Will Putin Resume Mobilization? If So, When and Why?

Yet another point in the debate regarding the Russia-Ukraine war that I have found recently recurring across international media coverage of this conflict, is whether Russian President Vladimir Putin will order another partial mobilization as soon as next month. In fact, multiple Ukrainian officials, Western analysts and opposition-minded commentators argue that the Kremlin is likely to be preparing a new round of mobilization after the Sept. 18-20, 2026 elections to the State Duma (see compilation below). It follows from their observations that mobilization will resume after this election so that such an unpopular action doesn’t reduce real support for Russia’s main pro-Kremlin party (United Russia) in the next iteration of the lower and more powerful chamber of the Russian national parliament. 

In contrast to their Ukrainian counterparts, Russian officials are staunchly denying any plans for resuming mobilization, which they claim to be unnecessary (also see compilation below). It should be noted here that Russian officials had deniedthere would be a mobilization shortly before Putin signed Decree N647 “On the declaration of partial mobilization in the Russian Federation” on Sept. 21, 2022, to compel as many as 300,000 Russian reservists to re-enter military service. Still, no matter how accurate (and sincere) the recent assessments of whether Putin will resume mobilization are, it is worth asking: What factors might shape the Russian leader’s decision on whether to order such a resumption this fall other than the Duma elections? Here are some in no particular order.

Situation on the battlefield: If Russian forces make significant gains with the existing level of personnel, the Russian leadership may judge that level is sufficient to eventually capture the Donbas region, which is something Putin has repeatedly publicly vowed to do in one way (war) or another (negotiations). In contrast, higher losses in stalled offensives could increase pressure for the mobilization of additional personnel. After all, hundreds of thousands of newly-recruited soldiers could, if adequately trained, equipped and commanded, make a tangible contribution to the Russian armed forces’ efforts to break the relative stalemate on the front.

Rate of voluntary recruitment: If the current rate of recruitment of volunteers and contract soldiers meets the Russian military’s current manpower needs, then the need for additional mobilization obviously diminishes. If recruitment slows, however, as some have claimed it has, then the incentive for mobilization grows, also obviously, ceteris paribus.   

Public mood: Putin needs to consider how Russian society will react to the resumption of mobilization, the Fall 2022 iteration of which dented Putin’s popularity and was followed by the departure of tens of thousands from Russia. (That said, Putin—whose approval currently hovers above70%—can afford for it to decline somewhat).

Labor constraints: Mobilization would remove more workers from an economy that already lacks 4.8 million workers.

New arms: Changes in Western military assistance to Ukraine, such as the delivery of long-range high-speed, high payload attack systems and interceptors of ballistic missiles (unlikely in the near future) or Ukraine completing the development of such systems itself, could prompt Putin to allow Russian generals to recruit more personnel, if only to compensate for the tilt in the correlation of military systems. 

Changes in Putin’s strategic objectives: With no public deadline set for capturing the entirety of Donbas, Putin can probably afford to keep mobilization on hold until the end of this fall, if not longer, if he believes private assurances by the Russian military that they will manage to subdue all of Donbas in that season. But what if Putin has or develops an appetite for something grander than swallowing the remainder of Donbas and turning Russia’s control of other parts of Ukraine captured and kept since February 2022 into a buffer zone? That would, most probably, require increasing the flow of soldiers to the forefront of Russia’s so-called special military operation, even if Russian officials’ claims that the Russian military is recruiting more volunteers to fight in Ukraine than it is losing there are true. “Appétit vient en mangeant,” as the French say.

Which of these factors play out and how is something I cannot know. What I do know is that keeping an eye on them can help to answer the key questions in the headline of this piece.

Recent Public Statements by Russian, Ukrainian and Western Sources on Possible Russian Mobilization (in chronological order)

Question 1: Who in Russia, Ukraine and the West has said there is going to be a mobilization in Russia this year? 

