Statements and views expressed in this commentary are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, the Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Key Judgments
- Singapore’s leaders have assessed that the prevailing global order – defined by deepening interdependence,
globalization, and multilateralism – in which they thrived is undergoing significant change in the
direction of heightened protectionism, exercise of power politics, retreat of globalization, and multilateralism
in duress. This new landscape poses fundamental questions for the city-state.
- At the heart of the issue is that the United States and China, both of whom Singapore has deep ties with,
have changed in how they are defining and pursuing their national interests globally.
- Using a wide range of diplomatic and political platforms, Singapore has steadfastly, audibly, and articulately
rejected the binary narrative of “choosing sides” between the United States and China.
- Singapore has directly confronted the challenge of conceptualizing and advancing new initiatives and
efforts to shape (and reshape) the global order around emerging strategic and policy domains.
- As it pursues this brand of internationalism, Singaporean leaders have been cognizant of the need to
present a clear value proposition to the great powers as these new frontiers take shape, and that its old
playbook may no longer be relevant for the future of their relationships with the two great powers
Singapore’s Role and Importance as a Middle Power
Despite its miniscule size (roughly comparable to New York City or Shenzhen), Singapore is widely recognized
as one of the most forward-leaning members of international society. It is an active advocate of multilateralism
not only in rhetoric but in practice, having spearheaded initiatives such as the Forum of Small States;
the COVAX international vaccine supply initiative, which played a crucial role during the COVID-19 pandemic;
the P4, which laid the groundwork for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and later the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); and the Digital Economy Partnership
Agreement. These initiatives were not driven by any aspiration to be counted among the ranks of middle
powers, however the term may be defined. Indeed, none of Singapore’s leaders — from its founding prime
minister, Lee Kuan Yew, to its current prime minister, Lawrence Wong — have entertained such visions of
grandeur. Rather, foreign policy activism has been an existential imperative for the city-state.
Since securing independence in 1965, Singapore has remained keenly aware of the impact external developments
can have on its security and survival as a small state.1 This is not to suggest that its leaders have
adopted a fatalistic view of geopolitics. As this paper will show, this has never been the case. Rather,
Singapore’s leaders and foreign policy decision-makers have always been clear-eyed about the country’s
geographic and resource constraints, and about how these limitations shape the strategic options available
in responding to the challenges beyond its shores. None have articulated this as clearly as the late Lee Kuan
Yew, who in 1966 famously employed a marine biology metaphor to describe the challenges confronting the
newly independent country:
“From time immemorial, that was the order of nature. And now, the big European fish are being pushed out
so that the stage is set for local big fish to settle terms with small fish, and small fish with shrimps. And we,
having the smallest area in the region, must naturally be concerned. There are various types of shrimps. Some
shrimps stay alive ... Species in nature develop defense mechanisms. Some shrimps are poisonous: they
sting. If you eat them, you will get digestive upsets. Obviously then, some small creatures have got their own
defense mechanisms. And we have got to discover our own survival techniques.”2
These remarks illustrate the “realist” outlook that still dominates Singapore’s foreign policy thinking, and it
is against this backdrop that the nation’s sovereignty and survival are invariably intertwined with economic
considerations. Specifically, Singapore’s security depends on its ability to sustain its relevance to the global
economy as a highly integrated and effective international financial and trading hub. Put simply, Singapore
“must trade with all to survive.”3
Building on these framing observations, this paper explores Singapore’s diplomatic, economic, and security
relationships with both the United States and China against the backdrop of intensifying great-power competition.
By unpacking Singapore’s foreign policy across three frontier domains — technology, climate, and
multilateralism — we see how Singapore has sought to adapt to an age of great-power rivalry while maintaining
strategic autonomy amid growing centrifugal pressure. This analysis advances three core arguments.
• Using a wide range of diplomatic and political platforms, Singapore has steadfastly, audibly, and articulately
rejected the binary narrative of “choosing sides” between the United States and China.
• Singapore has directly confronted the challenge of conceptualizing and advancing new initiatives and
efforts to shape (and reshape) the global order around emerging strategic and policy domains.
• As it pursues this brand of internationalism, Singaporean leaders have been cognizant of the need to
present a clear value proposition to the great powers as these new frontiers take shape.
As I have argued elsewhere, “ As a small country whose relevance to the international community is not at
all self-evident, and that is heavily dependent on economic linkages with the rest of the world, not least the
major economies of the United States and China, it behooves us to make ourselves relevant to their strategic,
economic, and commercial interests, so that neither would want to make us choose.”4 The underlying rationale
is simple. Great powers, by definition, have little time and bandwidth to consider other states, including
middle powers, unless they are directly relevant to their own interests and objectives. As a result, it stands
to reason that it is in Singapore’s best interests to be relevant to great-power interests even as the country
pursues its own priorities.5
Historical Overview
The story of Singapore’s economic development is often traced to its origins as one of the premier entrepôt
ports during the British Empire — a fact acknowledged in its own historiography and geoeconomic strategy.
Correspondingly, the city endeavored to become a global metropolis and trading hub in the world economy,
whether under British colonial administration or the post-independence government led by the People’s
Action Party. As then-Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam described vividly in 1972, “the alternative to not moving
into the global economic system is, for a small Singapore, certain death.”6
Driven by this existential impetus, Singaporean leaders have assiduously pursued global capital by courting
foreign investors, transforming the city-state into a manufacturing base of choice by the 1970s and, from
the 1990s onward, into a global hub for international finance and services. Underlying and amplifying this
perspective is the belief that, as Singapore is a small state that obtained independence during the turbulent
years of postwar decolonization in Southeast Asia, regional security and stability are paramount for its prosperity,
growth, and development. This combination of security and economics shapes how Singapore views
and approaches its relations with today’s two great powers, the United States and China.
