Event Recording: The Risks of Further Escalation in the Middle East

Full Video Transcript 

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

I'd like to welcome everyone here in the room and welcome about a little short of 200 people that are watching us online today. Today is October 7th 2024. It is a day of remembrance for many who lost loved ones a year ago today in the terrorist attacks by Hamas and those who lost loved ones in the many, many deaths that have occurred since that time. It's a day of mourning for many people who are still losing members of their family and loved ones. It's a day of hope for those who are looking for de-escalation or for families who may be looking for their family members who are being held hostage to be released. It's a day of diplomacy, as we know people around the world are seeking to de-escalate what looks like an escalating situation. And for us it's an opportunity and a day of discussion and reflection and an opportunity to hear from real experts about how they make sense of what's happening in this world today and what we might expect from the future.

And today we're facing a Middle East in crisis, a Middle East in peril. And as my friend and former president of Iraq, Barham Salih said, "We have moved away from a decade long war between Israel and Iran by proxy to a place where now Israel and Iran are in conflict with each other directly." We have different risk calculations on the part of many parties throughout the Middle East, we have different understandings of rules of engagement and different notions of deterrence. It's a very dangerous time and it is a wonderful time for us to have the opportunity to speak with four people who bring unique perspectives and real insights to us. I'll introduce them all in a moment. I would just like to say that the four of us, or actually I can count, the five of us are speaking in our personal capacities. I'm not purporting to speak for the university, nor are any of our panelists today.

So when we look back on the last year, there are a number of things that I'm really struck by. First is obviously the tremendous loss of life. A year ago today, more than 1,200 or approximately 1,200 largely Israelis were killed in the Hamas attacks. And 251 people taken hostage, 97 of them still unaccounted for. And since that time we have seen tens of thousands of Palestinians killed by Israeli military action. The estimates are that one in 20 people in Gaza have been killed or have been injured, and that half a million people living in Gaza are now in the brink of catastrophic food insecurity. And we've seen just in recent weeks, certainly it's not that the conflict has moved to Lebanon, there has been a conflict ongoing in Lebanon since Hezbollah launched rocket attacks in support of Hamas the day after October 7th. But we have seen an undeniable huge escalation there, which has had big strategic consequences, but also humanitarian costs in the death of more than 2,000 Lebanese.

So first is obviously the loss of human life of the last year, but I would say secondly, there's also the loss of aspirations for the future for Palestinians. They may be as far away as they've been in a very long time to realize their legitimate aspirations for statehood. So while it is true that Palestinians are back in the center of conversations about the Middle East and its future, at the same time, the actions of Hamas have probably made the realization of those aspirations even further than they would've been a year plus ago. For Israelis, the aspiration of being further integrated into the region is something that is certainly on hold, if not deferred indefinitely. Obviously, Israel still has meaningful relationships with countries in the region. We've seen that in how other countries have helped Israel defend itself against attacks by Iran on April 13th and October 1st.

But clearly the big shiny object of the normalization of relationship between Saudi Arabia and Israel is something that is not for the short or the medium term. And for Americans, the hope, the aspiration that America could right size its commitment in the Middle East certainly is an aspiration that is not being realized. And then for all of us in this room and elsewhere and online who have aspirations for people in that region, having futures of hope and prosperity and peace, those aspirations have also been thwarted. And then finally, I'd say in looking at the last year, when I think about what has changed, just the whole strategic landscape has changed in very significant ways. We've seen Israel really reassert itself as the dominant military power in the region through the use of military force and intelligence that seems unparalleled, but with open questions about what its strategy is beyond the military.

And we've seen Iran, which has tried to present itself to the region as being really like a regional superpower, real now questions about its conventional capabilities and its deterrent, which was this ring of fire, this group of proxies around Israel now seriously degraded and calling into question Iran's strategy. So I'd say overall, there's so much for us to discuss in this period of time today that we have, we've elected to focus primarily looking forward on the risks of further escalation. But before we do that, I thought it would be very useful to take advantage of Ambassador Djerejian's presence with us and ask you, Ed, if you could give us, just put this in a little bit of a historical context for us before we move to looking at the events and where things are going today.

Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian:

Okay, thank you Meghan. Thank you very much and thank you for all coming. I'll be brief, but I think it's important for us to keep in mind, as Meghan said, the historical context of what happened on October 7th. We're dealing with one of the central issues in the Middle East that's been unresolved for five decades now. We're entering into the 57th year of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. We have had successes, when I say "we", the United States and the collective international community and Arab and Israeli partners, Jimmy Carter in '78 '79, the Camp David Accords and the Peace treaty with Israel and Egypt, jumping forward, the Madrid Peace Conference where we were able to get a Likud Prime Minister, Shamir, to sit down with all of his immediate Arab neighbors and the larger arcs of interest regionally and international in direct face-to-face negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which led to the Oslo Accords.

The Oslo Accords led to in 1990 Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty. So there have been successes, peace has been achieved in segments, but the fact that a central issue, the Israeli-Palestinian issue is today not only unresolved but creating not only a regional but an international crisis, we have to keep that in context. Fundamentally, to put it simplistically you hear between the Jordan River and the Eastern Mediterranean, which has become a toxic phrase in many ways. But let me tell you what my definition of between the Jordan River-Eastern Mediterranean, between these two bodies of water, there were approximately 7.2 million Palestinian Arabs and approximately the same number of Israeli Jews living on that strip of land. Neither one is going anywhere. There is no military solution in eliminating one or the other. And the only solution is a political solution. When I was ambassador to Israel, I remember one conversation I had with I consider a very consequential and great Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, a man who fought all of Israel's wars but then decided when he was Prime Minister and looked at the landscape, there is no military solution, there's only a political solution.

And unfortunately what we're seeing today is the militarization of diplomacy and the resort to force to try to resolve a problem that cannot be resolved militarily, despite, as Meghan mentioned, Israel's phenomenal making up for the very important military and intelligence failures of October 7th. But then in what it has done in terms of degrading Hamas's capabilities and decapitating Hezbollah's leadership, these in my eyes are brilliant tactical victories. But what about the day? After the Prime Minister of Israel, Bibi Netanyahu defined his end game in Gaza as demilitarization and de-radicalization of Gaza. He's defined the Israeli military movements in Lebanon to change the balance of power in the north on the northern border of Israel. All right, but again, these are not... He calls it 'strategy', but these are mostly tactics without resolving the key issues. I'll just briefly now on terms of US policy. Yes.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Are you... Because I realize that I asked you to speak on history before I properly introduced you or the others.

