What Comes Next? Iran Through a Middle Powers Lens

UAE

As the conflict radiates across the Middle East, Iran confronts a narrowing strategic space. What may have begun as calibrated escalation now risks evolving into a broader regional confrontation. For United Arab Emirates (UAE), the central question is no longer whether instability can be avoided entirely, but how its scope can be contained while reinforcing deterrence and safeguarding sovereignty.

From an energy perspective, instability around the Strait of Hormuz places global supply chains and price stability within a single risk envelope. The Gulf’s role as a primary energy artery means that maritime threats translate rapidly into international economic consequences. For the UAE, energy security therefore becomes inseparable from national security. Ensuring redundancy in export routes, strengthening maritime coordination, and maintaining operational continuity are not merely defensive steps; they serve as instruments of strategic signaling that Gulf infrastructure will not be easily coerced.

Trade and connectivity represent a second-order but equally critical dimension. As a logistics and re-export hub linking Asia, Europe, and Africa, the UAE has a vested interest in preventing conflict from disrupting regional corridors. Prolonged escalation would increase insurance costs, distort freight routes, and deter investment. Middle powers thus face a dual imperative: shield economic networks from systemic shock while coordinating diplomatically to prevent further militarization of trade routes.

The defense and intelligence domains illustrate a visible recalibration. Sustained missile and drone activity across the region has underscored the importance of integrated air and missile defense, early warning interoperability, and intelligence fusion. Deterrence is no longer defined solely by capability, but by clarity. Clear red lines, communicated both publicly and privately, reduce the probability of miscalculation in compressed decision cycles.

The structural weakness in Iran’s strategy lies in its underlying assumptions. At its core, Tehran appears to calculate that Gulf actors lack the resilience to withstand military coercion and that striking them would induce pressure on the United States to restrain its actions. However, should Gulf states choose to break this assumption and demonstrate readiness to escalate militarily in response to Iranian attacks, the strategic equation alters significantly.

Emerging signals suggest that this dynamic may already be unfolding. Iran’s relative hesitation to maintain a high tempo of strikes following Gulf dissatisfaction and indications of potential military activation points to an awareness of escalation risks. Tehran must weigh the consequences of internationalizing the confrontation. A broadened conflict could expose Iran to a coordinated military response involving a wider coalition. The addition of hundreds of advanced Gulf aircraft to existing American and Israeli capabilities would substantially complicate Iran’s escalation calculus.

Looking ahead, the most probable trajectory is a precarious equilibrium characterized by calibrated pressure and calibrated restraint. Yet the risk of miscalculation remains acute. For UAE, the objective is not confrontation, but the preservation of strategic agency. Resilience demonstrated economically, militarily, and diplomatically, may ultimately prove more decisive than coercion in shaping the region’s next phase.

Turkey

Turkey’s immediate policy response to the recent escalation of conflict involving Iran can best be described as cautious strategic hedging, reflecting Ankara’s effort to avoid direct alignment with either the Israeli and U.S. position or that of Tehran. Turkish officials publicly condemned Israeli strikes as destabilizing and unlawful, called for immediate de-escalation and restraint by all parties, and signaled their readiness to facilitate diplomatic channels, including the possibility of mediation. This calibrated response is consistent with Ankara’s broader crisis diplomacy, which seeks to preserve strategic flexibility while avoiding entanglement in regional escalation.

This cautious stance is closely tied to the potential implications of a prolonged conflict for Turkey. While Ankara may derive certain strategic advantages from a weakened Iran, given that Tehran has long been a regional competitor across multiple conflict theaters including Syria, Iraq, and the South Caucasus, and that diminished Iranian influence could enhance Turkey’s position as a pivotal regional actor, significant destabilization or the potential collapse of the Iranian regime would carry substantial risks.

Energy dependence is one such vulnerability. Iran accounts for roughly 13 to 14 percent of Turkey’s natural gas imports, and sustained conflict in the region would likely generate further spikes in global oil and gas prices. Such developments would feed directly into Turkey’s already fragile macroeconomic environment, widening the current account deficit, which stood at 25.2 billion USD in 2025, and further exacerbating inflationary pressures.

