What's Next for Iran

Questions Over U.S. Objectives in Iran Highlight the Risks of Entering War Without Strategic Clarity

In warfare, strategy can be defined as the application of military means to achieve political objectives. If those political ends are ambiguous success is compromised. This seems to be the situation in the current United States policy toward Iran. What is the end game? Is it further elimination of Iran’s nuclear capabilities; reduction of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities; dismantlement of the “Axis of Resistance;” regime change. Or is it all of the above? Could these goals have been achieved through coherent and sustained diplomacy? Was the United States under imminent threat that it had to resort to war? In this case, are the national security considerations of the United States as a global power identical with those of Israel and, specifically, the current Prime Minister of Israel? These are all legitimate questions.

What is needed is strategic clarity. We have entered the fog of war and one can only hope that it will end quickly. But hope is not a policy. Much is at stake. Lives are at stake and the security, political, economic, energy, and humanitarian interests of our partners in the Middle East region and beyond are affected directly.

If the real objective is regime change, the question arises immediately of means and ends. There is a high risk of American casualties, depletion of military supplies, destabilization in the region. The history of United States involvement in regime change is not illustrious—For example, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya. Does the United States have the means to affect regime change for the better in Iran through military force alone or will it entail involvement on the ground? A highly questionable option that has led us into endless wars.

The Iranian regime of Vilayet al Fiqh—rule by the Islamist Jurist, has inflicted much pain on the Iranian people and the Middle East region and has targeted the United States and American lives since its inception in 1979. A new regime in Iran would be welcome, but that has to be the choice and action of the Iranian people and not imposed from outside. The deceased Ayatollah Khamenei put into place a succession scenario that is being carried out. Ideally, if there were a general uprising of the Iranian people they would have the opportunity to choose new leaders. Negatively, there may come to power more hardline leaders or, alternatively, more pragmatic elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who may pursue less extreme and non-ideological polices. This is all speculative but political change must come from within.

The United States as a global power has a major responsibility for the promotion of peace, security, stability and prosperity in the world. It should pursue its national security interests in this overall context taking into consideration its unique geopolitical position. In celebrating the Semi-quincentennial anniversary of our Republic, let us heed the words of one of our early presidents, John Quincy Adams who in 1823 stated, “We are friends of liberty all over the world; but we do not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”

The Costs of War

Throughout history, those who start wars minimize the costs. Initial over-optimism about a “short and decisive campaign” typically leads to a rosy assumption that costs will be limited. Public debate prior to a conflict focuses on threats, urgency, and patriotism. Planning for how to pay for the war or care for casualties is politically unappealing (and tedious) since it might jeopardize public support. Moreover, elected officials focus on the short-term, while the budgetary consequences of war extend for generations. All these incentives mean that costs get brushed aside in the rush toward military action. 

The current conflict with Iran is conforming to this pattern. The U.S. has already spent at least $5 billion over the past year on related operations alone. The short Operation “Rough Rider” against Iranian-aligned Houthi forces last May cost between $2.7 and $4 billion. A significant portion came from moving Patriot air defense systems from the Pacific to the Middle East using C-17 transport aircraft and using expensive missiles to shoot down much cheaper Iranian-supplied drones. And three F/A-18 Super Hornets ($70 million apiece) fell off the Truman carrier into the sea. Then came Operation “Midnight Hammer,” which cost a further $2.0–$2.2 billion in June. U.S. forces fired about 150 THAAD missile interceptors defending Israel from incoming Iranian missiles—at least 20 percent of our total inventory. 

Even if the fighting in Iran lasts only a few weeks, the long-term cost easily run into trillions of dollars.  Preparations for “Epic Fury” included at least $1-$2 billion for costs such as deploying, outfitting, and stationing two carrier strike groups in position over the past several weeks (at $9 million per day), as well as deploying anti-missile systems like the Patriot, Standard Missiles, and THAAD. The Institute for Policy Studies estimates that these operations cost the US $59million per day. 