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

Oh, that's all right.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Do you want to keep... You're going to take a forward look on US diplomacy.

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

Yes.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Should we do that in a moment?

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

Absolutely.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Should be an opportunity.

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

Absolutely.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Just to give you the proper introduction, as he's so familiar to so many in the room, this is Ambassador Edward Djerejian, who was US ambassador to Israel, also US ambassador to Syria and has been a senior official in the US government working on the Middle East for many decades. And he is currently a senior fellow here at the Middle East Institute. We're really lucky to have him. We work him over-time and grateful that he's here today. And then sitting to his left is Omar Rahman, who is a senior fellow with the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, which is in Doha, Qatar. So we're very privileged to have someone come all the way from the region to join us today.
And Omar works on issues related to the Middle East and geopolitics generally. We're thrilled to have you here, thank you for being here with us. And then to Omar's right, we have Gidi Grinstein who is joining us, he is joining us from New York, well, I don't know his exact travel itinerary, but Gidi is an Israeli societal entrepreneur and a former peace negotiator. He was working on the negotiations with the PLO when he was back as part of the Israeli government. He is now head of the Reut Group, which is an organization, a nonprofit that seeks to invent and scale solutions to some of Israel's major problems. We're thrilled to have you here today, Gidi. Thank you for joining us.

Gidi Grinstein:

Thank you for having me.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

And then my good friend, Karim Sadjadpour is joining us from Washington DC. Karim is one of the foremost experts on Iran, he is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. So thanks for joining us, Karim. So we're going to have a conversation now we've gotten... Ed, has given us a little bit of the very important historical backdrop. Thought I would roughly try to have the conversation go in three parts where we talk first about the escalation that many are anticipating, or I should say the further escalation because we've already seen a great deal of escalation. And then we talk a little bit about lessons. What have the key actors taken away from events of the last year? I mentioned many things have changed about deterrence and rules of engagement and all of that. So what are the lessons? And then we'll conclude before we come to questions of people in this room with asking: is there something that we're not seeing or maybe should focus on that could lead to a more positive future going forward?

So starting with that in terms of the immediate, the prospects for escalation, Omar, I'd like to actually start with you. And as we've referenced already, there's been a remarkable degradation of Hezbollah and its capabilities. You think of for many, many years, Hezbollah has been seen as this very formidable force on the border in Lebanon. And over a series of literally two weeks in time, we've seen the Hezbollah capacities greatly diminished. I think even beyond what is publicly known in terms of their missile capacity, their leadership decimated. And of course, Hamas has also experienced this decimation as well, although its leader remains alive, although in a place that no one is quite sure where. Could you give us your views on how, what kinds of threats do these groups pose from an Israeli perspective or just in the region? What is their standing in the region right now? Are they part of a military calculation going forward? If we're thinking about a potential confrontation between Israel and Iran, or are they in a position where reconstitution will take a very long time, if at all possible?

Omar H. Rahman:

First of all, thank you for having me. It's good to be here in the room with you, although I wish under different circumstances, I'm still in disbelief that a year on we're here and it's still unfolding both in Gaza and in Lebanon. In terms of Hamas and Hezbollah's capacities, certainly Israel has dealt them both a major blow, as you said, both to their leadership structures, the decimation of their leadership structures as well as their operations. And there's no, I don't think, downplaying that, at the same time, I think both are continuing to operate, to say nothing of Hezbollah, which maintains a massive fighting force and a huge arsenal. Hamas, after an entire year of maybe the most intensive bombing campaign in modern military history, after a ground invasion of over 11 months and after a total siege of the Gaza Strip in which food hasn't entered the territory, let alone arms, Hamas is continuing to fight. Israeli soldiers are being killed in the Gaza Strip, Israeli generals are saying every time they leave an area of the Strip, Hamas fills that void.

It's able to influence events on the ground, even unrelated to the fight against Israel. And then today, a year later on October 7th, Hamas fired rockets that reached Tel Aviv. So as an organization, certainly it has been greatly diminished, but it's continuing to operate. And I think in one sense that speaks to the resiliency of both how Hamas and Hezbollah are set up. They're expecting as organizations to have their leadership targeted and killed by Israel. It's been happening for many, many years, especially Hamas and have their infrastructure bombed. These things happen repeatedly. Israel has a whole policy about mowing the lawn with Hamas. At the same time, the method of warfare that Israel has engaged in in the Gaza Strip and now in Lebanon is so devastating. The total destruction of Gaza, which is in ruins today, the killing of over 40,000 people, which you mentioned mostly women and children, the amount of casualties and injured, I was just reading a report that 4,000 children in Gaza have had limbs amputated, children without anesthetic.

So the method of warfare is so destructive, for starvation in which the population has been reduced to eating animal feed and grass and drinking from puddles that you're creating a bottomless pit of despair, trauma, anguish, anger, all the things that will feed the resistance for generations. And so Hamas is not going anywhere as an organization. Hezbollah is not going anywhere as an organization, they will rebuild in time. Although Hamas' future is slightly different given Israel's presence in the Gaza Strip compared to Hezbollah. But this speaks, as Dr. Djerejian mentioned so eloquently...

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

I don't-

Omar H. Rahman:

Ambassador Djerejian, excuse me.

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:
I don't have a PhD.

Omar H. Rahman:

Excuse me, honorary. In my heart, you're a doctor. [laughs]

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

I only have an honorary PhD. [laughs]

Omar H. Rahman:

Excuse me, Ambassador Djerejian so eloquently put it, you made me lose my train of thought... But that there is no strategy here. There's a series of tactics that amounts to a long-term strategy for Israel. And so if your intention, if your vision of the future, if you're Netanyahu and the Israeli right wing, is Israeli sovereignty from the river to the sea, this is incompatible with a Palestinian self-determination, statehood or anything else. And therefore there's no political tool in Israel's toolbox right at the moment, all there is is force and that doesn't amount to a strategy. And if you have to constantly fight against these enemies, and Netanyahu has said openly throughout his tenure, Israel's ready to live by the sword indefinitely, and that's what it's doing. And so if there's no strategy to resolve these things, you just have to continuously fight and degrade, degrade, degrade, degrade. And that's what it's doing against Hamas. That's what it's doing against Hezbollah. That's what it's doing against the larger axis of resistance. And those forces will continue to come back and fight Israel and so you're in this situation of indefinite conflict.

