Q&A
Matthew Bunn, Assistant Director of the Science, Technology and Public Policy Program at the Belfer Center, is a lead author of a new report from the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), which calls for accelerating the U.S.-Russian cooperative effort to secure and account for potential bomb materials in the former Soviet Union. Bunn warns that the United States ought to put securing nuclear materials at the top of the U.S.-Russian agenda.
Q: What lesson should the United States take from the Russian submarine incident?
MB: The Kursk tragedy underscores the huge mismatch between Russia''s current resources and the enormous nuclear arsenal it is trying to maintain. A Navy that cannot keep up the capacity to rescue its sailors is a Navy that won''t be able to adequately protect its tens of tons of highly enriched uranium without U.S. help.
Q: The RANSAC report emphasizes that attempts to steal bomb material are still occurring. Can you describe a recent incident?
MB: As recently as 1998, there was a conspiracy among the workers at one of Russia''s largest nuclear weapons facilities to steal highly-enriched uranium. They were caught by Russian security agencies before the material left the plant, but the case was disturbing. Nothing could be more central to U.S. security than ensuring that such material, the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, does not fall into the hands of hostile states or terrorist groups.
Q: The report argues that this effort needs to go faster. Can you describe what''s needed?
MB: We recommend working with Russian experts to lay out a new strategic plan to get this job done as rapidly as possible, and then making the case to Congress for the extra money and people to carry it out. It''s not a large investment, probably in the range of a tenth of one percent of the defense budget for several years.
Q: What recommendations would you make to the next Administration to address these concerns?
MB: First of all, there needs to be a coordinated plan integrating the dozens of efforts now under way. In a previous report, I''ve laid out a first draft of such a plan, which would drastically reduce these threats over 57 years for a cost of $5-$8 billion. Secondly, the Administration needs to appoint a senior, full-time official, with direct access to the President, to carry this plan out.
Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union
(http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/ransacreport)
The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material
(http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/Nextwave)
(This interview was conducted by Miranda Daniloff in the Kennedy School''s News and Communications Office.)