Walking Away Means Losing the Peace: The Pentagon is Wrong

by John G. Ruggie
March 12, 2002
Reprinted from the International Herald Tribune

The Pentagon is threatening to lose the peace in Afghanistan even before
the war is fully won. Its opposition is blocking expansion of the
International Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul and a corresponding
increase in its 4,500-troop strength. Both measures are desperately
sought by the interim government of Hamid Karzai and supported by
America''s allies.

Even some warlords prefer an expanded international force, figuring that
their own political future as regional players in the country would be
better secured by a stable central government than by continued
factional fighting.

The analysis informing the Pentagon''s opposition is flawed. It cites the
ill-fated experience of 100,000 heavily armed Soviet troops in Afghanistan
and the well-known antipathy of the Afghan people toward foreign
intervention to argue that no international force of any realistically
achievable magnitude has a chance of controlling Afghanistan. Therefore,
the U.S. military insists, the only viable solution is an indigenous Afghan
army.

In the long run that is everyone''s preferred solution. But such an army
cannot be wished into existence. It will take at least two years for it to
materialize fully. And it will never materialize if the central government
does not manage to sustain itself and extend its reach to the provinces.
For that it needs an expanded international force.

Moreover, the analogy with the Soviet occupation is misplaced. Not only
are the Afghans themselves clamoring for this international force, but its
objective would be radically different from the Soviets'': to assist the new
government by deterring serious acts of banditry and factional violence,
not to impose alien rule on the country.

The security vacuum grows worse daily, encouraging warlordism and
meddling by Afghanistan''s neighbors, while impeding delivery of
humanitarian assistance and preventing the crucial job of economic
reconstruction. Down the road, it offers renewed opportunities for the
Taliban to regroup.

Even the existing international force in Kabul will unravel by the end of
April when the British terminate their command of it and draw down their
contingent to a few hundred. With the future of the force in doubt, no
one else is eager to step in and take over.

In effect, letting the Pentagon prevail would mean that the United States
is, after all, abandoning Afghanistan, despite repeated promises to the
contrary by President George W. Bush and other senior administration
officials.

The administration should support a UN Security Council resolution
authorizing a coalition of the willing to form an expanded international
force. Turkey, Malaysia, Jordan, Bangladesh and other Muslim countries
appear willing to participate and so do some Western countries. Canada
might be persuaded to play a leadership role.

This force should be deployed in the major urban areas beyond Kabul, and
patrol the main roads between them. The rules of engagement should be
quite robust, unlike traditional UN peacekeeping shoot back quickly and
decisively, and take preemptive action where required.

American ground troops need not participate, but the United States must
provide support in three critical areas: intelligence, for early warning of
impending trouble and targeting information; logistics, to maximize the
mobility and effectiveness of the force; and air cover, to help deter or
stop serious attacks by would-be spoilers.

The alternative is too grim to contemplate, and time is running out.
Neither Afghanistan nor the United States can afford to allow the
Pentagon''s exaggerated fears of a quagmire to undermine victory.

John Ruggie, a former assistant secretary-general of the United Nations, is
a professor of international affairs at Harvard''s Kennedy School of
Government. He contributed this comment to the International Herald
Tribune.