Relations with the United States
Singapore has long enjoyed close relations with the United States, to the extent that U.S. officials often
characterize the security relationship as more substantial than those Washington maintains with certain
formal allies. As a regular buyer of U.S. military equipment and technology, it has had privileged access to
cutting-edge Western military research over the years.7
During the height of the Cold War, Singapore’s avowedly anti-communist leadership saw the United States as
a vital bulwark against the spread of communism in the region. Consequently, Singapore was one of the most
vocal advocates of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Later, during the similarly controversial and unpopular
Iraq War in 2003, Singapore also cast its lot with the United States despite the challenges this posed for
managing sentiments among its own Muslim-minority community. At the time, the decision was justified on
the grounds that it was in Singapore’s interest to demonstrate commitment to the United States as a friend
and partner, irrespective of the limited assistance they could provide. It was also informed by a strategic
calculation that, having already declared a global war on terror, the United States could not be allowed to fail
—especially since Singapore itself was confronted by a terrorist threat in the form of the Jemaah Islamiyah
regional terrorist group.
Much discussion about the U.S. role in the region revolves around the perennial question of the reliability
of American commitment, particularly in light of diminishing resources and growing public fatigue for the
country’s many costly overseas conflicts.8 Aware of the risks of U.S. disengagement, Singapore has played
an instrumental role in facilitating the forward deployment of American assets in the region. Describing the
depth of the security relationship in [year], Prime Minister Lawrence Wong noted:
“[I]t is a security and defense relationship that has proven mutually beneficial for both sides, spanning many,
many decades. We appreciate fully how America has spilled blood and treasure to provide security for the
region. We appreciate fully the security umbrella that America provides for peace and prosperity in this part
of the world. And we lean forward to work very closely with the U.S.; we provide access to our air and naval
bases, we support rotational deployments, we provide logistical support, we exchange intelligence, we not
only purchase technology and military equipment, but we have a very productive two-way exchange of information
in many areas of security and defense, and that has proven to be mutually beneficial for both sides.”9
However, the strength of the relationship is not limited to security. The U.S. role in Singapore’s economic story
has been equally consequential. Singapore is the only country in Southeast Asia with which the United States
has a free trade agreement (FTA). Signed in 2004, the U.S.-Singapore FTA was made possible by a decade of
diplomatic and political legwork as well as economic negotiations.10 While the United States is not Singapore’s
largest trading partner, it maintains a trade surplus with the country, recorded at slightly under $40 billion
in 2025; this differentiates the United State’s relationship with Singapore compared to other export-oriented
countries in the region.11 Given their focus on the trade balance, this data point will unquestionably be a
foreign policy priority for the Trump administration going forward. The United States also remains the largest
source of foreign direct investment in Singapore by a considerable margin. In 2025, cumulative U.S.
investments totaled more than $467 billion — more than U.S. investments in China, Japan, and South Korea
combined — and nearly 6,000 American companies are currently domiciled in Singapore.12 According to the
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Singapore alone accounts for nearly half
of U.S. investments in the Asia-Pacific, underscoring its status as an established global investment hub in
Asia and its relevance for U.S. commercial interests.13
This is not to say, however, that bilateral relations have not experienced downturns, or that foreign policy
preferences and positions are consistently in lockstep. Ties with the United States hit a low point in the
mid-1990s, when a U.S. citizen in Singapore was caned for the crime of vandalism. Before that, Singapore
condemned the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada and remains at odds with the United States on other issues,
including Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the value of the global trading system.
As an economy heavily reliant on global trade and the free flow of commerce and investments, Singapore
views the current American impulse toward mercantilism with grave concern. Singapore was one of the most
vocal advocates for U.S. leadership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). For this reason, the Trump administration’s
abrupt dismissal of the pact in January 2017 marked a low point in the economic relationship, even
if the TPP was not strictly a bilateral issue. Indeed, Singaporean leaders made clear that while they understood
the domestic impetus for the withdrawal, the move still jeopardized the United States’ standing in the
region as a “resident power.” Former Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong did not mince words when he lamented
that the U.S. withdrawal “considerably undermine(d) American credibility and seriousness of purpose, and
confidence in America all over the region.”14 Similarly, although Singapore embraced the Biden administration’s
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), it did so with a clear-sighted appreciation of
the risks. There was awareness that IPEF could be sacrificed on the altar of domestic politics as the TPP had,
or that it was simply an inferior replacement. Those fears have since been realized as IPEF diminished to the
point of irrelevance in President Donald Trump’s second term, ushering in an alarming new era for American
global trade policy.
Relations with China
As Chinese foreign policy under Deng Xiaoping shifted away from the revolutionary objectives of Mao
Zedong, China’s paramount leader in the mid-1970s, Singapore’s Cold War suspicions of Chinese revolutionary
intent gradually gave way to cautious engagement. The two countries first initiated cultural exchanges
and encouraged tourism, and then gradually grew bilateral trade. When Deng launched his economic reforms,
he adopted the “Singapore model” as a reference point, aiming to replicate the country’s success, which
further fueled trade between the two nations.15 Nevertheless, when Singapore normalized ties with China in
1990, it was the last country in Southeast Asia to do so, having refused normalization until both Malaysia and
Indonesia had acted. This delay demonstrated sensitivity toward its neighbors for whom relations with China
were complicated by domestic difficulties between ethnic Chinese migrant and Indigenous communities.