And I think Netanyahu is willing to do that. Israel is the superior military power willing to deal in those kind of terms indefinitely. But the occupation, the apartheid, they continue, the conflict continues, the source of Palestinian resistance is intact and will continue indefinitely because Palestinians are not going anywhere as the doctor said. And I just want to bring up one more point if you allow me, and that is that it's become abundantly clear. You said Israel is the preeminent military power in the region, but it's become abundantly clear over the past year that Israel has needed the United States every step of the way for the last year. Israel is flying American planes, dropping American bombs, using American taxpayer dollars, American support within diplomatic circles, American intelligence. It's very difficult to see today where Israel's actions and America's involvement in the war that's unfolded over the past year starts. And so does America want to continue underwriting an indefinite Israeli war on the region? Is that something we want to do with our taxpayer money and our support at the cost of our national interests, our credibility on the international stage?

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Thank you very much. We will come to this American role in a bit, but Gidi, I want to bring you in. I had planned to ask you a different question at this juncture, but I think the more appropriate one, given the way the conversation's unfolding is to ask for your views. You're probably the best position to understand what Israel's strategy is here. There's been a lot of talk, not just in this room, but in other places about it being a largely military strategy. Do you think that's a fair criticism or do you see more there than other observers do? And then I'll come back to you in terms of thinking about what Israel might be contemplating vis-a-vis Iran.

Gidi Grinstein:

First of all, thank you very much for having me. I do want to say, of course, it's a very difficult time. Yesterday I spent time with my son, was basically the age of the generation in Israel who's been dramatically affected and every single household around them has been affected by this crisis, wounded, killed, abducted, personal friends, et cetera. And I do want to say and acknowledge that our tragedy creates a challenge of compassion, to look at the other side and feel their tragedy as well because there is an unimaginable tragedy happening in Gaza right now. And it's really when you look at the Gazan population being locked between Hamas who's fighting, which I think is worth mentioning from underneath and among the population.

There could be an easy solution for this war, which is for Hamas leadership to leave Gaza and end of war. And on the other side, the mighty force of the Israeli military forces, the outcome is a tragedy. But I do want distinguish between the two theaters. I think that many in Israel, present company included, are very critical of government for not having a robust diplomatic vision for how this war should end. But the situation is different in Lebanon, in Lebanon, there is UN Security Council Resolution 1701, goal number one, goal number two, which I think is achievable and the government should aspire for, is finally and permanently establishing a bilaterally agreed and internationally recognized border with Lebanon. In the year 2000, Israel withdrew to the international border. The UN actually approved, confirmed that we have aligned along the border, there are 14 segments along the border that may be in debate.

This is the time to finish this with the government of Lebanon. And I do see an opportunity in Lebanon because the devastation of Hezbollah is also a change in the balance of power in Lebanon. I'm not an expert on Lebanon, but I think it's clear to see that Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into war that most Lebanese did not want. The government of Lebanon didn't want this war. This war is being brought to Lebanese, forced upon Lebanese for interests that most of them don't really care about, which is the war in Gaza. So what is happening in Lebanon is destabilizing the political system in Lebanon and may create actually an opportunity to make significant progress in that theater. Again, I don't believe in the silver bullet end-all kind of solutions, but this is an opportunity to formalize the border, to bring back UN Security Council Resolution 1701 to push Hezbollah away from the border and to really stabilize the whole region for years to come, so yes, there is a difference.

I also want to offer the audience here a different perspective on the war in Gaza. And that is that Hamas has been fighting the two-state solution militarily since the 1990s. It's been going on and off, but this is what has been happening. In 1993 when the Oslo negotiations began 1994, 1996, there was a campaign of suicide bombings. In 2000 when I was involved as Secretary of the Israeli delegation, we were close, the second uprising led by Hamas. When the Arab Peace Initiative was published in April 2002, shortly thereafter, the suicide bombing in the Park Hotel, and we could go on and on, meaning Hamas has been targeting any kind of peaceful resolution in the area, any kind of political progress. They are the enemies of Fatah, which is the more moderate Palestinian movement there, the enemy of the Palestinian authority reformed or not.

And therefore, anybody here in this room that actually believes in peace would like and should want to see the removal of Hamas, meaning there is some sort of an alignment here that may open the door for a political process in the not too distant future. I do want to mention one thing here. Obviously it sounds so distant and so far, but in 1970, October 6th, we fought with Egypt a bitter war. By 1974, there was a disengagement agreement. And by 1978, '79, there was a peace accord, which is really A, came from a huge American leadership, diplomatic leadership by the Nixon-Kissinger administration, which opened the door for a political process, basically shaped the Middle East for the last 50 years. So I do, I'm saying this is a very plastic moment and big things could happen in the future.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Great. Thank you, I will come back to you in a moment. I like how I'm having to rein in people from going to the optimistic, what could happen next that could be positive. So I like the orientation, but I do want to come to this particular moment. And Karim, thank you again for joining us. So a week ago, exactly a week ago, I think there was a certain kind of conventional wisdom that Iran wanted to avoid getting into this conflict at all costs in a direct sense. But of course, a week ago tomorrow we saw that Iran did come in again with a second barrage of missiles directed at, against Israel. Can you tell us what you think changed the calculation on the part of Iran and what kind of situation the Iranian regime finds itself in right now?

Karim Sadjadpour:

Thank you, Meghan, for inviting me. I'm so sorry I couldn't be with all of you in person. I was really looking forward to it. So I think it might be useful to just first offer 30 seconds of context, which is I would argue from the 1979 revolution that essentially transformed Iran almost overnight from the US Allied monarchy to an anti-American theocracy, there's probably been very few governments in the world that have had a more clear and consistent grand strategy, in my view, those three pillars of that grand strategy, and I put them in descending order. Number one is to replace Israel with Palestine. Number two is to evict America from the Middle East. And number three is to partner with anyone who also aspires to help defeat the US led world order. So I'd say that this is am Iranian regime that has been very committed to its ideology, but it's also committed to staying in power.

