The Politics of Saving the MX

The latest major twist in the 10-year saga of the MX missile took place last April 11 when the President's Commission on Strategic Forces—headed by General Brent Scowcroft (USA F Ret)—issued its report. The document, whose "approach" President Reagan has assured Congress he shares, represents the most recent attempt to find a formula for selling the M X to the public and on Capitol Hill. In this it may well succeed, for it is a shrewdly crafted political package designed to appeal to several different constituencies simultaneously But as a framework for thinking about the nearterm futureofU S strategic forces, the Scowcroft findings are far from compelling They seem to be a recipe for acquiring the MX, nothing more. The background to the Commission's formation is crucial to understanding its recommendations. Only six months ago, on November 22, 1982, President Reagan announced in a televised speech that he wanted to produce the M X and to deploy it in a new way. The missiles were to be housed in closely based silos—underground concrete shelters located so near to one another that, in the event of a Soviet attack, the effects from the explosions of the first incoming warheads would destroy those following This "fratricide," the theory went, would ensure the survival of a significant percentage of the M X "densepack "