While Malaysia normalized relations with China on May 31, 1974, Indonesia only did so on August 8, 1990.
This paved the way for Singapore, the only nation with an ethnic Chinese majority outside of Greater China,
to follow suit on October 3, 1990.
As previously mentioned, the delay in normalizing ties with Beijing belied the fact that relations had already
been developing along several paths following the tumult of the Cultural Revolution in China. Indeed, from the
mid-1970s onward, ethnic Chinese clan associations in Singapore had begun organizing tours for members
to visit their ancestral homes. Small business delegations soon followed, invariably led by ethnic Chinese
commercial elites who formed the backbone of what became an explosion of bilateral trade and Singaporean
investments in China.
While political and diplomatic ties with China have steadily improved over the years, Singapore has occasionally
found itself on the receiving end of Chinese displeasure. In July 2004, shortly before Lee Hsien Loong
was appointed prime minister, he made a private visit to Taiwan. Chinese media and intelligentsia protested
vehemently, accusing the city-state of harming China’s “core interest.” Later, during heated exchanges at a
July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum meeting, then-Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reportedly glared at his
Singaporean counterpart while making his now-infamous comment: “China is a big country and others are
small countries, and that’s just a fact.”
On November 23, 2016, China impounded Singaporean military vehicles en route to the city-state after military
exercises in Taiwan.16 While the vehicles were ostensibly confiscated for customs violations discovered
following routine inspections, many saw it as an expression of displeasure with how Singaporean leaders
had been vocally championing international law following the July 12, 2016, UN Arbitral Tribunal decision on
a case brought by the Philippines, which invalidated the historical basis for China’s territorial claims in the
South China Sea. The fact that Singapore never named the claimants in their statements about the decision
cut no ice with Beijing.
A further bilateral issue of a particularly sensitive nature is the complex cultural, linguistic, and ancestral ties
connecting the majority of Singapore’s population — ethnic Chinese Singaporeans — to the Chinese mainland.
To be sure, these ties allowed Singapore to make inroads into the growing Chinese economy, especially
in the early years of the country’s opening up. At the same time, these ties can dampen relations when Beijing
attempts to make common cause with the ethnic Chinese Singaporean population to influence the nation’s
foreign policy choices.17
Despite these events, economic ties between China and Singapore have progressed steadily. Singapore
has been China’s largest investor country since 2013, when China also displaced Malaysia and the United
States as Singapore’s largest trading partner.18 Three signature projects in China in which Singapore invested
— Suzhou Industrial Park (1994), Tianjin Eco-City (2008), and Chongqing Connectivity Initiative (2015)
— demonstrate the strength of government-to-government relations between the two countries. Even as
Chinese priorities shifted away from these projects to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Singapore leveraged
its managerial expertise and brokerage capacity as a financial hub to augment its relevance for China and
facilitate some of the initiative’s operations.19 According to some estimates, as much as “a third of outbound
BRI investments and 85% of all inbound BRI investments will pass through Singapore shores.”20 Nevertheless,
Singapore’s role remains confined to soft infrastructure and capacity building, in part because the city-state’s
affluence and technological capabilities mean that it does not require the BRI to meet its own infrastructure
development goals.21
Great-Power Competition: The Fallacy of the Binary in Singaporean Eyes
As U.S.-China competition grows more acute, discussions on geopolitics have centered on “choosing sides”
as a new Cold War dawns. At issue is whether a given state — in this case, Singapore — will choose to align
strategically with the United States or China as great-power competition grows more adversarial across various
domains. Underlying this is a belief that U.S.-China strategic competition is increasingly — and perhaps
inevitably — imposing binary choices on friends and allies, despite claims by both powers that they have no
intention of doing so. As scholar and former U.S. official Victor Cha plainly put it, “Governments around the
world have to contend with demands for allegiance by Beijing and Washington on a range of security and
economic issues.”22
Casting geopolitics in such binary terms reflects a great-power vantage point, with an underlying premise
that any gain by one power automatically erodes the relative power and influence of the other. While this
approach may shed light on great-power dynamics, it is less helpful when it comes to illuminating the perspectives
of other nations, namely those that are being forced to choose.23 Despite the current geopolitical
climate, a vast majority of states do not hold — nor do they accept — this binary worldview. Given today’s
deeply interconnected and interdependent world, it is difficult, if not impossible, to envisage global affairs
returning to the blocs that characterized the Cold War. Using the great powers themselves as an example,
China remains the largest trading partner of the United States outside of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA), and the United States and China renewed their Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement in
December 2024 — notwithstanding diplomatic tensions and saber-rattling between Washington and Beijing.
A second point warrants consideration: if choice is foisted on smaller states, it may not have the desired
effect of strategic alignment. In this regard, it is important to appreciate that since the end of the Cold
War, the essence of regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific has been openness, inclusivity, and rules-based
cooperation. These principles govern the proverbial “alphabet soup” of regional initiatives and institutions
around which this architecture is constructed. Regional states are committed to these collective efforts to
reinforce stability and growth, but the binary approach of great-power geopolitics works against these principles.
Indeed, decision-makers in both Washington and Beijing should be aware that — having endured
colonialism, occupation, and violence during World War II and the discomfiting effects of the Vietnam and
Korean wars — most regional states have developed a deep aversion to great-power politics. It is against this
backdrop that Singapore’s response to the narrative of choice should be unpacked.
