Proliferation-Resistance (and Terror-Resistance) of Nuclear Energy Systems

at MIT for the "Systems Analysis of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" course

Matthew Bunn presented "proliferation-Resistance (and Terror-Resistance) of Nuclear Energy Systems at MIT for the "Systems Analysis of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" course. Dr. Bunn considered the following points in his presentation:

• Key issues are similar to those for PRA - system toocomplex to predict (and get probability data on) each sequence; unforeseen system interactions and commonmode failures particularly problematic
• In particular, predicting actions of intelligent adversaries extraordinarily difficult: assessors try to "brainstorm" all the possible attacks, but attackers may do something else
• Insiders particularly difficult to protect against: they know the system and its weaknesses (may be among assessors)
• Importance of realistic performance testing - does the system really protect, when faced with a credible adversary force (and/or insider) trying
• Assessment of absolute magnitude of vulnerability less reliable than identification of key areas for improvement