A Resilience Framework for Understanding Illicit Nuclear Procurement Networks

Abstract

Current approaches to global supply-side controls to curb the proliferation of nuclear dual-use goods and technologies fail to consider the mechanisms that drive non-state actors to adapt and innovate. Consequently, policymakers are left reacting to, rather than anticipating, new illicit procurement techniques and methods. This article proposes a new analytical framework based on the concept of resilience, which considers how illicit procurement networks change and adapt within environments characterized by risk and uncertainty. That is, how do internal and external drivers help to insulate or create vulnerabilities for procurement networks? Focusing on the causes and consequences of resilience offers a more dynamic and comprehensive picture of illicit procurement because the concept can account for how networks adapt to supply-side policies and vice versa. To further illustrate this framework, this article explores three cases of illicit nuclear procurement. Finally, the conclusion examines the possible implications for future global supply-side policies to control the spread of nuclear dual-use goods and technologies.