Russia Roulette: Is the Iran War Playing Into Moscow’s Hands?

The  U.S. operation in Iran introduces a fluid and complex set of economic and strategic variables for Ukraine. While the escalation in the Middle East is geographically distant from the war in Ukraine, it carries significant implications.

On one hand, increased pressure on Iran could constrain its ability to support Russia’s war effort, particularly in the provision of drones, long-range rockets, and other military supplies. On the other, an Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with rising global energy prices and easing of U.S. Treasury sanctions on Russian oil producers, could sustain or even increase demand for Russian crude. That, in turn, would bolster Moscow’s revenues and its ability to finance the war in Ukraine. At the same time, a shift in U.S. short-term military priorities, such as redirecting Patriot air defense systems and missiles to the Middle East, weakens Ukraine’s long-term capacity to defend against Russian long-range missile strikes. 

Russia’s intelligence sharing and military cooperation with Iran may reflect a broader strategic calculus: prolonging U.S. engagement in the Middle East could divert attention and resources away from Ukraine, ultimately serving the Kremlin’s war machine interests.

“Drill, baby, drill!”, one of Donald Trump’s campaign promises, was aimed at lowering the cost of oil products and, by extension, everyday goods like groceries. As a side effect of expanded U.S. energy production, combined with global oversupply from non-OPEC producers such as Brazil and Canada, oil prices declined over the past year, cutting into Russia’s energy revenues. This pressure was reinforced by American tariffs on key importers of Russian oil, including India and China, as well as U.S. Treasury sanctions targeting major Russian oil producers, Lukoil and Rosneft, giving Washington sustained economic leverage over Moscow and its war in Ukraine. However, U.S. intervention in Iran has reversed this dynamic—from a “house of cards” to having “no cards” at all. 

Following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, Brent crude jumped by roughly 60% in March, briefly approaching $150 per barrel. 

One of the most immediate consequences of the Iranian attacks on oil tankers and energy infrastructure in the Gulf, as well as the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz,  caused volatility in global energy markets. Oil exports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iran pass through this narrow maritime corridor, which carries roughly a quarter of global oil and 20% LNG supply. A prolonged disruption of traffic through the strait would significantly constrain global energy markets and further elevate prices. Such a scenario could benefit Russia, particularly given that the largest energy customers of the Gulf, China and India, are the biggest Russian clients. Data shows deliveries of Russian crude to India and China climbed sharply as the Middle East oil bottleneck emerged. 

Following U.S. sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil in October, seaborne crude export volumes from the two companies fell by 83% year-on-year between December and February. India’s imports of Russian crude recorded a 19% drop in early 2026 amid mounting sanctions pressure. In February, approximately 6.9 million tonnes of Russian crude remained at sea without a known buyer. Amid disruptions in the Middle East, the U.S. Treasury moved to ease pressure on energy markets by issuing a temporary waiver for purchase of Russian oil. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the measure as “narrowly tailored” and “short-term.” Under the policy, the Treasury authorized the sale and delivery of Russian oil already loaded onto vessels before March 12, with the exemption remaining in effect through April 11. 

By the end of the first month of the war in Iran, U.S. President Donald Trump signaled he was reversing course on blocking oil shipments to Cuba, saying he had “no problem” with a sanctioned Russian tanker approaching a Cuban port. This followed a U.S. decision to cut off Venezuelan oil exports to Cuba alongside threats to impose tariffs on any country supplying crude to the island. As a result, Cuba went roughly three months without receiving an oil tanker, until at least one Russian vessel reached its shores, with a second Russian tanker reportedly on the way.

Meanwhile Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico has urged the European Union to lift sanctions on Russian oil and gas and resume dialogue with Moscow, arguing it is necessary to address energy shortages caused by the war in Iran.

Every day of the war in the Middle East not only generates additional revenue for Russia’s war machine, but also weakens Ukraine’s air defenses. Russia fired a record number of drones at Ukraine in March, more than in any month since it launched its full-scale invasion in early 2022, intensifying deadly strikes as peace talks stalled. 

Meanwhile, Kyiv faces potential shortages of U.S.-made Patriot systems and missiles, while also diverting critical personnel, reportedly sending more than 200 air-defense experts to help mitigate the impact of Iranian drones in the Middle East. Ukrainian teams are currently operating in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, assisting local forces in countering Iranian drone threats. 

