The U.S. Intelligence Enterprise and the Role of Privatizing Intelligence

This paper was completed as part of the Recanati-Kaplan Foundation Fellowship

Introduction

To understand the US intelligence community and the seventeen components comprising it, one must study the collective as an enterprise that gathers intelligence, conducts all-source, non-policy prescriptive and objective analysis which it disseminates and briefs to policymakers.  The underlying force behind the intelligence enterprise consists of three parts; its workforce, the private firms that support that workforce through intelligence-driven contracts and the context upon which these two interplay.  Only then does the complexity of this arm of the national security apparatus come into focus.   

This paper offers a descriptive and a prescriptive narrative that provides context on the where we’ve been on the evolution of the government-industry relationship and postures on the where we must go to remedy the concerns outlined herein of this duality. As such, the paper highlights key succinct episodes of American history that shed light on the foundational elements of intelligence gathering through three phases; informal and singular relationships, quasi-governmental networks, and the transformation of the former to the modern commercial industry.  Throughout these stages, it becomes evident that the reliance of the US government on private entities grew during internal and foreign wars as did the blurred lines of who should do what and under whose authority. The primary underlying theme that emanates throughout the paper is the realization that while the National Security Act of 1947 was established to codify the loose threads of intelligence collection, especially after the failure of US intelligence to foresee the attack on Pearl Harbor; what has transpired is a return to the loosely governed intelligence structure emphasized yet again by a lack of demarcation of what does and does not constitute core governmental functions, limited oversight and accountability, decision-making authority and a pronounced outsource culture.  At no time in US history, the paper suggests, does this aspect of the government-private sector partnership get lost in translation than following the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the dizzying number of civil liberty and human rights violations accompanying it. 

Today, the cottage industry as it has become, outsourcing has shown its ugly face with serious lapses in responsible behavior.  Inversely,  any lapse in policymaking would be considered equally irresponsible.  While there is no doubt that as outsourcing continues to nourish and flourish private industry, there is likely to be less oversight because Congress is overwhelmed by the sheer enormity of privatized intelligence functions, not to mention longstanding issues facing congressional committees such as staffing shortages to conduct effective oversight. As such, noting this trend, the for-profit private industry will continue to reap the rewards of a policymaking establishment it considers weak.

The purpose of the paper is not to suggest that outsourcing has no place in the role of government; to the contrary, the paper argues the elements of these two spheres have morphed into this modern strand of DNA which cannot be undone but to the point, DNA functions within the confines of the right environment as should outsourcing under straightforward regulation. The privatization of intelligence cannot be allowed to function in a vacuum and inadequate oversight must be called out to avoid further exploitation by industry.

The author fears that this debate will resurface in the face of the subsequent crisis when both sides will seize another blame-game opportunity while leaving core issues unresolved. Consider then that the consequences could not be staring us down any harder if the call to privatize our current wars does take shape.