Security and humanitarian concerns are equally pressing. A deepening conflict or internal collapse in Iran could trigger a large-scale humanitarian crisis, increasing migratory pressures along Turkey’s 534-kilometer eastern border with Iran. This prospect is particularly sensitive given that Turkey continues to host around two million Syrian refugees, and domestic tolerance for additional refugee inflows remains limited. Turkish authorities have already begun reinforcing the eastern border with additional barriers and surveillance systems to deter irregular crossings.

Perhaps the most consequential long-term risk concerns the Kurdish question. In the event of fragmentation within Iran, a weakening of state authority in the country’s Kurdish regions could create space for PKK-linked Kurdish political and military actors to expand their operational reach. Such a scenario would raise the specter of a broader cross-border Kurdish security challenge and could force Turkey into deeper and more prolonged military engagement beyond its borders.

Finally, a destabilized Iran could intensify regional geopolitical rivalries. In particular, it could sharpen strategic competition between Turkey and Israel at a moment when Ankara increasingly fears the consolidation of an Israeli-led regional order that marginalizes Turkish influence.

For Ankara, therefore, the objective is not the weakening of Iran in itself but the avoidance of a destabilizing regional vacuum, one that could ultimately prove far more threatening to Turkey’s security, economic stability, and geopolitical standing than the fragile equilibrium it currently seeks to preserve.

Located on the outskirts of the Middle East, Kazakhstan is directly affected by the ongoing hostilities and is deeply worried about their consequences. Kazakhstan is evacuating its citizens from the region, while its businesses are suspending transportation of agricultural and other goods to Iran and the Gulf countries. The war is ushering in an uncertain future pregnant with significant risks for Central Asia. Nobody can predict what will happen to Iran, but it is not hard to imagine scenarios featuring destabilization, waves of refugees, and smuggling of weapons, oil, and fissile material by criminal groups. 

The war is also putting a shadow on the opportunities that Kazakhstan has been investing in. Geographically, Iran provides the shortest route to the open seas, optimal for trading with the Gulf countries, with which Kazakhstan has developed strong economic and political ties. With the Northern corridor via Russia constrained by the war in Ukraine, and the Southern corridor via Iran at risk, travel and trade across the Eurasian continent is limited to a sliver in the middle – the so-called Middle Corridor, connecting China, Central Asia (Kazakhstan being the lynchpin), the South Caucasus, and Europe. The route is under development, but it is challenging and vulnerable.

Iran, a perennial thorn in the back of its Arab neighbors and Israel, has been a friendly partner for Central Asian countries since the early days of their independence. It helped end the civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990s, and played a constructive role in negotiations on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Although the great potential of Kazakhstan-Iran bilateral trade and investment was constrained by the U.S. sanctions, the two sides never gave up their efforts. Not long before the war, in December 2025, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Kazakhstan and signed agreements aimed at enhancing cooperation, most notably in transport, transit, and logistics. They confirmed the plans to double freight volumes on the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway by 2030 and build a dedicated terminal near Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf. 

Another important aspect of Kazakhstan-Iran cooperation is nuclear non-proliferation. In 2013, Kazakhstan hosted talks between Iran and six world powers (P5+1). In 2017, Kazakhstan opened an International Atomic Energy Agency Low-Enriched Uranium Bank, designed to provide countries, such as Iran, with an alternative source of nuclear fuel material for peaceful purposes (rather than them pursuing sensitive uranium enrichment technology domestically). The choice of Kazakhstan as the host of the bank took into account not only its impeccable non-proliferation credentials, but also its status as a developing, Muslim country, with good relations with Iran. The Kazakh leadership had supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (informally known as Iran Nuclear Deal) till its collapse in 2016.

As in the case of the Russia-Ukraine war, Kazakhstan has well established partnerships with all the parties to the conflict – Iran, Israel, the United States, and the Gulf countries, and it does its best to maintain neutrality, while calling for de-escalation. President Tokayev sent messages of support to the “brotherly people” of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Jordan, and held telephone conversations with the Amir of Qatar, the President of the UAE, and the Sultan of Oman. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement expressing condolences to the people of Iran over the loss of civilian lives, including children, as well as members of the senior leadership of the Islamic Republic. Notably, it emphasized the importance of preserving humanity in times of armed conflict. In 2024, together with Brazil, China, France, Jordan, and South Africa, Kazakhstan launched the Global Initiative to Strengthen Political Commitment to International Humanitarian Law. 