Russian sources

• Eight anonymous sources working with or close to Russia’s Presidential Administration said that a new mobilization was being discussed at every level of government, although no final decision had been made. (Meduza, 06.24.26)
• A source who oversees the recruitment process at one of Russia’s state corporations said that preparatory measures “for what will never be called mobilization” have been underway “for several months already.” (Meduza, 06.24.26)
• An anonymous Russian general said a new mobilization was “entirely possible,” particularly if the Kremlin demanded sufficient forces to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held areas of Donbas. The anonymous general said that Russia would need to replace “at least 55,000-60,000 casualties every month” in order to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held areas of the Donbas. (The Moscow Times, 07.21.26)
• Russian opposition media source Verstka reported on July 28, citing sources in and close to the Russian government, that Russian officials are discussing the potential introduction of new restrictions on the Russian population in the event of a mobilization after the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections. (ISW, 07.28.26)
• Kremlin officials are reportedly considering a wide range of options to support a potential mobilization in the future, as Russian President Vladimir Putin likely continues to weigh his options. (ISW, 07.28.26)
• Re: Russia contributors wrote that Russia “is failing to achieve its objectives in the war of attrition,” a third phase is only possible through “escalation of the conflict and the mobilization of additional Russian resources,” outlining four options: “1) nuclear escalation; 2) a hybrid conflict in Europe…; 3) a second round of ‘partial’ mobilization; 4) a ‘coercive campaign’” of intensified strikes on Ukrainian energy and logistics. (Re: Russia, 07.28.26)
• Alexander Gabuev, Alexandra Prokopenko and Tatiana Stanovaya wrote that strategically, Putin believes he retains an edge through “the destructiveness of his ballistic missiles” and a coming, quieter electronic mobilization; as long as he thinks he can “wear Ukraine down,” the authors conclude, he sees “little need to negotiate.” (Foreign Affairs, 07.31.26)

Ukrainian sources

• Ukrainian MP Roman Kostenko warns in a June 6, 2026, interview that the mobilization of 300,000–500,000 troops in Russia could become a turning point in the war. The war could also reach a turning point if Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons at the front, Kostenko claims, adding that such a scenario “cannot be ruled out.” The MP—who is the secretary of the parliament’s security, defense and intelligence committee and a member of Rada’s Holos faction—claims that Russia might employ tactical nukes “to break through the forward edge of defense.” ("Zhovti Kedi with Yulia Borisko,” 06.06.26)
• Ukrainian defense analyst Mykola Bielieskov, a research fellow at Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies, wrote that “everything” pointed toward a large-scale Russian mobilization in the coming months. (Atlantic Council, 07.04.26)
• Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation said Russia was planning to mobilize more than 500,000 people in autumn 2026 to replace battlefield losses and possibly create forces for operations on another axis. (Kyiv Post, 07.18.26)
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: “Our intelligence reports that he is preparing for mobilization. He wants to do it after his elections to the Duma on Sept. 21. He wants to increase mobilization. Not openly, because he is afraid of his society, but he will do it at the beginning of October, if we don’t cause him problems with logistics, weapons, petrol, diesel and if our partners don’t impose total sanctions for his aggression.” (Zelenskyy’s X account/Sky News, 07.27.26)

Western sources

• Andrew Berrier of Delphi Global Research Center wrote: “Russian mobilization in 2026: the odds are even.” (Delphi Global Research Center, 07.23.26)
• Washington Post columnist David Ignatius assessed the likelihood that Putin would order a general mobilization to gain an advantage in the war as “at least 50/50,” saying Putin would otherwise need President Trump to find him a way out. (The Washington Post, 07.27.26)
• The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Putin was very likely preparing to compensate for the exhaustion of voluntary recruitment by mobilizing parts of Russia’s reserve in 2026, probably through a rolling or disguised process rather than a single openly declared call-up. (ISW, 07.27.26)
• Lawrence Freedman wrote: There is “evidence that more compulsion has already entered the recruitment process, and the need for more bodies at the front is likely to lead to there being more. It will probably be incremental than a sudden mobilization of hundreds of thousands, depending on the state of the fighting. It may also depend on the state of the economy.” (Freedman’s Substack, 07.29.26)
• The headline of a Thomas Grove and Daria Matviichuk article in WSJ: “The Kremlin Is Bullying More Russians Into Fighting in Ukraine: Measures increasingly include beatings and manipulation, fueling expectations of a second forced mobilization.” (Wall Street Journal, 08.02.26)
• U.S. officials say the Kremlin is still weighing the possibility of calling another round of forced mobilization, which could bring another several thousand soldiers to the front. Such a measure, they say, would likely come after Russian parliamentary elections, slated for Sept. 20. (Wall Street Journal, 08.02.26)

Question 2: Did any of those who said there’s going to be a mobilization in Russia this year specify in what month mobilization could happen?