It's committed to its survival, it's homicidal, but it's not suicidal. And so when I sometimes hear people say that Iran doesn't want war, I say, "Well, that's not entirely... Iran doesn't want war with Israel." And my view is they want war with Israel but not obviously on Iranian soil. They want to wage war against Israel from Arab soil. And as most of you know, Iran is dominating five Arab lands now, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza. So these are all failed, failing states, and that's where Iran tends to do very well. I'd say that what changed Iran's, if you could argue a somewhat cautious approach, was the view that having not retaliated in particular to the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Haniyeh was visiting Tehran for the inauguration of Iran's new President Pezeshkian. And there was a series of punches that Iran took to the face, elimination of senior Hezbollah leaders, assassination of Haniyeh, they didn't react to that.

And then we saw the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah who in my view is the second most consequential part of Iran's axis of resistance after Iran's Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. And I think after the assassination of Nasrallah, they realized that if they didn't react or by not reacting, they were essentially projecting weakness and vulnerability and encouraging Israel to continue to go after them. So now what is the situation that Iran is in when it chose to react? My view is that the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, he's operating within these very delicate parameters and that if he doesn't respond to Israeli provocations, he risks losing face both with his regional proxies and his own population. And for any dictator, you want to be feared by your population so if he doesn't react, he loses face.

If he reacts excessively, he risks losing his head. And my view, Iran's retaliation against Israel probably erred more on the latter, which is it was probably a little too strong and Gidi can talk about what the Israeli reaction might be, but I think that now the regime is in a very difficult position because they do well when there's an element of surprise. October 7th is a good example of that. When the world isn't paying attention, Iran and its proxies can do devastating damage or they carry out assassinations where people aren't paying attention. But when the world, when the United States and Israel is on 24/7 alert, it's much more difficult for Iran to do damage. So I'll stop there.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Right. Thank you Karim. Gidi, I want to come back to you before we go to Ed again. Just in terms of what do you think, I know you're here with us and you're not in Israel right now and it's hard for anyone to know exactly what Israel's response is going to be. We have Defense Minister Gallant coming to Washington on Wednesday, and that'll be a set of consequential conversations, but we hear people talk about a category of potential retaliation actions, military targets, regime targets, energy targets or nuclear facilities. Give us just a little sense of your thinking. What is the most likely, the least likely, how you see this playing out, if you're able to share any thoughts on that?

Gidi Grinstein:

Of course, it's very hard to assess just what we have seen in the last few weeks, how much we didn't know. I was a pessimist about our ability to deal with Hezbollah, but who knew what was in store and the capabilities that are being put in place. Everybody that understands anything, intelligence knows that it's been years in the making to put these devices in Lebanon and be able to activate them the way they had been and so many other things. So we don't know what is in store, but what I will say is that we're looking at the key nuclear facilities for Iran. They're spread over an area, that's how a person described to me that is the size of Berlin, Paris and London. If you can imagine a triangle, which is about a thousand miles away, hundreds of miles away over hostile territory.

So it is a very, very ambitious endeavor to take out the Iranian nuclear project. The second thing is that we know that a lot of it is in the brains of people, in the brains of scientists, and there is the ability to recreate. And Iran has been very defiant and very persistent in its efforts. Obviously Iran is a big country. There's a range of targets, I think that Israeli response is a given by now. The political leadership has pledged to do it, but looking at different considerations, I will say though that when it comes to the American perspective, I'm seeing very limited imagination coming out of Washington in terms of dealing with this Israeli commitment and need to deal with Iran. And that is that the American administration is obviously locked in very heavy political considerations due to the election.

So I can't see a heavy-handed directed diplomacy, but there are tools that Americans could use now to put an Israeli response against Iran in context of a broader vision of the Middle East. And remember, we all should remember the Americans were on a project to create what they call the IMEC, the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, which would've been a giant alignment of agreements, containing Russia and Iran, a counter move to the Belt and Road Initiative of China and all of this is still possible. This is still possible to bring it together. So I'm not seeing these, let's call it Kissingerian diplomacy right now, which could have been in place, it could have been containing the effects and directing the energy into some sort of a really new Middle East post-war.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Thank you. Perfect segue to Ed here. So accusations of lack of imagination in American diplomacy, would like you to comment on that, Ed, see if you agree with that. I was really struck by President Biden publicly saying absolutely no attacks on nuclear facilities and then being openly skeptical or not dismissive, but saying wouldn't like to see them on energy infrastructure. I can certainly imagine this being the position of the United States, but to make these statements publicly, is that strategic or is that Biden simply sharing a little too much? What is your take on how America has performed and maybe you can reply to Omar's assertion that America is as much to blame for what happens as Israel is?

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

Well, the United States has traditionally played a consequential role in the Middle East, as we know for good and for bad. But fundamentally, I think the crisis we are facing now, the Biden administration has had two initiatives on the table. The first initiative is Gaza, which is ceasefire, release of the Israeli hostages, exchange of Palestinian prisoners, a transitional period in Gaza leading to restoring Gaza and then way out, looking for future negotiations. That's initiative number one. Initiative two, which is concomitant is on Lebanon, which is as Gidi mentioned, UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which has been on the books since 2006. And Israel has been mired down in Lebanon before, and I hope Israel has learned the lesson to not make the same mistake of getting caught in the mud of Lebanon and then having to extricate itself without much glory. The fact of the matter is that 1701 would rectify the security on the Lebanese-Israeli border and demilitarize militias like Hezbollah.

That's a long stretch, but it's a viable policy goal. So these are the two initiatives that the Biden administration has been put in place and people like Hochstein has been negotiating that and Lebanon, and we've had the whole team of Biden and Sullivan and Bill Burns negotiating the ceasefire without success, without success. And what I find is that there's a lack of... How can I put it? Strength in the administration's diplomatic approaches. I'm prejudiced, I had my senior roles in a couple of administrations, the Reagan administration and Bush 41 and Bush and Baker had this approach of principled pragmatism. You don't give up on your values, but you are pragmatic in trying to get a deal done and you put the force of the United States under that. What has happened in this case? President Biden embraced Netanyahu on October 11th I believe, when he went right after October 7th.

