Nuclear Lessons

The Boston Globe Wednesday, October 27, 1999

Nuclear Lessons By Graham Allison

President John Kennedy would have appreciated the irony of the coincidence: The Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on the 37th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy's experience with nuclear danger in that confrontation led him to propose a ban on nuclear tests.

The clamor about the recent Senate actions leave concerned citizens confused as they try to distinguish between forest and trees in the nuclear landscape. For a reality check on the current debate, it is useful to recall lessons learned in the only nuclear crisis the world has experienced.

In October 1962, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev began sneaking shorter range nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba. American intelligence agencies discovered Khrushchev in the act, "with his pants down and his missiles showing."

Kennedy confronted Khrushchev eyeball to eyeball and demanded withdrawal of all Soviet missiles and imposed a naval blockade of Cuba.

Afterwards, he estimated the risk of war at the time as "between one out of three and even."

Khrushchev finally backed down, though not without secret American concessions, which become fully evident only in the new edition of "Essence of Decision."

The Cuban Missile Crisis proved to be a turning point in the Cold War. Having felt the burden of responsibility for decisions that might cause sudden death for tens of millions of their fellow citizens, Kennedy and Khrushchev each determined to find a better way.

In the year that followed, JFK halted American nuclear testing unilaterally, challenging the Soviets to equivalent action. He initiated negotiation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the precursor to the current Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; installed a hotline for direct negotiations; made non-proliferation a priority for American policy in a campaign that led to the Nonproliferation Treaty; and started up the steep path of arms control.

Lessons from that crisis for US nuclear policy today include the following:

* Remember the nuclear bottom line. The ultimate danger (for Americans) is that of nuclear explosions on American soil. A considered, rational choice by the Russians to launch weapons against the US is one possible path to this outcome that we must avoid. But other risks abound. Accidental launch, unauthorized launch, or misperceptions could all result in Russian warheads destroying Americans. Current conditions in Russia greatly magnify risks of accidental failure. Proposed American assistance to Russian early-warning systems as an inducement for amendments to the ABM treaty is a "twofer" that would provide information about missile launches from North Korea, and assure Russians that they are not being attacked.

* Recognize the increasing danger of "loose nukes." Terrorists or rogue states could surreptitiously deliver one or a half dozen nuclear weapons to attack American troops abroad or cities at home. The bombings of New York's World Trade Center and American troops' barracks in Saudi Arabia were not science fiction. Russia could become a Home Depot for weapons unless the US motivates more vigorous steps to consolidate and secure nuclear stockpiles. Here as elsewhere in a nonproliferation strategy, the surest defense is to stop proliferation at the source.

* Realize that defending America against attack by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction will require eternal, multi-layered vigilance. As the most open society in the world, America will remain most vulnerable to attacks, especially weapons delivered surreptitiously. In the real world of the next quarter century, dreams of an invulnerable America are fantasy-whether Ronald Reagan's vision of a Star Wars shield that would "render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" or UN resolutions to "eliminate all nuclear weapons from earth."

Anyone who doubts that terrorists could smuggle a nuclear warhead into New York City should note that they could always wrap it in a bale of marijuana.

A multi-pronged, multi-layered strategy to achieve these goals will reject both the unilateralists' enthusiasm for going it alone, and multilateralists' claims that treaties and agreements will suffice. Actions like the moratorium JFK announced in the aftermath of the missile crisis, and the treaty to limit nuclear tests he sought to negotiate, are strands in the web of strategy to contain the threat.

Advocates on both sides of the current debate need to lower the rhetoric and reconsider America's real interests. As JFK drew the central lesson of the missile crisis, a sound strategy for protecting America from nuclear attack must mobilize every weapon in our potential arsenal. This includes bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements not as alternatives to, but rather as complements of, US nuclear forces, US nuclear guarantees, American threats and inducements, and America's overall posture as the dominant military capacity in the world.

Graham Allison, director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, is coauthor of the revised "Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis."