U.S. Security and Military Cooperation with the Countries of the South Caucasus: Successes and Shortcomings

Ashot Voskanian and Brenda Shaffer at the 13 May Caspian Studies/Black Sea Security Program panel on “U.S. Security and Military Cooperation with the Countries of the South Caucasus: Successes and Shortcomings.”

On May 13, 2003, Harvard’s Caspian Studies Program and Black Sea Security Program sponsored a panel at Harvard’s Kennedy School on “U.S. Security and Military Cooperation with the Countries of the South Caucasus: Successes and Shortcomings.” This panel featured high-level representatives from the ministries of foreign affairs in the three countries of the southern Caucasus:

• Ashot Voskanian,head of the Armenian Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Department
• Mamuka Kudava, director of the Georgian Foreign Ministry’s USA Department
• Elman Agayev,deputy chief of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry’s Security Affairs Department

Voskanian began his remarks by talking about the four main aspects of U.S.- Armenian security cooperation: (1) assistance in the war against terrorism; (2) U.S.- Armenian dialogue on additional security issues; (3) Armenian discussions with the United States about Iraq; and (4) U.S.- Armenian military coordination.

Voskanian said that Armenia has supported the U.S.-led campaign against international terrorism with both strong statements and concrete actions. He noted that Armenia has been vigilant in freezing bank accounts and controlling the transfer of funds to groups that are suspected of terrorism, has made measures to secure civil aviation in the region, and has conducted criminal investigations into people within Armenia who have suspected links to terrorist organizations. He indicated that these programs are expanding and that the United States has already acknowledged Armenia as “a country that is working to enhance international security.”

In terms of U.S.-Armenian dialogue on security issues, Voskanian explained that the two countries are in constant communication on four issues: (1) de-mining of territories in the Caucasus; (2) weapons nonproliferation; (3) maintaining civilian control over the military; and (4) joint cooperation on regional security issues.

In his discussion of Iraq, Voskanian noted that the recent war there represented a milestone for U.S.-Armenian relations. He reiterated Armenia’s support for the U.S. military campaign in Iraq but also expressed his country’s concerns about the postwar situation. Since Armenia is geographically close to Iraq, it is possible that postwar instability in Iraq could have a negative impact on Armenia. In addition, Voskanian explained, there is a substantial Armenian population within Iraq. Before Saddam rose to power, many members of Iraq’s Armenian community held important government positions, but Armenians became one of Iraq’s embattled minorities under Saddam’s authoritarian regime. The Iraqi government even targeted Armenian property and religious sites in the country, including the destruction of an Armenian Christian church in Basra. Ultimately, Voskanian explained, Armenia is pleased with the U.S. military success in Iraq and is eager to play a cooperative role in postwar reconstruction efforts.

Voskanian next talked about some of the more recent developments in bilateral and multilateral forms of U.S.- Armenian cooperation. Armenia, Voskanian noted, is an active participant in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) and has sent peacekeepers to Kosovo. In 2003, Armenia will be one of seventeen countries that will participate in Operation Collective Best Effort, a series of joint military exercises between NATO and PfP countries.

Voskanian closed by saying that Armenia does not believe regional security in the Caucasus should depend on total agreement on all security issues and that Armenia is actively searching for joint ventures that can improve the security of three countries of the southern Caucasus.

Kudava began his remarks by providing some recent historical background on the relationship between Georgia and the United States. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Kudava explained, the United States was primarily interested in Russia. Other former Soviet countries, including Georgia, were not at the center of U.S. attention. By the mid to late 1990s, Kudava indicated, U.S. and other Western policymakers were beginning to shift toward more multipolar and less Russia-centric policies in Eurasia. Two elements that brought more attention to the Caucasus region included energy development in the Caspian Sea and the Russian military campaign in Chechnya.

During Russia’s 1999 campaign in Chechnya, Kudava noted, Russia began to have discussions with Georgia about the effect of the Chechen war on both Russia and the Caucasus. Russia even asked to be allowed to enter Georgian territory when it became clear that both Chechen refugees and Chechen fighters were crossing the border into the Pankisi Gorge region in northeastern Georgia. Kudava explained that the presence of Chechen fighters in this region of Georgia was not because of the Georgian government’s support for these groups, but due more to the weakness of Georgian military and political institutions and its inability to seal the border.