Given its position, Kazakhstan could play a role in reducing tensions in the Middle East. Earlier, President Tokayev joined both the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace. However, there are obvious limits to what it can do in the context of a crumbling international order and the disregard for international law. 

Brazil 

Brazil’s response to the expanding conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran reflects a familiar middle-power strategy: diplomatic caution, rhetorical defense of international law, and a focus on managing economic spillovers rather than shaping the conflict itself. It also reinforces the conviction that, in a highly turbulent and increasingly unpredictable geopolitical environment, hedging is the best way forward, involving both the diversification of partners in areas such as technology, trade and defense, as well as a stronger emphasis on developing domestic capacities.

The Brazilian government has condemned the US-Israeli attacks on Iran, stating that "the attacks occurred amid a negotiation process between the parties, which is the only viable path to peace, a position traditionally defended by Brazil in the region". At the same time, Brazil has avoided aligning itself with Iran politically or militarily, and the government has also expressed solidarity with Gulf countries affected by Iranian missile and drone strikes, signaling that it does not support attacks against regional states or civilian infrastructure. 

This approach reflects Brazil’s broader positioning within the Global South, where many countries have criticized the legality and destabilizing implications of the attacks, arguing that unilateral military action undermines international norms and increases the risk of wider regional conflict.

Economic considerations also shape Brazil’s posture. While the country has limited direct exposure to the Middle East conflict, energy markets represent a key transmission channel. Rising oil prices caused by instability around the Strait of Hormuz could influence inflation dynamics and monetary policy in Brazil. Government officials have warned that a prolonged conflict could shorten the country’s anticipated interest-rate-cutting cycle if higher energy prices feed into domestic inflation – a concern for president Lula, who is set to seek reelection in November.

At the same time, Brazil may benefit indirectly from the geopolitical shock. As a large oil producer outside the Middle East, Brazil is increasingly viewed by energy companies and investors as a stable alternative supplier. Major international firms have already pointed to the country’s geopolitical stability as an opportunity in a world of heightened energy insecurity. 

In short, Brazil is responding to the Iran crisis less as a security actor and more as a diplomatic and economic stakeholder—seeking to contain the geopolitical fallout while protecting its own economic stability and international credibility.

India 

India’s response to the US-Israel military campaign against Iran marks a subtle but definitive shift in its approach to the Middle East. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has tilted toward Israel and the Gulf Arabs and now faces vigorous domestic criticism for his silence on the US-Israeli assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, even as he extended solidarity to the Gulf states under a barrage of Iranian drones and missiles. Modi’s visit to Israel, just days before the attack on Iran began, his strong expression of solidarity with the Jewish people, and his government’s reaction since then suggest a conscious decision to reorient India’s Middle East policy.

India’s traditional policy rested on public support for Arab causes and the defence of the sovereignty of post-colonial states against Western hegemony and interventionism. It also involved a careful avoidance of taking sides in the region’s many inter-state conflicts. The normalization of ties with Israel in the early 1990s, Israel’s growing engagement with the Arab world, Delhi’s deepening energy and economic integration with the Gulf, and India’s expanding ties with the United States gradually produced greater balance in India’s regional diplomacy.

Delhi has now gone beyond that balance. Modi has been more open in translating the traditional goodwill for Israel within his party—the Bharatiya Jana Sangh—into concrete policy positions. This shift also reflects India’s expanding stakes in security, defense, and technological cooperation with Israel. On the Arab side, the Modi years have seen a dramatic transformation in ties with the Gulf kingdoms, especially the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The UAE, in particular, has emerged not only as a major bilateral partner but also as a regional collaborator. The formation of I2U2—a framework bringing together India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States—during the Joe Biden years signaled the new minilateral bonhomie. That coalition, especially the triangular cooperation between India, Israel, and the UAE, has now acquired a strategic dimension.