Singapore’s leadership has vocally and categorically rejected this binary geopolitical narrative. When asked
how Singapore would approach relations with the United States and China in the context of the present
downturn in bilateral relations between the two powers, former Prime Minister Lee explained in 2024, “We
know what their basic attitudes are, and the basic contradictions between the U.S. and China remain. …
Therefore, in this troubled environment, we want to be friends with all sides and to have mutually beneficial
relations with all sides.”24 This deceptively straightforward response in fact constitutes the fundamental
guiding principle of Singaporean foreign policy, addressing the question of “choosing sides” between the
United States and China in an era of great-power rivalry and geopolitical contestation.
Singapore has long been vocal about the roles of the two great powers in regional affairs, well before their
bilateral relationship took its current sharp downturn. Early in his tenure as prime minister in 2007, Lee
argued that the United States was irreplaceable as the region’s security guarantor: “We would like to see
America continue to play a positive role in the region ... Security-wise, it’s crucial. The Chinese cannot take
over this role.”25 In a 2016 interview with Time, after the dust from the global financial crisis had settled and in
the face of Chinese economic ascendancy, Lee remained “very reluctant to say that American is on a downhill
slope,” noting that both the United States and China faced challenges. He concluded that while U.S.-China
relations were “reasonably well-managed,” in the interviewer’s words, irreconcilable differences and a lack
of strategic trust remained.26 Needless to say, these observations proved prescient. Soon after, U.S.-China
relations shifted decisively.
In 2020, Lee penned an article for Foreign Affairs about the implications of a U.S.-China confrontation.
Questioning whether the United States could move past its view of China as an existential threat and whether
China could assume a more responsible and self-confident great-power role, Lee highlighted the dilemma
facing smaller countries when forced to choose between the two. Just as he noted that China could not
replace the United States “security-wise” in 2007, he remarked in 2020 that neither can replace the other in
the economic sphere.27
The first known reference by a Singaporean public official to “choosing sides” appeared in a 2010 New York
Times article quoting then-Ambassador to the United States Ashok Mirpuri.28 The first instance of a political
officeholder introducing the notion then came in September 2012, when Lee warned that regional states
might be “forced to choose between major powers” during an address to the Central Party School in Beijing,
shortly after a Sino-Philippine standoff in the South China Sea.29
It has since become a recurrent theme in regional discussions on geopolitics, with Singaporean foreign policymakers
expressing their displeasure with a zero-sum geopolitical game. As Lee shared in a interview
with the BBC in 2021: “It is not possible for us to choose one or the other because we have very intense and
extensive ties with both the U.S. and with China, economic as well as in other areas, and so do many other
countries in the world.”30 Elaborating on this view, Teo Chee Hean, the senior minister who oversees security
issues, opined, “We have said that we don’t choose sides. But people sometimes misunderstand that by not
choosing sides, we don’t have a view. That’s not true, we have a view, we choose principles.”31 What’s more,
Home Affairs Minister K. Shanmugam has emphasized that the United States and China must work together
to address global challenges such as nuclear proliferation and climate change. To that end, choosing sides
“is highly disruptive, either for our security or our economy or many other aspects.”32
This is not to say that Singapore is ignorant of the centrifugal forces generated by great-power rivalry, or blind
to the reality that pressure from either power might compel a choice. Lee has also conceded the unvarnished
truth of this dilemma: “If you are friends with two countries which are on different sides, sometimes it is possible
to get along with both, sometimes it’s more awkward when you try to get along with both… I think it’s
very desirable for us not to have to take sides, but the circumstances may come when ASEAN may have to
choose one or the other. I am hoping that it’s not coming soon.”33
It would be a mistake to dismiss these statements as cavalier rejections of the narrative of choice, when in
fact they offer a window into how Singapore’s decision-makers view the country’s role in the context of greatpower
rivalry. From Singapore’s perspective, aligning with one great power at the expense of the other is not
considered a viable option. Instead, the primary strategic response to intensifying geopolitical competition
is the creation of maximum latitude and space for autonomy. To that end, Singapore has resisted pressure
to align itself with either power not so much as a hedging strategy but as an expression of sovereignty. Its
stance reflects an intent to embrace opportunities proffered by both American and Chinese technological
advancements and their respective international value chains while minimizing geopolitical risks.
In keeping with its tradition of proactive, forward-looking foreign policy, Singapore has sought to bridge the
growing gap between the United States and China. Its senior leaders regularly engage their counterparts from
both great powers, cautiously but opportunistically seeking to alert them to global concerns regarding their
escalating rivalry. Ultimately, Singapore believes that great powers will naturally “do what great powers do,”
with little regard for the interests of small states. Acute strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing,
however, has severely limited Singapore’s ability to push for U.S.-China cooperation, either through bilateral
efforts or multilateral mechanisms, on “over-the-horizon” issues such as climate and AI governance.
At the same time, there is growing concern that geopolitical room for maneuver is shrinking as U.S.-China
competition has accelerated following Donald Trump’s return to power. The escalating trade war between the
United States and China, driven by the administration’s reciprocal tariffs, now poses an existential threat to
Singapore, an economy for whom global trade is a lifeline. This is all the more true as U.S. officials blatantly
use market access as leverage to pressure other nations on their trade relations with Beijing, while Chinese
President Xi Jinping has explicitly warned states against undermining Chinese interest when negotiating with
Washington.