Reports of heavy use of the Patriot air defense interceptor system in response to the threat of Iranian drones in the Middle East have raised concerns that the United States may have underestimated the threat, as well as about potential strain on U.S. stockpiles and the long-term sustainability of continued air defense support for Ukraine.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Iranian-designed Shahed drones have played a significant role in Moscow’s offensive. The first reported use of the Shahed drones occurred in September 2022. Thousands have since been deployed against Ukrainian infrastructure, military and civilian targets, often in coordinated waves intended to overwhelm air defenses. After initially sourcing Shahed drones from Tehran, Russia has established domestic production lines, manufacturing the Geran-1 and Geran-2 within its own territory. NATO did not take this risk into account or invest sufficiently in addressing the looming threat, which soon backfired both in the EU and Middle East.

In September 2024, Russian drones entered the airspace of Romania and Latvia. One year later, in early September 2025, during a large Russian strike on Ukraine 23 Russian military drones entered Polish airspace. Up to four were confirmed to have been shot down by fighter jets and Patriot air-defense systems, highlighting the challenges and potential cost implications for NATO in defending against swarming drone attacks, where a $35,000 Shahed drone may be intercepted with a $3.7 million missile. 

The incident marked one of the first times that Russian drones were engaged and destroyed over NATO territory, prompting NATO to invoke consultations and bolster air defence efforts in the region. 

In response to Russian drone incursions into NATO countries, Poland is launching joint training programs and defense manufacturing projects. Building on these efforts, five European nations—France, Poland, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy—have announced a broader initiative to develop low-cost air defense systems using Ukrainian know-how “drone wall” designed to improve the detection, tracking, and interception of drones violating European airspace.

Despite these efforts, in September last year, in the Hedgehog NATO exercise in Estonia, which involved more than 16,000 troops from 12 NATO countries, a Ukrainian team acting as an opposing force simulated the destruction of 17 armored vehicles and carried out roughly 30 additional strikes, effectively neutralizing two NATO battalions in just half a day and highlighting NATO’s vulnerability to low-cost drone warfare.

With the escalation in Iran,  it has become clear that the United States still faces limitations in defending against drone swarms similar to those seen during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although the U.S. has advanced air defense systems, including Patriot missiles, these are not optimized for intercepting large numbers of low-cost drones, making such engagements economically and operationally inefficient. 

Media reports indicate that Russia has transferred drones to Iran, including models derived from Iranian designs and produced domestically. As a result, while the destruction of Iranian drone and missile facilities could affect Tehran’s capacity to supply drones to Russia, replenishing Iran’s stocks with Russian and Chinese drones and rockets is unlikely to take long. These risks warrant careful monitoring.  Any impact on Russia’s drone attacks in Ukraine is therefore likely to be limited—though not entirely negligible—given Russia’s domestic production capabilities.

The larger risk lies not on the battlefield, but in the global markets. Conflict involving Iran has a predictable consequence: tighter energy supply and higher prices. For Russia, that is not a liability but a lifeline. Elevated oil revenues weaken the pressure imposed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, replenishing the Kremlin’s capacity to finance a long war.  The burden then shifts back to NATO, which must spend more to sustain Ukraine and counter a better-funded adversary.

This creates a strategic asymmetry. A prolonged, low-grade conflict with Iran—one that disrupts markets but stops short of decisively weakening Tehran—aligns neatly with Russia’s interests. It raises revenues while preserving a key Russia’s military partner. In that sense, time becomes a resource the Kremlin can exploit.

For Washington and its allies, the objective must be clarity, not drift. They should either act decisively to degrade Iran’s capacity to project power and support its partners or deliberately limit the scope and duration of the conflict. In either scenario, as one of Russia’s key Middle Eastern partners is weakened, the urgent priority must be a rapid intensification of economic and military pressure on Moscow to prevent it from exploiting the conflict to sustain its own war effort and to constrain Iran’s ability to replenish its stockpiles. What cannot be afforded is the middle ground: a prolonged campaign that drives up global oil prices, eases pressure on Russia, and leaves the underlying Russia-Iran alignment largely intact.