Right now, the US is using up expensive munitions, rockets, equipment and fuel, and manufacturers will demand a premium to expedite.  To date, these costs have been funded largely from a $150 billion supplemental appropriations that Congress passed by a narrow margin last month.  I expect that in the next few days, President Trump and Speaker Mike Johnson will request an  “emergency” appropriations of upwards of $40 billion to replenish stocks, buy more missiles and sustain operations.  “Emergency” money is supposed to be used for events like hurricanes and wildfires.  But it is convenient for the defense department because it has few strings attached and goes mostly into the Pentagon’s most flexible “Operations & Maintenance” account. This makes it easy to pay military contractors, who now comprise half the military budget.  The US funded ten years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan (2001-2011) using this exact mechanism. 

The much bigger financial consequences will come  from the likely huge increase in the Pentagon’s $840 billion base budget.  The President has already called for a 50% increase -- asking Congress to pass a $1.5 trillion budget for the “Department of War”.   The backdrop of a live war in Iran  will allow the President to argue that he needs the money to replenish stockpiles and “support our troops.” 

It is likely that under the current circumstances, the majority in Congress will set aside concerns about the Pentagon (for example, the fact that the department has flunked 8 audits in a row) and approve a much higher increase to the DoD base budget than it  would have enacted in the absence of war in Iran.  This will, over time, embed trillions of dollars into the core annual US spending. Even assuming Congress approves only $100 billion more in defense spending than it otherwise would have, the cumulative cost attributable to the conflict will comfortably exceed $1 trillion over the coming decade.

All this spending will be financed through increased borrowing – which transfers the full cost plus interest to future generations (our current students and children).  Previous US wars (dating back to the War of 1812) were financed partly through higher taxes, so the country paid the cost while fighting.  Presidents Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman, and Johnson called on the nation to  “pay as we go”  (as Truman put it when raising top marginal taxes to 92% during the Korean War).  Lyndon Johnson’s imposed a tax surcharge to pay for Vietnam, lamenting,  “I have to figure out how to pay for this f—king war.”   

That approach ended after 2001, when President George W. Bush cut taxes twice as the US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq.  President Trump has reduced taxes further and there is no appetite in Congress to raise additional revenue to finance the war with Iran. 

History shows that these secondary effects—not the initial combat operations—drive the largest financial consequences.  The long-term cost of the Iran war will be a familiar pattern: rising defense budgets, additional borrowing, and decades of interest payments layered onto out existing obligations, including $7.3 trillion in unfunded disability benefits we owe to US veterans from previous wars.  Debt held by the public now stands at about $31 trillion compared with less than $4 trillion when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. Interest payments now consume over 14 percent of the federal budget.  The military and economic outcomes of this conflict may be hard to predict. But the financial burden is sure to rise steeply and to cause serious long-term financial harm to the nation. 

Iran's Domestic Political Order

What happens next as a result of the current conflict could lead to three distinct outcomes in terms of Iran’s domestic political order, and each would carry different implications for both Iranian domestic politics and foreign policy.

The first possible outcome is government collapse. This aligns with the stated objective of both the United States and Israel, whose sustained joint strikes have already killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, numerous senior commanders and security officials, and destroyed or heavily damaged key political, military, and security institutions. These operations have incurred significant collateral damage, including strikes that hit civilian sites such as hospitals, schools, and residential areas. Yet the ultimate consequences of such an outcome remain highly uncertain. Even if state institutions are substantially degraded, the aftermath could unfold in very different ways, ranging from civil war and territorial fragmentation to the consolidation of a new political order, whether democratic or authoritarian.