Notwithstanding the increasingly difficult geopolitical climate, great-power tensions have also offered
Singapore opportunities. As global technology and electronics companies pursue geographical diversification
to avoid entanglement in U.S.-China competition, Singapore has conceptualized new initiatives and modalities
of international collaboration in frontier domains. In assessing how Singapore is navigating — and eliding
— the specter of choice, this paper will now examine three key areas: technology, climate, and multilateralism.
Navigating the Technology War
The U.S.-China competition over technological primacy has been addressed in detail elsewhere and need
not preoccupy this discussion.34 The point to stress is that this competition sets the stage for Singapore as
it pursues its national objective to be a global hub for advanced technology development. These efforts are
notable because they have been undertaken in close collaboration with U.S. and Chinese government and
private sector interests, all while sidestepping the vicissitudes of great-power competition — such as tariffs,
export controls, and market restrictions — that threaten to fragment the global tech order.
Today, technology is a cornerstone of Singapore’s economy, and it will be so for the foreseeable future. To
illustrate the growing importance of these sectors, in 2002, semiconductor manufacturing accounted for 80%
of Singapore’s electronics output, which constituted 7% of its gross domestic product, 11% of the global semiconductor
market, and 20% of global semiconductor equipment.35 To bolster its appeal to global technology
counterparts — most certainly from the U.S. and China — the city-state committed $25 billion to research,
innovation, and enterprise in 2020 as part of an assiduous and ambitious five-year research and development
plan. Meanwhile, its state investment firm, Temasek, has earmarked $1 billion for deep-technology
investments.36
Additionally, Singapore has positioned itself as a major startup capital. Between 2022 and 2024, Singapore
has risen from 18th to seventh largest in the global tech startup ecosystem, behind only Silicon Valley, New
York City, London, Tel Aviv, Los Angeles, and Boston, and ahead of Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Shanghai.37 This
rise was fueled by the highest venture capital funding per capita globally.38
Aside from heavy investments in its indigenous tech ecosystem, Singapore has capitalized on its ties with
global tech powers, leveraging its competitive advantage as a business-friendly regional hub to attract both
American and Chinese multinationals. With its strong talent base in engineering and data science, world-class
tertiary education, and pro-business environment, Singapore hosts over 80 of the world’s top 100 technology
firms and continues to draw interest from those seeking an operational base from which to target growing
Asian markets.39 Chinese tech giants like Alibaba, ByteDance, and Tencent have expanded operations in
Singapore, driving up the value of Singaporean engineering talent. This, in turn, enhances the advanced capabilities
Singapore offers these multinationals.40 The booming e-commerce industry in Singapore, a gateway
to the region via the emerging ASEAN e-commerce infrastructure, has also been a target for Chinese commercial
tech giants, as demonstrated by Alibaba’s $1 billion acquisition of a controlling stake in local e-commerce
firm Lazada in 2016.41 Huawei has also sought to attract Singaporean talent through incubation centers
and collaborations, such as the Southern Pacific OpenLab in 2016, a cloud and AI innovation lab in 2019, a
virtual AI Academy in 2020, and a host of research memorandums of understandings with top Singaporean
universities.42
In contrast to Chinese tech companies’ emerging interest in Singapore, U.S. technology is already deeply
integrated into Singapore’s core technology infrastructure and its accompanying supply chains. Given that
the United States remains Singapore’s largest investor, Singapore remains an attractive destination for
advanced technology companies, especially semiconductor manufacturers and data centers, seeking to relocate
and diversify their operations from Greater China in the wake of the continued deterioration in U.S.-
China relations.43
Progress with the United States in cybersecurity has been especially significant. Three memorandums of
understanding covering the public, defense, and financial sectors followed then-Vice President Kamala Harris’
visit to Singapore in 2021.44 After then-Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s reciprocal visit to the United States
in 2022, a U.S.-Singapore Cyber Dialogue was initiated, catalyzing further bilateral cooperation through interagency
exchanges.45 Notably, there has been no comparable cooperation with China to date.46
Amid increasing cooperation with the United States and China, Singapore has had to tread carefully around
tech competition. As the fourth industrial revolution dawns, decades of rapid state-led economic development
have led China to aspire to global tech leadership, captured in slogans such as “Made in China 2025.”
Under the banner of the Digital Silk Road, part of the BRI, it also aims to be a major exporter of digital infrastructure-
building capabilities. While this technological ambition is motivated by great national pride, there
is a sharp security edge as well. It is driven by the imperative of reducing vulnerability to U.S. technological
dominance, which finds expression in Washington’s regulatory reach and the commercial power of Big Tech.
Chinese aspirations have rendered the geopolitical dimension of tech competition more acute, provoking a
backlash rooted in American concerns over challenges to U.S. dominance.
Here, the primary American argument is that China’s drive for technological dominance has benefited unfairly
from immense state funding, distorting the market and creating an uneven playing field. Additionally, there
is concern that augmented Chinese technological prowess, especially in dual-use technologies, would translate
into advanced military capabilities — a concern rendered more acute by the Russia-Ukraine war, where
Russia allegedly benefited from Chinese dual-use technologies. Presumedly, this would pose a security threat
to of the United States and its allies. Consequently, the United States has deployed an arsenal of unilateral
and multilateral tools against purported unfair economic practices, illegal intellectual property theft, and the
export of authoritarian technologies and values. Beijing has responded with its own punitive measures, albeit
not in equal measure.
