Remarks on the Report of the Defense Science Board 'Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technology'

Nonproliferation Education Center, Washington, DC 11 March 2014.

Niels Bohr, the noted Danish Nobel Laureate and physicist, once said: “Prediction is difficult, especially if it’s about the future”.

It is a message to remind us of the certainty of uncertainty, hence to acknowledge a little humility in forecasting what will happen ahead of our time. That said, knowing that there is no foolproof plan to chart outcomes, it remains very much within our control to take certain steps and actions that can make the future less uncertain and better managed its direction. The Task Force Assessment Report on Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technology by the Defense Science Board is quintessential in providing a forward-looking framework and recommendations to better prepare us to prevent and shape nuclear proliferation choices.

We live in a changing environment that has brought some big surprises and challenges. Who would have thought when Mohamed Bouazizi - in protest of police corruption and ill treatment - set himself on fire in Tunis, it would ignite the Arab Spring and provoke drastic changes to the political landscape of the Middle East, of which the tumultuous aftershocks are still reverberating today.

Similarly in nuclear non-proliferation, amidst much success, we have seen a few surprises and faced a number of disappointments. The trajectory of the IAEA’s safeguards evolution has shown that it was necessary to continuously adjust and adapt its traditional approach, both from an analytical as well as technological perspective. It also reveals the need to rethink certain traditional concepts, for instance on monitoring proliferation, given the greater ease and spread of nuclear know-how either through clandestine means; a proliferation state seeking a mutually beneficial cooperative arrangement with another state; or with the rise of technologically savvy states with requite means and ambition.  It should also be stressed that nuclear safeguards encompasses monitoring and verification, two different concepts with its own emphasis and objectives, but its combination is necessary in counter-proliferation work.

We also live in a world with shades of grey. This is true of nuclear technologies as well. The dual-use nature of enrichment and reprocessing has been at the heart of much debate and contention surrounding the right for a country to develop such technologies. The grey zone of sensitive technologies allows states to build on nuclear weapons capabilities. We also know that weapons of mass destruction programs are highly compartmentalized and closely held secrets of states. They are often developed parallel to civilian programs, which provide a cover to legitimize efforts for sensitive activities such as uranium enrichment. The true intent of a nuclear program could only be known to handful of people. Further complicating this picture is the subterfuge and stonewalling that IAEA inspectors often encounter in dealing with proliferation states.

The Task Force Report assesses future technologies necessary to support arms control and non-proliferation treaties and agreements within the broader context of addressing nuclear proliferation. It further suggests understanding monitoring and verification activities from a holistic perspective, and highlights the need for non-negotiated monitoring to supplement treaty monitoring. Much of the Report’s recommendations have direct relevance that impact on the IAEA’s work that is worth taking heed and careful study. With my limited time available at this presentation, I will restrict my comments to supplementing the report with some of my experiences on IAEA verification work (on the Libyan case) that bear testimony to some of the recommendations the Report makes.

When the Americans and British exposed Ghaddafi’s uranium enrichment program in 2003, it was a result of tedious and painstaking intelligence and monitoring work, which eventually lead to the abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction programs by Libya. Data tracking from various sources coupled by intelligence gathering and use of novel detection technologies were cornerstones in monitoring of the Libyan uranium enrichment program.

There are number of lessons we can draw from the Libyan case. First, the busting of Libya’s proliferation efforts was a result of tracing the activities of individuals, companies, government officials, and movements of nuclear and essential raw materials and equipment over a dozen countries. The monitoring of nuclear activities and equipment helped fill-in a picture that was emerging and send warning signals. Second, the findings also demonstrated that sensitive technologies – often low-grade technologies that passed below export controls - are available for proliferators from black markets, with collaboration from proliferating states. Third, an added dimension is the synergies and inter-connectedness that verification work brings that open up other avenues of potential concern, corroborate information, or provide a missing puzzle. Investigations into the Libyan case revealed that Iran – in spite of its November 2003 statements – had also received information and worked with the development of more advanced centrifuges. Further investigations also showed that these technologies had been offered by the A.Q Khan network to other states. The latter investigations remain incomplete.  Fourth, events in Libya highlighted the strength of cooperative arrangements in tackling counter-proliferation issues not only in the US, but also beyond its borders, notably with the UK.

There are additional lessons to draw from the Libyan case that also resonate within the report’s findings. Decisive actions after detection and exposure stopped Libya’s program at its early stages. Circumstances and the situation within Libya played a part as well in the final result. Each situation is different. In general though, when nuclear programs proceed further – examples in the cases of Iran and North Korea – they turn into wicked problems over time and become more difficult to stop, roll back or dismantle. A more expansive monitoring architecture that identifies signals can bring about early detection and open up more time and options to address potential proliferation cases from proceeding further. Another lesson to be drawn, as the report also points out, is the risk of a proliferation cascade particularly to neighboring countries when counter-proliferation fails. In the Middle East to-day, states in the region have, to varying degrees, indicated their aspirations for uranium enrichment quoting their rights under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the light of Iran’s nuclear program. This, in turn leads to another important observation made by the Board: the nuclear future will not be a linear extrapolation of the past. Each proliferation case has had its own features, and, thus, the remedy required is also different.

Where there is intelligence, there is also counter intelligence, concealment and deception. Proliferators learn from each other, and constantly re-adjust their approaches and circumvent non-proliferation rules such as countering export controls with indigenous production. Thus, one cannot win tomorrow’s wars with yesterday’s tools.

The report suggests improvements to administrative arrangements, and a investing in a variety of new tools. These are all fine, and essential for success. At the same time, standing at the end of the line, all findings are subject to assessment by the analysts. In that regard, the report would certainly benefit from more insights – its strengths and weaknesses - to the development and maintenance of cadres of analysts, and their supervisors, who process the information to a cohesive picture for the decision makers. The report that is in front of us provides the platform to review and turn needed recommendations to actions.