He gave the Israelis everything they asked for in terms of military and political support. And yet, and I'm fast-forwarding on this because we don't have much time, Bibi Netanyahu has sidestepped both of these initiatives on the Lebanese front and on the Gaza front by resorting to force, total victory in Gaza and change the balance of power in the north, but it's all military. He has shunned the American president on our diplomacy. So Meghan, when you ask me if I have to assess American foreign policy in this crisis, I don't give it a passing grade, I don't give it a passing grade. I understand the complexities of all of this, but the fact of the matter is that even if you talk about Indian roads, Gidi, and all these other... The Abraham Accords, I'll be honest with you, I've been a critic of the Abraham Accords from the beginning.

Why? Not that I'm against normalization between Israel and Arab countries, that's a very desired goal. But the fact of the matter is if you don't address the core issues, be they Palestine, Syria, Iraq, all these issues that are out there, if you don't address them pragmatically and successfully and with strength, all these initiatives are going to falter. So I think American foreign policy is... And then one other point, look what's happening because of this American policy, if you will, the Arabs, the regional powers are realigning their alliances. There was just an Asia Summit in Doha and the president of Iran was there and the Gulf countries went and solidified or are beginning to solidify their relationships with Iran.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

All right, thank you very much for that. I think I'm just going to throw something out there, and Gidi didn't say this, but what came into my mind is maybe there's a moment now for the US to be creative and talking to Israel about, okay, we understand you need to do something retaliatory, but let's do it in this way and maybe be supportive of a more limited or some kind of response. And maybe that's happening, we don't know.

Omar H. Rahman:

Make an assumption...

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

Could I make a point on that?

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Okay, so that was the point you were getting right now, saying creativity not just on, but going forward.

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

Okay. Can I make one point on that?

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Yes, I realize I have to speed myself up a little bit because I want to get to the questions.

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:
Okay, then very quickly.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:
Yeah.

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

I think there's an opportunity, let's be totally realistic, we have our presidential elections coming on November 5th. Everyone's looking over the shoulder of the Biden administration, who the next President of the United States is going to be. This is a real inhibiting factor to our diplomacy, have to be honest about that. But what will Biden do after November 5th, no matter who wins? Will he then feel free to assert a pragmatic and more effective American policy? That's the question.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Omar, if I could come to you, this reference to the realignment of the region, really interesting question. You're out there in Doha, so seeing it firsthand, including this summit that Ed referred to. So what is changing in the region here and looking at it from the perspective of the Palestinians, how are they going to advance their cause in this current environment?

Omar H. Rahman:

Sure.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Are regional actors going to be the main advocates for Palestinians, and how do you feel about the likelihood of their effectiveness and persistence on that?

Omar H. Rahman:

Yeah, I think in terms of regional realignment, there are processes that were taking place prior to October 7th. Ones that were disrupted by it, ones that were actually reinforced by it, the one that he spoke about in terms of Arab states, especially in the Gulf and the relationship with Iran that proceeded October 7th and has actually I think in a sense been reinforced by it. Those parties I think recognize that stability and security in the region cannot be had at the barrel of a gun or by maximum pressure or any of those things. In fact, that those are escalatory measures that raise tensions. And for the Gulf states, I think there was a realization that they could not necessarily depend on the United States and Israel in terms of the Abraham Accords to come to their defense. In fact, they were the front line in any type of outbreak of conflict.

If October 7th had happened without that agreement being in place, think of the pressure those states would feel under with Iran right across the Persian Gulf from them, and they're aligned with Israel and the United States in a war that's happening now. Because of that agreement that happened, they were able to talk and de-escalate continually with Iran. And actually I think they were the primary factors in preventing this from being a major spillover and a regional war and so that I think has been a success. When it comes to the Palestinian issue, obviously these are related, but the Palestinian situation is at the moment incredibly dire. There's no sugarcoating that whatsoever, what's taken place in Gaza, the situation in Gaza is an absolute catastrophe of epic, epic proportions. Palestinians have not faced the type of threat and situation since 1948 and the situation is also true in the West Bank.

I don't think Israel has ever been closer to a formal annexation of the territory and this right-wing and far-right element within this current government are using the post-October 7th context in order to advance an annexationist agenda of the West Bank and that is putting tremendous pressure on the situation. At the same time, this is all compounded by the fact that the Palestinian leadership has been absent, pretty much absent. We barely see anything from Mahmoud Abbas. The PLO is a hollow institution, so the Palestinians are rudderless at the moment, and I think that's really compounded the threat and the pressure level that they're feeling at the moment. And because of... There are reasons for that stemming from 15, 17 years of policies but our own policies vis-a-vis Hamas and Fatah, our own policies in the United States and the Israelis are aimed at keeping those Palestinians divided, not allowing unity. And that has made a revitalization of the Palestinian leadership almost impossible and Mahmoud Abbas is pulled into that and I think he's failing his people dramatically in this moment.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Great. So what I'm going to do, Karim, I'm going to ask you one more question and then I'll take some questions from the audience. I have a lot more things to ask, but I will get some questions in and see where that takes us. Karim, I wanted to ask you about, we've been talking about the likelihood of an Israeli retaliation for the Iranian attacks of the other week. Assuming that something comes and assuming that it is beyond the scope of what we saw Israel's reaction to the April attacks, so something more significant than that, where do you think this goes in terms of Iran? You're a real expert on Iranian domestic politics. The regime seems to be under pressure in a variety of ways. We can see that in the election of a new president who's been given a little bit more domestic space than usual. Do you think that there are consequences for the regime if there are significant Israeli attacks? And how would you assess that?

Karim Sadjadpour:

So Meghan, my sense of how it plays out when, not if, but when Israel attacks depending on where they hit, my view is it will likely accentuate the existing political dispositions of Iranians. Meaning if you're a supporter of the regime, and my estimate would be 15 to 20% of society is a supporter of the regime, I think that they will be angry and double down obviously on their support and commitment to the regime. I think those who, the majority who are opposed to the regime will blame the regime for making their lives more difficult, especially if it turns out that Israel goes after oil refineries. But I don't think that those people are likely to...

Their reaction isn't likely to be impactful because they're unarmed, they're unorganized, they're leaderless, so they're not going to go out into the streets and show themselves and flex their muscles in the same way that regime supporters will. So my view is that an Israeli attack doesn't really get people to change teams inside Iran. If you're a government supporter, you don't become a government opponent and vice versa. I think in the near term it will likely have the effect of strengthening the security forces inside Iran, the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij. But that's not going to be, in my view, a long-term consequence. I think the big question is how will an Israeli attack on Iran change the country's nuclear calculations? Because my view up until now is that Ayatollah Khamenei's end goal has been the Japan model, not the North Korea model.

