Can Russia Somehow Benefit From Israel-Iran Conflict?

In July 2015, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran’s Quds Force traveled to Moscow to explain to his Russian hosts how a series of defeats for Syria’s Bashar al-Assad could be turned into victory—with Russia's help, according to Reuters. In fact, that visit by Soleimani “was the first step in planning for a Russian military intervention that has reshaped the Syrian war and forged a new Iranian-Russian alliance in support of Assad,” according to Reuters.¹ Fast-forward to 2025, and you find Assad’s regime in Syria, which Russia and Iran did manage to prop up for several years, gone, Soleimani killed in a U.S. strike and Russia’s other regional ally, Iran, doing so badly in its armed conflict with Israel that it is facing a regime change. Does that mean, though, that Russia only stands to incur costs if Israel prevails in the conflict, in which Russia has limited means for intervention?² Not necessarily.

Whether Russia stands to lose or benefit from the conflict depends in part on whether Israel manages to attain a durable end to Iran’s capacity for producing nuclear weapons. If Iran is denuclearized that way, then Russia actually stands to benefit from that outcome. After all, as I wrote years ago, having a nuclear neighbor, separated from Russia only by the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, has never been in Russia’s interest.

In the short-term, Russia can also count on the diversion of America’s already diminished attention from Russia’s war against Ukraine, at least for as long as the conflict continues.³ (One example of such diversion is U.S. President Donald Trump’s June 16 decision to cut his participation in the G-7 summit short for a situation room meeting on the Israel-Iran conflict, before Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy could meet the American leader at a June 17 event to ask for his support on new sanctions on Russia.) Additional shorter-term benefits Russia would gain from the conflict for as long as it continues may also include a rebound of oil prices,⁴ which would help Russia mitigate its budget deficit. 

While interested in a nuclear-free Iran, Russia is not, necessarily, interested in an Iran free of Ali Khamenei’s regime. Even though Iran’s Supreme Leader has not called Russia an “ally” in public, it is during his now-precarious rule that the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed by Teheran and Moscow,⁵ with the former supplying blueprints for key components of the latter’s military campaign against Ukraine, such as Iranian-designed Shaheed drones. Having already lost its other regional ally (Syria), Moscow clearly wishes to avert the downfall of the current Iranian regime if only because it needs to keep Teheran on its side, not only in Moscow’s war against Kyiv, but also in the standoff against the West. In addition, should Israel implement its threat to neutralize Ali Khamenei with or without tacit approval from the U.S., expect Russian President Vladimir Putin and other authoritarian leaders to pocket this precedent as well. The loss of this key member of the so-called Axis of Upheaval would also  likely strengthen Moscow’s resolve to prevent Ukraine’s integration into the West

On balance, one good outcome for Putin would be an Iran that has been durably denied the capability to produce nuclear weapons either by Israeli action or through renewed negotiations—perhaps led by the U.S. and even mediated by Russia⁶—while still ruled by a Kremlin-friendly regime. The Russian leader would probably view this dual outcome as advancing Russia’s long-term interests, as he sees them, much more than any short-term gains from increases in oil prices. It is unlikely, however, that Israel and its main ally, the U.S., which are both interested in not only denying Iran a capability to produce weapons-grade material, but also in regime change in Teheran, would factor in Russia's interests. 

Footnotes

1. This account of Soleimani’s role in persuading Russia to intervene on Assad’s behalf is disputed, however.
2. Russia could, for instance, reciprocate for Iran’s sharing of Shaheed drone production know-how by supplying more S-300 air defense systems, which Iranians already know how to operate, though, of course, Israel would seek to destroy them before they are deployed for operational use.
3. When Israel’s Rising Lion operation, in which Israel appeared to have adopted Ukraine’s pioneering tactic of concealing attack drones in vehicles to launch them remotely when needed, began, I instantly asked myself which of the belligerents in the Russian-Ukrainian war and their allies stood to gain from the armed conflict between Israel and Iran.
4. The price of Urals crude oil went up by 11.63% from 60 USD/Bbl on June 5 to 66.98 USD/Bbl on June 16.
5. The treaty doesn’t contain any equivalent of NATO’s Article 5.
6. Trump told media on June 18 that he rejected Putin’s mediation services in their latest phone call on June 14.

Simon Saradzhyan is the founding director of Russia Matters. Opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author. Photo by AP Photo/Hadi Mizban.