India’s current posture underlines the limited salience of Delhi’s ties with Tehran, despite earlier claims of carefully balancing relations among Iran, the Gulf Arabs, and the West. A Tehran at odds with itself, the region, and the wider world can hardly realize the many genuine synergies with India. As Delhi waits for a different Iran, it has chosen to bet on its expanding partnerships with Israel, the UAE, and the wider Gulf.

Pakistan

The fear in the Middle East was that an attack on Iran would spread the war to the entire region. This implies far greater damage across multiple countries, higher casualty numbers, and deeper and lasting geo-political implications. 

For Pakistan, a country that borders Iran, the conflict is unwelcome news for several reasons. It is already in active war with Afghanistan, its other neighbor, and has been conducting military strikes to deter the Taliban regime from supporting terrorist outfits operating against Pakistan from Afghan soil. It can ill-afford another restive border at the moment, which the Iran conflict promises to bring if the war drags and the Iranian state is unable to remain internally cohesive.

Pakistan is also a long-time partner of the Arab states in the Gulf and has signed a recent defense pact with Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Pakistan has the largest Shi'ite population outside Iran and has to be extremely careful not to stoke any sectarian sentiments by opposing Iran. Nor does it see a justified reason to take a position against Iran in the context of the present conflict. It does not want to get sucked into the Middle East conflict and continues to advocate restraint and an end to the war.

Finally, any outcome that weakens Iran and the Arab world vis-a-vis Israel will be a concern for Islamabad. The overwhelming majority in Pakistan see the US-Israeli military action as illegal and as being conducted at Israel’s behest to achieve precisely that outcome. Pakistani leaders have noted growing alignment between Israel and Pakistan's archrival India and talk about defense cooperation between the two with great concern. Many in Pakistan believe that the talk of ‘Greater Israel’ is real and that a strong, nuclear Pakistan will be seen as an obstacle to achieving that. They fear that India and Israel will collude to destabilize Pakistan once Israel's other regional challengers are neutralized.

Although unlikely, for Pakistan, a swift end to the Iran war with an outcome where Iran's sanctions are eased or lifted will be ideal as it will allow Pakistan to build critical trade and transit ties and an energy partnership with Iran that it has long desired and desperately needs.

Realistically, Iran’s immediate future will be extremely troubled.  The U.S. and Israel have promised use of massive military might and Tehran has signaled its intent to continue raising the cost of war for the region. If the war prolongs, the region will face significant damage and Iran will be debilitated. If the Iranian regime falls, a state collapse cannot be ruled out; if it survives, it will be severely weakened, even if it will be more popular at home for having stood up to the U.S. and Israel. Harsher sanctions are almost certain, forcing Iran to find new ways to run its economy. Whether China and Russia choose to support or sideline Tehran will heavily shape Iran’s political and economic future.

In addition, there is a clear mismatch between U.S. and Israeli objectives, and for now Israel’s goals seem to be prevailing. For Israel, the war is a means to eliminate the last major regional threat; an Iran ruled by a weakened, Israel-friendly government with no missile program or real military would be ideal. The U.S. may share this preference, but not at the cost of chaos in Iran and wider regional turbulence that unsettle Arab allies. If the war drags on, Washington could face growing pressure to put troops on the ground to achieve Israel’s objectives, something President Trump has so far resisted. Regardless, what is already clear is that the U.S. will leave this war with its credibility as a security provider to its Gulf partners significantly damaged and with its standing among Muslim populations of the region further dented. 

Singapore

Instability and conflict in the Middle East is a matter of concern for Singapore on several counts. First, the region remains a major supplier of oil and gas (LNG) to Singapore. Projected rises in energy prices as a result of the conflict might drive inflation in Singapore upwards, particularly in the event of closure of the Straits of Hormuz or shutdown (however temporary) of Qatari gas facilities.

Second, Singapore has been an ardent advocate of the US role as an offshore balancer in the Asia-Pacific region. It has long encouraged Washington’s focus on and commitment to the region. It follows then, that a shift of American attention and resources to the Middle East might affect Washington’s ability to play this role more decisively. It will hence have an impact on the strategic equation in the Asia-Pacific. 