What that means is that he aspires for Iran to be a screwdriver turn away from having a bomb, but did not intend to actually cross the threshold and detonate a bomb. After an Israeli attack, and especially given that Hezbollah's leadership has now been decimated, there are growing voices in Iran who are openly talking about the need for a nuclear weapon. All I would say is that for Ayatollah Khamenei himself, that would be not an easy path towards a nuclear weapon, even though one could argue that they're quite close to it from a technical perspective. And the CIA has long said that it's no longer a technical question. Iran has the technical capacity, it's a political decision, but if you think some of the most sophisticated cyber attacks, sabotage attacks, assassinations in history have been carried out by Israel against Iran's nuclear program.

So Khamenei knows that this is a program which has been pretty thoroughly penetrated by US and Israeli intelligence, and it's not simply that he can make a mad dash. The final point I'll make on Khamenei's calculations is that there's a good body of literature in political science about the cautions of civilian leaders to pursue nuclear weapons, knowing that it could well shift the balance of power to their militaries. Because at the end of the day, it's not Khamenei who's going to be controlling the launch codes and overseeing this nuclear weapon, it would be the Revolutionary Guards. And I don't think his goal is to transform Iran into a military dictatorship in which the clerics are irrelevant and that's what well could happen. So I think there's a lot of talk now that in the aftermath of an Israeli strike, Iran will go nuclear. I just say that it's not a simple or easy choice for the leader to do that.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Great. That's a very interesting insight. Thank you, Karim. So I'd like to take some questions from those in the room. There are two microphones there if people don't mind just coming to the microphone. And please just... Urge the... Yep. We can't see you quite as well. That's okay. That's great. And feel free to get up and please introduce yourself.

Thank you.

Student:

I'm an MPP Master in public policy student here. I want to get back to Gidi's point around Hamas being a big part of the culprit here and then connecting that with some of the points you made, Omar, about the despicable situations that Gazans are facing right now. I've tried to go to these events for a year now, and I still don't really know what an average person in Gaza feels about Hamas. I can understand if they support Hamas, given the war crimes taking place in Gaza right now. I would also expect them to be frustrated with Hamas given the toll that the war is having on Gaza.

So I think my question is, if any of you can speak on whether there's momentum building in grassroots, in Gaza, or any change we see coming bottom up to either offer an alternative to Hamas or change Hamas towards a state where Israel can engage with them. Because it seems like what's happening right now is maintaining a status quo that is not helping anyone. And I also wonder in that if some of the bottom-up grassroots attempts are being held down by Hamas, back to Gidi's point, and if we have to acknowledge that as well, that it's Hamas exerting either pressure or even violence towards people trying to create an alternative.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Great. Thank you. It's a great question. And of course if talking about Israel having more than a military strategy, it has a diplomatic strategy, it needs to have a partner. I don't know who would like to come in on that question. It's hard to know what Gazans are feeling right now. Anybody want to make a reflection or perhaps comment on prospects for, I think you talked about Palestinian leadership in a fairly disparaging way right now.

Omar H. Rahman:

Sure. What an average person in Gaza thinks of Hamas and in the West Bank, it's difficult to know. There's polling around support for Hamas. I think the most recent Shikaki poll was somewhere in the 30s percent, in the past, prior to October 7th, at times it was in the 20s. But I think there's support for the brand of armed resistance that Hamas represents to an extent because Palestinians are extremely vulnerable. No avenue, no pathway toward their liberation, towards their freedom, towards their self-determination has worked and they're facing an endless or inexorable encroachment on their lives, their livelihood, their land and everything else. And so people are looking to anybody to defend them, the international community is not coming to their defense.

The PLO under Mahmoud Abbas has been co-opted into a subcontractor role for the occupation. And so people look towards Hamas and I think that's where its support comes from. At the same time, there's got to be clear frustration towards what has happened and the result of October 7th as well. So I think, I'm sure mixed feelings, I'm not in that thing. One tiny thing I wanted to say about Palestinian leadership is there are attempts, both within the factions themselves to find some type of unity. There's meetings in Moscow, meetings in Beijing and all this kind of stuff. But I think fundamentally there are obstacles in it, which I mentioned regarding the dependencies of the PA and Mahmoud Abbas on both Israel to function in the occupied territories and the western donor countries to provide the support. Yeah, I'll leave it there.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Great, thank you. Gidi, didn't know if you wanted to come in and respond to this at all. At the beginning of our conversation, you mentioned that Israel, there was a regional war in 1973, but a few years later there were significant diplomatic advances. If Netanyahu was to shift to a more diplomatic oriented strategy, how would you see him doing that? What would be the first step, the first stages?

Gidi Grinstein:

So first of all, I'd like just to acknowledge that to try to understand the strategic impact of this war right now would be similar to trying to understand the strategic impact of the 1973 War in November 1973. The processes are still unfolding. I would like to submit that there is one thing, or there is one avenue that I believe is inevitable and that is that faced with the option of directly controlling Gaza, which is where Israel is going right now, the internal opposition in Israel will be very, very strong. And the only alternative to that is to re-Institute the Oslo Accords in Gaza meaning to cancel the fact that Israel disengaged from Gaza, to re-institute the Oslo Accords in Gaza, and to divide Gaza into area A and B. I don't want to be overly technical here, but that actually defines the different areas of Gaza, it addresses the immediate security needs of Israel.

It gives the Palestinians the certainty that in the future Gaza will be Palestinian and then basically declare another interim period, meaning if the Oslo Accord established the first interim period to declare a second interim period, and basically through that create a platform that allows an international force with very significant Emirati participation to land in Gaza and to begin to do the work of reconstruction. My argument, which is a very difficult argument to make in the world of international relations, is that this is the only path forward. And I've said it to many people, and if you subscribe, anybody who subscribes to this view can begin to operate as if this is the working assumption. Now with regard to Hamas, we have to remember, all of us have narratives or mythologies about how we got here. Mine begins in January 2006 when Hamas was allowed to participate in the elections for the Palestinian National Council.

