, secure, and used only for peaceful purposes will require a new global management framework. This should include new or strengthened institutions that can effectively accomplish agreed safety, security, and nonproliferation goals while respecting states’ interests in sovereignty and energy security.

Russia and the United States, working with other countries, should lead an international negotiation of effective global nuclear safety standards, binding on all participants. Improving safety will also require all states to: strengthen existing regulatory approaches, and establish effective nuclear regulation in “newcomer” states building their first nuclear power plants, to align with the global standard; build “reporting cultures” in which all staff are encouraged to report and resolve all problems that arise that could have an effect on safety; and commit to accepting IAEA-led peer reviews for major civilian facilities.

Leading nuclear states must also work together to forge effective global standards for nuclear security, building on agreements already in place, such as the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities, the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism, and the IAEA’s physical protection recommendations. Expanded exchange of international best practice and more comprehensive and detailed reporting on safety and security-related incidents is vital to this mission.

If, on the other hand, nuclear energy is pursued without such measures, the result could be both dangerous and inimical to the conditions necessary to achieve and sustain large-scale nuclear growth. Even a single catastrophe – whether a Chernobyl-scale accident, a successful sabotage (a “security Chernobyl”), or worse yet, a terrorist nuclear bomb – would severely undermine prospects for nuclear growth.

Success in pursuing the agenda outlined above would contribute to better prospects for peace and prosperity around the world. Success can only be achieved by Russia, the United States, and other countries working together. The US-Russian 123 agreement puts the necessary legal framework in place; START ratification will clear away the political barriers. The time to begin is now.