Article
from The New York Times

Why Say NO to 1,500 Warheads?

The centerpiece of next month's superpower summit meeting is to be the signing of a treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces. The public and Congressional debate about ratifying the treaty will greatly influence future arms control efforts and our relations with Europe and the Soviet Union. While informed opinions on the merits of the treaty differ, a few basic considerations can help guide the debate.

Any assessment that considers only the effects on American forces and ignores the effects on Soviet forces will conclude that the agreement is not in our interest.

Critics of the agreement typically focus on its elimination of about 350 American nuclear warheads on Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and on ground-launched cruise missiles. But they gloss over the required dismantling of more than 1,500 Soviet warheads, and generally forget that British and French nuclear weapons that can strike the Soviet homeland are not affected by the accord.

Imagine that the terms were reversed - that America was trading away more than 1,500 warheads for about 350 on the Soviet side, while permitting Moscow's allies to keep and even expand their own nuclear arsenals, which threaten our territory. No President could expect this deal to be acceptable to the Senate, American people and our allies.

We will have to measure the benefits and costs of the treaty in different ways. There will be implications for the military balance, cohesion of the Atlantic alliance, arms control, American-Soviet relations and domestic politics.

Dismantling our intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe would have little military effect. The West would retain more than 4,000 nuclear weapons on the Continent. All targets vulnerable to attack by intermediate-range missiles would also remain vulnerable to attack by other North Atlantic Treaty Organization arms.

Indeed, because the more than 500 Soviet missiles eliminated by the accord need no longer be targeted by NATO, the pact effectively ''destroys'' more Soviet targets than could possibly have been attacked by the 350 warheads offered in trade.

As for alliance cohesion, claims that the treaty would decouple America from its European allies are exaggerations. Many ties bind us; Pershing 2's and ground-launched cruise missiles are only two threads in this complex web. At the heart of the alliance lie common values, interests, commitments and trust. The Administration's careless diplomacy in dealing with arms control negotiations has had significant negative consequences in Europe, but the ratification process can repair that damage. The treaty sets significant arms control precedents. These include eliminating an entire category of modern weapons in which both sides have made major economic and political investments, imposing asymmetric reductions to achieve an equitable end result, establishing strict and intrusive verification provisions, and demonstrating that ''arming to parlay'' can be a successful strategy.

Concluding this agreement would demonstrate to both governments that they can deal productively with each other. This could set the stage for further cooperation. America's credibility can only be strengthened by our demonstrated willingness to take ''da'' for an answer to our own proposal to eliminate intermediate-range weapons.

President Reagan's signing of the deal would go a long way in again legitimizing arms control as a means of enhancing national security. Proponents of arms control should applaud his apparent conversion.

The elimination of intermediate-range forces carries important implications for conventional forces, battlefield nuclear weapons and some strategic forces. Concluding the accord would focus attention on shortcomings in these other segments of the military balance. Thus, the treaty may provide an opportunity for movement on such pressing problems as the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe.

While the deal amounts to less than many advocates claim, it would remove the threat posed by more than 1,500 Soviet nuclear warheads. That seems clearly worth doing.

Recommended citation

Allison, Graham. “Why Say NO to 1,500 Warheads?.” The New York Times, November 15, 1987