This was a decision that the American administration pushed in contradiction to the Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords say that only parties that accept the Oslo Accords can participate in the elections. Many Palestinians and Israelis, present company included, although I was young and junior, said to the American counterparts, "No, it's a big, big mistake." And they went ahead because they thought that in the elections of January 2006, Fatah will win the elections and that will be the ultimate vindication for the peace process. So they were making a big bet on a political process that failed and that's when Hamas won. And 18 months later they took over Gaza and then the situation kept becoming more complicated. For the last 10 years, since 2014, '16 until 2023, we were in a situation of some sort of cohabitation between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. And again, no time for getting into details.

May 2021 is when Israel is asleep, thinking that it still has its agreements with Hamas while Hamas begins to prepare for war and by October 2023 they go to war. But this, there is a period of cohabitation and I also thought that this was actually, Hamas was into... Gaza was moving into some sort of an independent polity of the Palestinian National Project. My point is we're going back... This war will have, I think everybody will agree, the war will have a transformative effect on all of the parties internally and externally. And one of these things is Hamas will not be able to be part of the Palestinian system as it is right now. This I think is everybody agrees upon.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Great. Thank you. I think I see people hanging back, so do you have a question for us?

Student 2:

I do.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

I can't believe I'm having to lure people to the microphone. Come on! [laughs]

Student 2:

Are you supposed to lure people to... Okay, I've lured myself. Hi, I'm an MPID student here. And I had a very specific question with the relation to the US government just from the perspective of a US policymaker because we talk about regional actors and their interest a lot, but I'm intrigued by the US government perspective. So the way I see it is that the US has for the past 30 years, pursued three core fundamental strategic goals in the Middle East. One is a two-state solution. The next is the inviolability of Israel's external borders. And the third is the confrontation of what we might call the axis of evil, be it Syria, be it Iraq, be it Iran, be it Afghanistan. And what we've seen, especially since the end of the Cold War, is a neglect of this two-state solution from the US to some extent, there's no limit to the willingness to protect Israel's external borders. And the axis of evil has gone... The axis of evil strategy seems to have undergone an evolution from confrontation and regime change under the Bush era in Iraq and in Afghanistan and then the recognition of the cost of that, it seems to have gone into containment in the Obama era with Iran nuclear deal.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Can I ask you to...

Student 2: 

Yeah, I'll speed up. So if you take given political limits of the United States, not just the presidency, but also in Congress and given Israel's core strategic needs, I don't think Israel would accept the Japan model of just putting in a screw for Iran. And given Iranian core strategic desires, namely we need to deter against Israeli superior might, and our Hezbollah and Hamas deterrence have just gone away. What would be a right vision for the US strategic policy going forward? How do you rebalance these three core goals that exist, the two-state solution versus external inviolability of Israel versus trying to contain between brackets and axis of evil? How do you rebalance that?

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Thank you. Great question. Ed, I'm going to turn to you and Karim, I'm going to come and get your thoughts on this as well.

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

Okay. Very quickly, because I know we're tight for time, I think looking ahead, let's assume that this horror that we're going through for both, for everyone, for the Israelis, for the Lebanese, for the Palestinians, for the region, this horrible period we're going through, let's assume that there's a path toward stabilization of this current crisis that we haven't gotten into a worst-case scenario of a major confrontation between Iran and Israel, the US and all that. The only path forward in my eyes, and I agree with Gidi to a certain extent, not with everything you said, Gidi, but I agree with him in terms that there's a moral equivalence between what happened in October '73, the Yom Kippur War, and what we're seeing now because the consequences are going to be geopolitical of the crisis we're going through now for not only Israel and Palestine and Lebanon, but for the whole region and for US policy in the Middle East, just to speak about us.

A coherent policy for the United States would be get back to the bargaining table of what we put together in Madrid, which is a two-state solution, as illusory as that sounds now. And we were talking, there's only 28% favorable public opinion in Israel now for a two-state solution. But Israel has to separate itself from the Palestinians, the Israelis have to recognize the self-determination of the Palestinian people and the Palestinians have to recognize fully all the Palestinians, the self-determination of the Israeli people. That is the fundamental goal and the strategic goal of American policy. And the only way we're going to get there is not by this government. This government is not, and Israel is not interested in a two state solution. On the contrary, it's interested in land and the Palestinians, as Omar said, they have such a weak, weak leadership.

They're not capable. We're going to have to have new elections in Israel. We're going to have to have new elections in Palestine. New leaders are going to have to emerge. And there are some charismatic leaders on both sides that can come to the fore. Marwan Barghouti is one of the most prominent Palestinian prisoners. If a Marwan Barghouti, a Marwan Barghouti came, was liberated, he could mobilize and he's Fatah, he could mobilize Palestinian public opinion and bring together more a pluralistic Palestinian leadership. And I'll leave it to Gidi because the Israeli political scene is very complex, but this government in Israel now is not capable of entering into serious negotiations for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

So I'm going to turn to Karim and then I'm going to give every panelist just a short time to say anything that's left niggling in their brain that they haven't had a chance to say before we close. So Karim, would love your thoughts on the big question of US strategy towards the region, but in particular, of course, there has talk about Iran despite all of this, still being interested in restarting negotiations with the United States and others over its nuclear program. So those are mixed messages and two different paths so to speak. But if we were making some recommendations to the new American administration, I would love to hear your thoughts.

Karim Sadjadpour:

Thanks, Meghan. The reality is that every US administration from the 1979 Revolution to the present, meaning from Jimmy Carter to Joe Biden has realized it's in the US national interest to have a working relationship and a better relationship with Iran. Even actually, you'd be surprised to hear President Trump on 12 occasions try to meet with Iran's President Hassan Rouhani. And the reality is you can't force a regime whose entire identity is premised on hostility towards the United States to normalize with you. That's not a unilateral choice that you can make. And so the reality we then left with is some form of containment, containing Iran's nuclear ambitions, containing its regional ambitions until there is a course correction. And if this is my last comment, Meghan, what I'd say is that I think that what we see in Iran today is an historic aberration.