A second possibility is continuity with recalibration: the Assembly of Experts (the constitutional institution charged with appointing the Supreme Leader) selects a more pragmatic successor. Iran has already activated its constitutional interim mechanism: a Leadership Council is currently exercising supreme leader responsibilities until the Assembly of Experts selects a permanent successor. In this case, the Islamic Republic endures in its existing framework but modifies its direction. Domestic priorities would likely focus on economic reconstruction, stabilization, and governance reforms, while foreign policy shifts toward de-escalation.

Third, the crisis could produce consolidation around a more conservative or even more hardline successor. In this outcome, the Islamic Republic persists with ideological continuity,  or potentially an intensified, more securitized version of it.

These are broad outcome categories and each scenario could unfold in multiple variations, depending on elite dynamics and post-conflict conditions.

Gulf State Security and Washington's Response

The Gulf states are facing a strategic paradox. A weakened Iran may prove more immediately dangerous than a strong, deterred one.

For years, Gulf security thinking rested on a managed threat model. Iran could project power, but below the level of direct confrontation. The United States would deter attacks on Gulf territory. Confrontation would unfold through proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen rather than inside the Gulf itself. Those assumptions were tested in previous crises over the past few years. This time, they appear to have broken down.

From the Gulf regional perspective, recent Iranian strikes on civilian and military targets inside Gulf states move the confrontation from the periphery to the center. Even states that cultivated mediation roles, such as Oman and Qatar, have not been insulated. The threat is no longer something to be observed from a distance. It is immediate, domestic, and politically and economically consequential.

The deeper concern in Gulf capitals has never been only a nuclear Iran. It has been Iran’s aggressive regional behavior and the predictability of that behavior. Today, the greater risk may be the prospect of an unstable or fragmenting Iran and the erosion of centralized control. A cornered regime facing sustained military and economic pressure is more likely to rely on asymmetric escalation to signal survival. More troubling still is the possibility that parts of the security apparatus, especially within the IRGC network, operate with increasing autonomy if central control weakens. For Gulf states, unpredictability is more destabilizing than rivalry.

There is visible convergence across the GCC in front of the Iranian attacks. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and others have publicly condemned violations of sovereignty and coordinated diplomatically. But this shouldn’t be overstated. Recent tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have not disappeared. What unites Gulf states in this moment is not strategic harmony but shared exposure and a sense of vulnerability.

Security doctrine is therefore being adjusted in real time. Requests for expanded air and missile defense systems signal recognition that U.S. guarantees alone are not enough. Maritime coordination is becoming more urgent. De-escalation channels with Iran remain necessary, but they are no longer assumed to shield anyone from retaliation.

For Washington, this recalibration should be instructive. The objective cannot be framed solely as degrading Iranian capabilities or speculating about regime survival. The more immediate task is preventing volatility from turning into fragmentation. Strengthening the integrated defense systems, encouraging deeper institutionalization of GCC military coordination, and avoiding rhetoric that treats regime collapse as cost free are central to stabilizing partners who now sit closer to the front line. This moment of shared exposure offers an opportunity to move from crisis-driven coordination toward institutionalized defense frameworks.

The central question is not only whether the Iranian regime survives this moment, but also whether Iran remains governable and all armed forces within its system remain under control. For the Gulf states, that distinction is not abstract. It is strategic and immediate, and it is reshaping how they think about security.

Defense and the Nuclear Dimension 

The joint U.S.–Israeli strikes that began on 28 February 2026 have plunged the Middle East into a crisis without modern precedent. Operation Epic Fury and its Israeli counterpart, Lion’s Roar, were presented by Washington and Tel Aviv as decisive blows against Iran’s leadership and military architecture. They were sweeping: air strikes and missile attacks struck dozens of targets across the country, and U.S. officials announced that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had been killed in the opening salvos. Iranian retaliation followed swiftly — missile barrages against Israel and U.S. bases throughout the Gulf, warnings of Hormuz closure, spiking oil prices, and spreading global alarm.