Third, it is not at all clear that American foreign policy adventurism enjoys a reservoir of support among the population in Singapore. This is of course not to imply that Washington should bother about the views of the Singapore population when it comes to decisions of national consequence for the US. But it does reflect views of and receptivity towards the US not only in Singapore but in Southeast Asia writ large. 

As it stands, the Trump administration’s approach to tariffs has won it few friends in the region. The manner in which this war is being waged - without legal authority, for purposes of regime change (by force), and without a clear end in sight - will surely alienate Southeast Asians further. To be sure, President Trump will eventually claim victory whatever that looks like in the end, and few are shedding any tears for the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But as the war drags on as it almost certainly will, it will cost the US not just materially and the loss of lives, but also broad public opinion at home and abroad.

Vietnam

Co-authored by Huynh Trung Dung 

The recent U.S.–Israeli assault on Iran marks a rupture in the regional order that no middle power can afford to ignore. For Vietnam, long practiced in strategic equidistance, this is a stress test of whether its Bamboo Diplomacy can hold in a more turbulent and violent world.

The assault has immediate economic and strategic implications. Any disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, together with shipping rerouting away from the Suez or Red Sea corridors, would raise logistics costs for a highly trade-dependent economy like Vietnam. Higher oil and gas prices would quickly transmit into production and transport costs, intensifying inflation and complicating Hanoi’s ambitions of 10% growth target for this year. Vietnam must also be prepared to protect Vietnamese citizens in Iran and, if conditions deteriorate, facilitate evacuation. Similar contingency planning applies to roughly 10,000 Vietnamese workers in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait. Strategically, Hanoi will study how escalation ladders form, how deterrence fails, and how drones, precision strikes, and attacks on civilian infrastructure shape coercion—lessons that matter for Vietnam’s own risk environment, including the South China Sea.

Vietnam’s response is shaped by a multi-directional, diversified, and proactively integrative foreign policy. Although only one of Vietnam’s current 25 strategic partners comes from the Middle East (Kuwait), Hanoi has cultivated workable relations across the region: historical ties with Iran (since 1973) and Iraq, a growing partnership with Israel, traditional support for Palestine, and expanding ties with Gulf Cooperation Council states, notably in energy, logistics, labor, and digital sectors. 

That breadth, however, sharpens Hanoi’s dilemma when the region polarizes. On the one hand, Vietnam’s historical relationship with Iran and traditional partners (like Russia, China, North Korea or Cuba) shape its political options. Vietnam also anchors its diplomacy in international law and UN Charter principles—especially non-use of force and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity—reflecting its own history of being invaded and attacked by large powers. From this vantage point, unprovoked strikes and the killing of hundreds of political leaders and civilians are difficult to accept.

On the other hand, Vietnam has accelerated ties with the United States, upgrading relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, its highest diplomatic tier. General Secretary Tô Lâm’s visit to Washington, D.C. just ten days ago—including participation in the Gaza Board of Peace initiated by U.S. President and a bilateral meeting at the White House—created a channel to discuss U.S. priorities with direct concerns for Vietnam, including tariffs and trade imbalance. Economically, the United States remains Vietnam’s leading export market and a major partner in technology, investment, and education; geopolitically, U.S. presence in Southeast Asia helps balance China’s dominance.

Israel adds another layer in calculation. Vietnam has deepened cooperation with Israel in technology and defense, particularly as Vietnam’s traditional reliance on Russian military assets faces sanctions-related frictions.

As a result, Vietnam’s public statements reflect calibrated neutrality and principled consistency. On February 28, Hanoi called on “all relevant parties to exercise maximum restraint, immediately cease escalatory actions, protect civilians and essential infrastructure.” On March 3, it sharpened its stance by opposing “the use of force against sovereign states, especially against civilian infrastructure, which results in the deaths of many civilians,” and urging parties to comply strictly with international law and the UN Charter and to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In short, Vietnam will sustain Bamboo Diplomacy while tightening practical guardrails: economic shock planning and careful management of exposure to sanctions and reputational risk. Hanoi’s strategic objective remains constant: protect strategic autonomy, preserve economic resilience, and defend an international-law-based stance.