This is a nation with 2,500 years of history, and in my view, 2,500 years of Iranian soft power will eventually defeat 45 years of hard power of the Islamic Republic, meaning this is an old nation and death to America, death to Israel, the mandatory hijab, that's not something that appeals to most Iranians. And in my view, and this will show my biases, I don't think we're ever going to see meaningful peace and stability in the entire Middle East until you have a government in Iran, I won't say democratic, but a government in Iran who's organizing principle is not the revolutionary ideology of 1979, but the national interest of Iran. And I see my dear friend, Badham Saleh in the audience, and my hope for Iran would be one day a great statesman like an Iranian Badham Saleh eventually sees himself into power in Iran.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

I'll vote for that, for sure. Okay, thank you Karim. We're just about out of time. If I could just ask everyone very briefly, if there's anything they'd like to say in closing, Gidi, I'll start with you and end with Ed here.

Gidi Grinstein:

First of all, just want to start with Marwan Barghouti. Anecdotally, I actually met Marwan Barghouti multiple times. If he is today, after many years in jail, the way he was, he is the hope for the Palestinian political system. And Marwan Barghouti, I know he was convicted of killing Israelis. He's also saved many Israelis. There was a time where every Israeli that wandered a stray in some refugee camp, it was Marwan Barghouti's people that would bring him back. And Marwan Barghouti had a standing order that such an Israeli cannot be touched, had to be handed to the security forces and brought back to Israel. I really hope he hasn't changed in jail. Second, I want to say that there are two countries in the world that have today leverage on Israel and influence. One is the US and the other one is the UAE. Because the UAE has the channel, the UAE has the communication.

The UAE is the last standing kind of representative of the vision of the Middle East that Netanyahu was hoping to promote. And there is access and those of you that follow the news here and there, you see that there is ministerial deliberation and professional conversations all the time going on with the UAE. The UAE has an influence because the UAE is the only country that has actually pledged to put people on the ground in Gaza. And the UAE is the only exit strategy that Israel has from having direct control in Gaza. They have leverage and hopefully they'll use it. Third, I want to say that when it comes to the Middle East, I think the United States has the right vision. It doesn't have the right muscle, but it has the right vision. And the vision is IMEC, India-Middle East-Europe Corridor with its economic pillar.

Just note that the Suez Canal has been 40% decreased in terms of traffic, and the world has not responded. Why? Because things are moving on ground. And today you can land a container in Haifa Port and within an hour and 40 minutes, it crosses into Jordan and goes across the Middle East. The economic side is operating, the security side, we all saw how it responded in April. And then again now. This is the security architecture that is being put in place for six years, the vision is there. This requires the Saudi deal, both the normalization with Israel and the security agreement and that requires the two state solution. And this is where the Americans have much more muscle that they have been using. The Americans could be very creative about acknowledging that the Palestinian authority will be a state, meaning it's no longer a matter of negotiation.

It's an outcome and we have to get there. And the last thing I'll say is Trump, look at the Trump plan. Everybody dismissed the Trump plan, but the precondition for the Trump plan was the removal of Hamas from Gaza, and we're very close to that. And the Trump plan speaks about the Palestinian state on 86% of the West Bank expanded Gaza territory, Palestinian capital in the area of Jerusalem, resolution of the refugee issue. Not things that Palestinians will sign on right now, but it's all in there as a basis for a political process. So what I want to say is the Americans I think have the right vision, they just haven't been playing their hand right and they have a much stronger hand than they have been using.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Thank you Gidi. Omar?

Omar H. Rahman:

I'll try to make it quick. In the last few weeks, especially since the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, I think there's been a lot of talk and fantasizing about Israel reshaping, and the United States, a new Middle East out of this. Push the advantage militarily and reshape the Middle East. And I just can't imagine a greater fantasy or a height of hubris to believe that through bombing you can reshape the politics in a country. Israel was in South Lebanon for 18 years trying to refashion a government that would be supportive, and it generated Hezbollah in its wake and it failed miserably in that project. The United States ourselves were in Iraq and in Afghanistan for how long, invested how much money, soldiers lives and everything else, and failed in those projects to reshape those countries in the image that we saw.
So to believe that going and bombing this country and that country and that this new Middle East is going to arise from the rubble and the ashes of that is insane. What I'm hearing from the region and what I'm hearing from policy makers in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in Qatar is a genuine fear that what has happened over the last year is going to radicalize the populations in the Middle East. I have my phone... Sorry, I have my phone, I look at it every day. I see shredded bodies in Gaza and a million war crimes, things that make me sick to my stomach and every person in the Middle East sees that, and people are going to be...

The lessons we learned from 9/11 and all those kind of things are going to be visited God knows how many times over from what people are seeing on their phones. One last thing, the one bright spot I've seen is that there has been lots of advancements at the United Nations. I don't put a ton of faith in the United Nations, but the international courts have stepped up, have issued rulings that are groundbreaking and fundamental. The UN General Assembly has followed suit in the resolutions it's put in place. I think those are the pathways for the type of accountability and pressure that will lead us out of this situation if we can focus on international law and not on dropping bombs to change the regional reality. Thank you.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Thank you. Omar. Ed, you get the last word.

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

Oh my God. [laughs]

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Just about the last minute.

Amb. Edward P. Djerejian:

I'm going to be very brief. In a conversation I had, I'll be discreet, with a very consequential Gulf leader, he looked at me and he said, "Where's the coach? Where is the United States of America? Where's the coach?" That ambiguity is a fundamental flaw in our diplomacy for the region. We, America, has to define its role, agreed in a totally multipolar context. Now, we're no longer the preeminent power we were in 1991. But the United States has to adopt statecraft and diplomacy, and based on what I said before, principled pragmatism.

Live up to our values, but then be able to strike the deals and really be effective with the parties in urging them to strike the deals and use the power we have. So I hope that whatever happens after November 5th, whatever happens after the horrors we're going through in the region, that there'll be new elections in Israel, new elections in the Palestinian community. That in the long run, there'll be the moral equivalent of the Yom Kippur War where the political landscape was changed and the shifts were there, but that America could play a non-biased role of a honest interlocutor between and amongst the parties.

Meghan L. O'Sullivan:

Thank you. So you can expect a new Belfer Center, Middle East Initiative brief. Where's the coach: Advice for a new incoming US administration!

I won't try to recap. It'd be impossible to do and we're out of time. But I will say that this has been an extraordinarily rich conversation with four people. Very, very different perspectives, a deep historical appreciation, and even with some optimism about how maybe a year from today we could find ourselves in this room having a more forward-looking positive conversation. That certainly is my hope as well. I'd like you to join me in thanking the three panelists on stage and Karim on video and all of you.

Thank you for spending a part of today with us. Have a good day.