This action-reaction dynamic poses a perennial security dilemma for Singapore and prompts concern over
“technological decoupling” as Chinese technological development faces greater U.S. scrutiny, particularly
in the advanced semiconductor sector, which has been subject to sweeping restrictions. That Washington
has exerted political pressure on allies and partners further heightens concerns.47 Acutely cognizant of the
need to avoid political and security backlash, given the scrutiny of Chinese technology development by a
reinvigorated U.S. regulatory environment, Singapore has taken care to ensure that joint commercial and
technological ventures carry minimum risk of spilling over into sensitive domains. Regulatory authorities have
endeavored to sensitize private sector entities and universities to the need to understand and adhere to U.S.
export controls. Singapore has also reinforced its own regulatory framework through legislation such as the
Cybersecurity Act.
In recent years, a major pain point has been the information and communications technology (ICT) sector.
The growing 5G capabilities of Huawei — the Chinese telecommunications giant suspected by U.S. officials
of having ties to the People’s Liberation Army — and subsequent American responses have become emblematic
of this struggle. U.S. concerns over Chinese access to the ICT architecture of U.S. allies has prompted
Washington to encourage, and in some cases compel, circumspection toward technology from Huawei. The
company was eventually placed on the U.S. “Entities List” and designated a national security threat by the
FCC.
Notably, while Huawei bid to be a vendor for Singapore’s main 5G network, the contracts were awarded in
2020? to Scandinavian providers Ericsson and Nokia to work with local telecommunications companies.48
Huawei’s absence from the list of service providers undoubtedly raised eyebrows, especially since Singapore,
unlike U.S. allies, had never issued a formal ban on Huawei. In fact, Huawei continues to be a vendor for other
network elements through China TelecomGlobal (the Chinese company for which Huawei is a vendor) and
has been a critical supplier of cloud technology to the city-state.
Any reservations about the use of Huawei equipment in the core 5G network derived not from security concerns
but from the realistic possibility that the entire system could be crippled if further U.S. regulations
undermined Huawei’s ability to operate effectively. In other words, this move aligns with the larger strategy of
diversification to minimize supply chain disruptions caused by geopolitical competition.
Energy and the Climate Change Challenge
Amid expanding competition, climate change has emerged as an issue where the United States and China
might find common cause, as evidenced by previous collaborations. Until the sharp downturn in bilateral
relations, Washington and Beijing had managed to work together to address the global challenge of climate
change, as seen in their joint leadership in securing the passage of the 2015 Paris Agreement.49 Additionally,
given its transnational and global nature, the climate crisis intuitively lends itself to a convergence — if not
alignment — of interests. Yet the harsh reality is that neither assumption appears to provide sufficiently
robust common ground. Still, some bilateral efforts to foster convergence remain, such as the U.S.-China
Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s. Moreover, the Trump administration’s open hostility
to green energy and decarbonization suggests a discomfiting misalignment of objectives with Singapore,
while pushing prospects for U.S.-China climate collaboration even further out of reach.
Given its status as a low-lying, small island state, Singapore is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate
change. As a result, it treats the issue as nothing short of an existential challenge.50 In public statements
and policies, Singapore has made it clear that climate action is a priority, particularly in the document titled,
“Singapore Green Action Plan 2030,” which details its climate strategy. The plan identifies five priorities,
including increasing green spaces in the land-scarce city-state, reduction waste and water consumption,
increasing use of solar energy, advancing green finance and sustainability entrepreneurship, and enhancing
coastal protection.
Significantly, Singapore’s mitigation efforts have gone beyond domestic policies and approaches. Since climate
change is a transnational issue, Singapore has sought to facilitate greater regional and multilateral cooperation
while positioning itself as a hub to support green transition efforts across Southeast Asia.51 These initiatives
include the Climate Action Package in 2018, which assists environmental efforts in regional countries
and fellow island states. Singapore has also played a key facilitator role in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change negotiations, enabling the adoption of crucial declarations and partnerships
at COPs since 2015. Additionally, the country contributes experience and financial support to ASEAN-led initiatives
and workshops, partners with the International Civil Aviation Organization and International Maritime
Organization to reduce transport emissions, and cooperates with various states to facilitate carbon markets
and low-carbon energy sources. In 2023, Singapore launched Financing Asia’s Transition Partnership (FASTP),
a blended finance initiative involving global private and public partners to support decarbonization efforts
in Asia.52 In 2024, the nation pioneered the Transition Credits Coalition (TRACTION), a financial instrument
designed to help Southeast Asia shift from coal to more climate-friendly energy sources.
Singapore has made noticeable headway in two areas by parlaying its status as a global financial center and
its tradition of forward-leaning diplomacy. First, it has facilitated green finance to incentivize environmentally
friendly projects both domestically and across Southeast Asia, targeting low-carbon, efficient energy use in
real estate and transport. Green finance taps into Singapore’s longstanding advantages as a regional hub
for financial institutions and multinationals domiciled in the country. Moreover, to encourage these shifts,
domestic banks have incorporated environmental, social, and governance (ESG) foci into their priorities, and
Singaporean financial regulators have shared experiences and best practices through relevant multilateral
financial forums since 2015.53 The Monetary Authority of Singapore initiated the green bond market in 2017;
today, Singapore accounts for about 50% percent of ASEAN’s market for green bonds and loans.54
A second area in which Singapore proactively shaped international engagement and norms is sustainable
urban planning and design. The city-state’s successful and effective urban planning in areas such as waste
management, sustainable real estate, and public transportation has positioned it as a global leader that
openly shares its knowledge in various international forums. Singapore has leveraged its expertise by establishing
initiatives like the biennial Lee Kuan Yew World City Prize. Launched in 2008 and named after the
nation’s late founding prime minister, the award recognizes global achievements in sustainable urban development
while enhancing knowledge and capabilities. Singapore also participates in international city networks,
like the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, the ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, and
World Cities Summit.55 As chairman of ASEAN for 2018, Singapore seized the opportunity to establish the
ASEAN Smart Cities Network to develop partnerships among leading cities and improve South Asian smart
cities initiatives.56
Efforts to combat the climate crisis have also involved separate cooperation with the United States and
China. With the United States, Singapore signed the U.S.-Singapore Climate Partnership in August 2021.
