Statement of Olli Heinonen before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

In my testimony, I will focus on the verification aspects of elements needed in a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran, which is being negotiated as a next stage to the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) concluded in Geneva on 24 November 2013 [1]. I base my remarks on the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and relevant UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, recent experiences from the implementation of the JPOA, and complemented with personal experience drawn additionally and in particular, from the IAEA verification activities in South Africa after its dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program, Libya, Syria and North Korea.

When we look at the lessons learned on nuclear proliferation cases of the last couple of decades, states have chosen to use undeclared nuclear materials at undeclared locations or facilities at declared sites to which the IAEA had not had full access. Proliferators also took advantage of weaknesses at the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle by exploiting the use of yellow cake for uranium conversion at undeclared facilities. In order to achieve their objectives, states often, in addition to secrecy, stalled, misled or obfuscated to buy time and delay the IAEA in its verification mission. Since 2002, we have experienced many of these adverse actions taken by Iran. Iran has not heeded to the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council [2], which have asked it, inter alia, to suspend all enrichment-related and heavy water-related activities, and to cooperate with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly with those which raise concerns on the military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program [3]. Both the implementation of the JPOA and the Framework on Cooperation [4] have generally proceeded well, but negotiations have also seen headwinds as reflected in Secretary Kerry’s op-ed on 1 July 2014 in the Washington Post on where Iran needs to be. Moreover, as the Iranian Ambassador’s recent letter to the IAEA demonstrates [5], Iran continues to challenge, inter alia, the Agency’s right and obligation to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations under the CSA, the legality of the IAEA Board resolutions, and the IAEA Secretariat’s practices in reporting its findings in its reports to the IAEA Board and the UN Security Council.

Due to the fact that Iran has been running parts of its nuclear first clandestinely and then without satisfactorily fulfilling its reporting obligations to the IAEA and disregarding UN Security Council resolutions, the onus of proof bears heavily on Iran to show that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful.

I have recently published with David Albright and Andrea Stricker [6] an analysis on principles, which the negotiators crafting the comprehensive final agreement should follow. Five fundamental principles are:

1. stable provisions;
2. a nuclear program meeting Iran’s practical needs;
3. effective verification;
4. adequate irreversibility of constrains, and
5. sufficient response time in case of violations.

I will highlight in the full text attached some details that should be included to a final agreement negotiated. I will note a need for possible additional UN Security Council resolutions, and points to bear in mind on future reporting of the IAEA on safeguards implementation in Iran.

[1] Communication dated 27 November 2013 received from the EU High Representative concerning the text of the Joint Plan of Action, IAEA, INFCIRC/855, 27 November 2013.

[2] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, 9 June 2010.

[3] The involvement of military institutes includes support to the acquisition of nuclear technology, building the nuclear infrastructure, and work related to acquisition of nuclear materials, nuclear source materials, and key raw materials, and production of single use nuclear equipment. Of concern is also work by these organizations related to neutron physics, neutron sources, high explosives, missile re-entry vehicle, which appear to have the characteristic of nuclear weapon development.

[4] Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation, GOV/INF/2013/14, IAEA,11 November 2013.

[5] Communication dated 4 June 2014 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran, IAEA, INFCIRC/866, 13 June 2014.

[6] D. Albright, O. Heinonen, and A. Stricker, “The Six’s” Guiding Principles in Negotiating with Iran, ISIS, 3 June 2014.

The full written testimony can be downloaded below.