Tehran’s ballistic missile arsenal and proxy networks had long anchored its deterrent posture. Yet that deterrent had been quietly unraveling. In 2024 and 2025, Iranian missile salvos against Israel were met with high interception rates, exposing capability ceilings without shaking adversary resolve. Iranian air defenses were repeatedly degraded. What was meant to function as a display of coercive power instead furnished Israeli and American planners with a detailed targeting map.

On the nuclear question, Tehran stopped just short of weaponization while approaching breakout capability, wagering that latent nuclear potential would purchase restraint from its enemies. It didn’t. Adversaries concluded that Iran lacked the will to cross the threshold and that, in the absence of an actual weapon, it remained a viable target for preemptive action.

Finally, diplomacy provided a false sense of cover. Ongoing negotiations ran in parallel with military preparations — but rather than deterring a strike, they obscured Iran’s shrinking window. In American and Israeli thinking, talks were not a reason to pause; they were background noise against an accelerating clock.

The result: a state whose missile deterrent had eroded, whose nuclear posture offered neither protection nor credibility, and whose diplomatic reading proved catastrophically wrong.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

The War with Iran Is An Opportunity to Reshape the U.S.-Israel Relationship

For the first time, Israel is waging a significant military campaign in full coordination with the United States. Not a joint operation, but fighting side by side. The closest historical parallel is the 1956 Sinai Campaign, in which Israel fought alongside Britain and France, a venture that collapsed and, ironically, cemented American dominance in the Middle East.

This time, the roles are different. The current war with Iran serves, first and foremost, American strategic interests in a consolidating bipolar world order: weakening the China-Russia-Iran axis, removing the Iranian threat to American interests in the Gulf, cutting off Beijing's access to sanctioned oil, and enabling the long-delayed pivot to Asia. It also happens to serve Israel's core objectives: eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat, neutralizing long-range missile capabilities, and ending the regime of terror and proxies that has destabilized the region for decades. Secretary Hegseth described this alignment in his March 3rd briefing: “Israel has clear missions as well for which we are grateful, capable partners, as we've said since the beginning, capable partners are good partners.”

When it comes to Iran, the United States has been willing to support Israel, but within limits,  preferring diplomatic solutions over military confrontation. But Iran's critical miscalculations changed that calculus. Since the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, an Iranian-backed attack that killed 63 people, Tehran has built a vast proxy network responsible for countless attacks and the deaths of hundreds of Americans. However, Iran's actions were contained to the Middle East. This changed with their increased military involvement with Russia and Iran’s incessant support of China as their most important economic and military partner. Iran has become to the U.S what Hezbollah is to Israel.

Yet this war unfolds against a troubled backdrop for the U.S.-Israel relationship. A February 2026 Gallup poll found that, for the first time in over two decades of tracking, American sympathies now tilt toward the Palestinians (41%) over the Israelis (36%). This shift, driven largely by independents and Democrats, predates October 7, 2023, and reflects deeper currents in American society. Criticism of the relationship is mounting from both the progressive left and the isolationist right, particularly around continued military aid to a country increasingly perceived not as a vulnerable state but as a regional economic and military power.

Israelis are acutely aware of these trends. Israel consistently ranks among the countries with the highest favorability toward the United States, 87% according to Pew Research. And even Netanyahu, in a January 2026 interview with The Economist, proposed phasing out the $3.8 billion annual military aid package entirely within a decade, signaling a shift toward a strategic, reciprocal partnership rather than dependence.

The current war can catalyze this transformation. A Middle East in which Iran, even if its regime survives, is significantly weakened and stripped of its proxy armies and long-range missile arsenal, opens the door to a new regional order, led by the U.S. and Israel alongside Abraham Accords partners. Israel must now prove that it is, indeed, a capable partner.

On October 7, Israel was forced to fight on seven fronts. Today, it is Iran that finds itself at war with an expanding coalition. This may be the Middle East's first true regional war, but it could also be the catalyst for a new regional order, one that moves the Middle East from constant conflict to prosperity.