In 2000, Washington told Moscow that it recognized that Georgia would need to make more of an effort to deal with the security situation in the Pankisi Gorge but would not tolerate the Russian military crossing into Georgian territory. Kudava said that since the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, however, the focus of these discussions about Chechnya and the Pankisi Gorge have shifted. The Georgian government still steadfastly maintains that it does not support Chechen fighters or any Islamist-oriented terrorist organizations but also acknowledged both Russian and U.S. concerns that it needed to do more to control the Pankisi Gorge region. In April 2002, the U.S. government began supporting the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), which represented the first deployment of U.S. military personnel in Georgia. Kudava credited the success of the GTEP in helping train the Georgian military in border security and counterterrorism and said that due to the success of this program, there are currently no Chechen fighters in the Pankisi Gorge region.

In his closing remarks, Kudava noted that Georgia supported the U.S. campaign in Iraq as part of its understanding of the need to develop a pragmatic, reciprocal security relationship with the United States.

Agayev began his comments by noting that the United States understands the important role Azerbaijan can play in helping to maintain security in the Caucasus region. The main three cornerstones of the U.S.-Azerbaijani relationship, Agayev explained are (1) enhancing security in the Caucasus and in its bordering regions; (2) the development of Caspian Sea hydrocarbon resources; and (3) supporting the development of the rule of law in this region, which serves as a bridge between Europe and Asia.

Despite the strong relationship between Washington and Baku, Agayev noted that there was one significant problem that has hindered the development of stronger relations between Azerbaijan and the United States. The U.S. Congress’ inclusion of Section 907 sanctions in the 1992 Freedom Support Act has meant that the United States has been limited in the type of security assistance that it could provide to Azerbaijan. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations, Agayev noted, have worked for the repeal of the Section 907 sanctions. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. policymakers realized that they could not ignore Azerbaijan and its possible contributions to the war against international terrorism. Consequently, Section 907 sanctions have been temporarily suspended over the last two years.

Agayev mentioned that since the suspension of the Section 907 sanctions, Azerbaijan has made significant contributions to combating terrorism. It has conducted investigations into terrorist organizations in Azerbaijan and has already made several important arrests—including the recent detention of a group of individuals with links to the Hizb-ut Tahrir organization. Agayev also explained that Azerbaijan has taken steps to strengthen its own antiterrorism laws and has cooperated with the United States on issues such as the tracking of terrorist financing and freezing terrorist-linked bank accounts.

Agayev indicated that Azerbaijan supported the United States in its campaign against Iraq. Azerbaijan has taken this stance not only because of the threat Iraq could have posed with weapons of mass destruction but also because of Baghdad’s consistent flouting of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. Agayev said Azerbaijan hopes that the current UNSC mechanism—which requires unanimity in dealing with serious security problems— will be amended. The absence of UNSC member consensus on any given security concern often means that the issue is not addressed by the international community. Agayev indicated that the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has fallen into this category, since the UN Security Council members have not agreed on a way to move forward toward resolving the conflict, very little progress has been made over the last decade.

Q & A

Q: Mr. Voskanian, can you tell us more about Armenia’s relationship with Iran?

Voskanian: Armenia does have close relations with Iran, but we do not engage in any form of military cooperation. Armenia’s cooperation with Iran is determined by geography. Two of our country’s four neighbors—Azerbaijan and Turkey—have established an effective blockade of trade on Armenia’s western and eastern boundaries. We do have some trade with Georgia to the north, but this trade relationship is not entirely stable due to regional separatism and lack of infrastructure in Georgia. Consequently, Armenia is essentially compelled to work with Iran in order to survive.

[Dr. Brenda Shaffer, acting as chair, noted that Iranian Chief of Staff Shmakhani had recently visited Yerevan and that, according to the Armenian press, the two sides had signed an agreement for military cooperation. Also, two Armenian companies are under U.S. sanctions as part of the Iran nonproliferation act due to cooperation that could advance Iranian WMD programs.]

Q: How will the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline affect security in the Caucasus?

Agayev: The development of hydrocarbon resources will have a positive effect on the Caucasus region. It will definitely help Azerbaijan and Georgia. 

Kudava: The BTC Pipeline is very important from Georgia’s perspective. It should be noted that the Caspian Sea is expected to have only four percent of the world’s oil reserves, compared to twenty-five percent in Saudi Arabia, eleven percent in Kuwait, etc. So the main reason behind the development of Caspian oil is to help diversify energy sources rather than expect them to replace other existing sources.

Voskanian: Armenia has a calm attitude toward the BTC Pipeline. If it helps promote positive economic development in the region, it is possible that it will also have a positive effect on Armenia as well. However, we do not want U.S. policymakers to assume that one pipeline will provide the solution to the many different problems in the Caucasus.

Please note that this is a summary of the event and not a transcript.

Summary by John Grennan, Caspian Studies Program

Photograph by Jeanie Barnett