Since its launch, the agreement has undergone several rounds of refinement aimed at establishing mediumand
long-term goals for climate action, marking a substantial collaborative effort to build capacity, improve
environmental governance and standards, drive sustainable research and development, and devise low- and
zero-emission solutions.
With China, cooperation has centered on ongoing government-to-government projects, such as the Tianjin
Eco-City. New collaborative initiatives center on green growth, low-carbon living, ecological resilience, innovation
and talent development, and governance. A signature development from this partnership is the establishment
of a Green and Digital Shipping Corridor (GDSC), the first of its kind, which aims to foreground green
growth in Tianjin and further decarbonization efforts across the broader maritime industry. Progress has also
been made in green finance, which is a priority for both China and Singapore. In April 2023, the respective
authorities — the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and the People’s Bank of China (PBC) — agreed to
establish a China-Singapore Green Finance Taskforce (GFTF), tasked with deepening bilateral cooperation in
green finance and facilitating greater public-private sector collaboration in decarbonization.
Championing Multilateralism
That the global multilateral order is in crisis became readily apparent during the first Trump presidency, when
the U.S. leader hardly hid his disdain for multilateral institutions. This disregard translated into policy in the
form of U.S. withdrawal from a slew of multilateral agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
and Paris climate accords, alongside threats to withdraw from NATO and the World Health Organization
(WHO). Following Donald Trump’s return to office, the United States formally withdrew from the WHO in
January 2026.
Amid major global transitions and transformations, Singapore maintains that as a small state, it must use
every tool at its disposal to reinforce the importance of international law, international organizations, and
multilateralism. This is not because these instruments are perfect — far from it. Rather, the logic that is that
despite their deficiencies, they serve as important levelers for smaller states, especially when great-power
politics threaten to overwhelm them. For Singapore, a functioning multilateral global order predicated on
international law is critical. As Lee Hsien Loong explained, “For small countries like Singapore, multilateral
institutions, systems, and laws are critical for our survival. These give us a stake in the global commons, and
a means to defend and advance our interests. A rules-based system imposes responsibilities on all countries
and creates a stable environment for all. This is why Singapore is a staunch advocate of the UN, international
law, and of the multilateral system.”57
Singapore has long been a proactive member of the international community, not only as a participant but as
progenitor of several initiatives and minilaterals. These include the Global Governance Group and the Forum
of Small States. Singapore was also part of the P4, which set the stage for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
and later evolved into the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Digital
Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA), among others. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic and amid
a lack of leadership from major powers, Singapore and Switzerland initiated and co-chaired the Friends of
the COVAX Facility, which played a crucial role in the global distribution of vaccines. Additionally, Singapore
chairs the UN Open-Ended Working Group focused on ICT, cybersecurity, and digital cooperation as well as
several other climate-specific initiatives discussed previously.
For all its deficiencies and shortcomings, ASEAN remains a central pillar of Singapore’s foreign policy and
an instrumental vehicle for navigating the centrifugal pressures of great-power competition. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Singapore’s website highlights that “Singapore was one of the founding members of
ASEAN when it was formed on 8 August 1967, along with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
As a small nation-state, Singapore strongly supports ASEAN’s goal of building a strong, prosperous and
rules-based ASEAN.”58 Through ASEAN, Singapore has also expressed growing concern for how great-power
competition tests the sacrosanct principles of the rule of law and the multilateral order. In 2018, Lee Hsien
Loong emphasized, “The international order is at a turning point. The existing free, open and rules-based
multilateral system which has underpinned ASEAN’s growth and stability, has come under stress. Countries,
including major powers, are resorting to unilateral actions and bilateral deals, and even explicitly repudiating
multilateral approaches and institutions.”59
Managing the effects of escalating U.S.-China competition while maintaining its centrality in the regional
architecture has been a major preoccupation for Singapore’s? ASEAN diplomacy. Within Southeast Asia,
Singapore has been arguably the most forthright and vocal on the issue. During his tenure as prime minister,
Lee made clear the Singaporean view that the United States was the irreplaceable security guarantor in
Southeast Asia: With regards to China, he also expressed that ASEAN’s interests lie not in casting Beijing as
an adversary, but rather as a partner: “ASEAN cannot counterbalance China [though we] can complement
China, yes.”60
A prime example of how ASEAN manages the great-power competition unfolding in their backyard is the
organization’s response to the challenge of the “Indo-Pacific” concept articulated by President Trump in 2017.
To counter potential threats of its regional centrality, ASEAN moved quickly to conceptualize its own version
of the Indo-Pacific: the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Adopted by all 10 member states at their
Bangkok Summit in June 2019, the AOIP sought to reaffirm ASEAN’s leading role in “shaping and leading
the evolving regional architecture that is built upon ASEAN-led mechanisms and to ensure that geopolitical
and geostrategic shifts will continue to bring about, and not disrupt, peace, security, stability and prosperity
for peoples in the Southeast Asia as well as in the wider Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions or the Indo-
Pacific.”61 While the AOIP is not without its shortcomings and there is an increasingly urgent need for operationalization,
ASEAN’s ability to reach an agreement and come together on its own conception of regional
order is significant. In the face of an evolving strategic landscape, the organization still plays a valuable role
for members such as Singapore in navigating new challenges.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Singapore undoubtedly benefited from a global order sustained by U.S. military and economic power for a
quarter of a century after the Cold War. But that era has passed. Consequently, Singapore must revisit and
recalibrate some fundamental foreign policy assumptions, including the existence of an open trading order,
stable great-power relationships, and the ability to maneuver autonomously without making strategic alignment
choices. In their place, the nation must contend with rising global populism and protectionism deepening
great-power competition that creates centrifugal pressure, and a geopolitical climate where international
law is transgressed with impunity by use of force. Against this backdrop, the deterioration of U.S.-China
relations remains the paramount concern.
Singapore has responded proactively to this changing landscape. It has actively engaged both the United
States and China, seeking to strengthen its bilateral relations with both powers while successfully sidestepping
(at least so far) the risks posed by the two countries’ deteriorating relationship. At the same time, in the
absence of definitive global leadership from either the United States or China, Singapore has endeavored to
play an active, forward-leaning role on issues critical to its interests in the coming years.
With these considerations in mind, the following discussion outlines key guiding principles that should inform
and govern how great powers formulate policies toward Singapore, and small states more generally, against
the backdrop of their own competitive relationship.
First, like the vast majority of states, Singapore does not wish to see the competitive relationship between
the United States and China slide into conflict. A full-blown trade war and technological decoupling would
be immensely damaging for both great powers but devastating for Singapore. The situation could worsen for
all parties concerned if the bilateral relationship turns conflictual. To that end, the United States and China
should take great care to maintain effective communications channels and robust guardrails to prevent conflict.
Moreover, these channels must be able to withstand inevitable crises and downturns in the relationship.
Second, given both countries’ strong relations with Singapore, they should not only respect the sovereignty
of the city-state but advocate for its preservation by rejecting policies or positions that pressure Singapore
to undermine its own interests. For instance, Singapore’s value to the United States and China stems from
its reliability as a principled partner. Forcing the nation to choose sides would undermine the very principles
that make it a valuable partner, to the detriment of any strategic advantages both powers seek in the Indo-
Pacific region.
Third, a great power that foists alignment on smaller states risks unintended outcomes. Such pressure could
ultimately undermine its own interests, create distrust, and diminish its credibility.62 More to the point, it
could trigger balancing behavior, where small states choose to align against the source of pressure.
Fourth, the United States and China should both invest political, economic, and diplomatic equity in ASEAN
and the wider regional architecture. Such a move would be of great value to Singapore, but more importantly,
it would help the great powers advance their own interests. This entails more than paying lip service to
ASEAN “centrality” in regional affairs; it requires more concrete commitments to regional stability, such as
exercising restraint in the South China Sea or enhancing economic partnerships with the region.
Based on these broader guiding principles, the following sections offer specific policy recommendations for
Washington and Beijing.
The United States
• Maintain a “small yard” approach to its regulatory and punitive measures against China, particularly in
the area of technology development. Although the Biden administration originated the “small yard, high
fence” concept, and it has since been jettisoned by President Donald Trump, the principle still holds.
While Singapore understands U.S. concerns about China, punitive measures against Beijing should still
be carefully calibrated to avoid fundamentally undermining Chinese growth. This is not out of altruism
but because Singapore’s economic growth and well-being — and that of many other U.S. partners —
remains deeply tied to China.
• Enhance contributions to regional security by strengthening bilateral defense relations with Singapore.
The United States should build on the U.S.-Singapore Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement to
focus on critical and emerging technologies. Deepening technology access for Singapore would foster
more robust coordination and interoperability.
• Maintain a strong economic footprint in the region through deepening economic engagement with
Singapore, leveraging the city-state’s reputation as a global financial and trading hub. Notwithstanding
the Trump administration’s nationalist and transactional approach to trade, a strong U.S. presence in the
regional economic architecture would be of great benefit to regional prosperity and stability. Additionally,
it would bolster Washington’s position in in a high-growth market.
China
• Leverage its strong economic relationship with Singapore to enhance its role in the region through the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Specifically, China should work on green finance
and digital trade and governance frameworks. These are not only new areas for promote regional economic
development but would also strengthen China’s efforts to further internationalize the RMB.
• Play a stabilizing role in regional security by exercising restraint in South China Sea disputes, acknowledging
the inherent power asymmetry between itself and other claimants. In the same vein, Beijing would
do well to respect the role of international law in managing these disputes.
• Diversify its cultural diplomacy to expand outreach beyond ethnic Chinese communities in Singapore.
This would help dispel concerns that Beijing might leverage its cultural appeal and deep commercial
ties to influence foreign policies in states with sizable ethnic Chinese populations. China should recognize
that Singapore’s national identity is deliberately multicultural and multiethnic. The assumption
that ethnic Chinese Singaporeans should somehow be more sympathetic to Beijing’s interests is not
only unfounded but also invariably risk misperceptions and misinterpretations, undermining bilateral
relations.