Russian sources 

• Sources close to the Russian presidential administration told Vyorstka and IStories that although officials were weighing various options to expand the army, no final decision had been made. A source close to the Kremlin’s domestic policy bloc said, “rumors were circulating” that “something could happen” in October, after the State Duma elections. (The Moscow Times, 07.21.26)

Ukrainian sources

• Ukrainian defense analyst Mykola Bielieskov predicted mobilization in the coming months and said official confirmation was unlikely before Russia’s September 2026 parliamentary elections. (Atlantic Council, 07.04.26)
• Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation said the mobilization was being prepared for autumn 2026. (Kyiv Post, 07.18.26)
• Zelenskyy said Putin could begin the mobilization at the beginning of October unless Ukraine and its partners first disrupted Russian logistics, fuel supplies and weapons production and imposed stronger sanctions. (United24 Media, 07.27.26)
• Zelenskyy said the call-up could begin in late September or early October, following Russia’s State Duma elections. (Kyiv Post, 07.27.26)

Western sources

• Sources inside Russia are reportedly discussing rumors of another large-scale mobilization to rapidly provide the Russian military with thousands more people and resources after Russia’s September elections. (Delphi Global Research Center, 07.23.26)
• Latvia’s intelligence service assessed that the likelihood would rise after Russia’s September elections. (LRT, 07.25.26)
• The Institute for the Study of War wrote that Russia’s voluntary recruitment pool was approaching exhaustion, making some form of reserve mobilization increasingly likely. (ISW, 07.27.26)
• U.S. officials say the Kremlin is still weighing the possibility of calling another round of forced mobilization, which could bring another several thousand soldiers to the front. Such a measure, they say, would likely come after Russian parliamentary elections, slated for Sept. 20. (Wall Street Journal, 08.02.26)

Question 3: Did any of those who said there’s going to be a mobilization in Russia this year specify why mobilization could happen?

Russian sources 

• An anonymous Russian general said substantially more personnel would be required if the General Staff were ordered to seize all remaining Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donbas; he estimated a need to replace at least 55,000–60,000 casualties per month. (The Moscow Times, 07.21.26)
• “What could Russia do with a new wave of mobilization? It could quickly expand the number of reserve regiments,” Russian military analyst Dmitry Kuznets said. “But these units would not be able to operate effectively.” “Simply increasing the number of personnel in the military grouping would not lead to a comparable improvement in combat effectiveness.” (The Moscow Times, 07.21.26)
• Anonymous Russian government and security sources said mobilization was being considered because fewer Russians were willing to sign military contracts and many of those being recruited were medically or militarily unsuitable. (LRT, 07.25.26)

Ukrainian sources

• Ukrainian defense analyst Mykola Bielieskov said Russia’s volunteer pool and supply of recruitable prisoners were diminishing, while Putin still needed to preserve Russia’s manpower advantage, regain the battlefield initiative and avoid the failure of his invasion. (Atlantic Council, 07.04.26)
• Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation said the proposed call-up was intended to replace battlefield losses and potentially provide personnel for opening a new operational axis. (The New Voice of Ukraine, 07.18.26)
• Zelenskyy said mobilization was being prepared because Russian battlefield losses—about 225,500 killed or wounded in 2026, according to his figures—had overtaken recruitment of approximately 221,000 personnel. (The Kyiv Independent, 07.26.26)

Western sources

• The Delphi Global Research Center identified battlefield setbacks, manpower strains and conditions resembling the period preceding the September 2022 mobilization as factors increasing the risk of another call-up. (Delphi Global Research Center, 07.23.26)
• Washington Post columnist David Ignatius said the pressure for mobilization arose because “something has to give.” Putin would either mobilize to gain an advantage or seek a Trump-brokered way out of the war. (The Washington Post, 07.27.26)

Question 4: Who in Russia, Ukraine and the West said there is not going to be a mobilization in Russia this year?

Russian sources 

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev said there was “no necessity whatsoever” to announce a new wave of mobilization at the present time. (Meduza, 03.27.26)
• Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the Russian authorities were not planning a new mobilization “in the near future” and that the issue was not on the government’s agenda. (The Moscow Times, 03.30.26)
• Russian military analyst Dmitry Kuznets said Russia was still replacing battlefield losses with contract recruits, showed no widespread evidence of large units being chronically understrength, and lacked the command structures, officers and equipment needed to turn a mass influx of mobilized personnel into a comparable increase in combat effectiveness. He also noted serious federal and regional budget constraints. (The Moscow Times, 07.21.26)
• Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, called rumors of a new mobilization this fall “nonsense” and a Ukrainian “lying provocation,” saying about 200,000 people signed contracts with the Defense Ministry in the first six months of 2026. He cited this figure to argue additional mobilization is unnecessary. However, sources cited by Meduza and other outlets report a gradual decline in volunteers, forcing authorities to raise payments and intensify recruitment, while the Kremlin reportedly weighs a new draft wave after the September State Duma elections—matching Ukrainian intelligence claims that Putin plans post‑election mobilization. (Meduza, 07.28.26)
• As stated above, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, called rumors of a new mobilization this fall “nonsense” and a Ukrainian “lying provocation,” saying about 200,000 people signed contracts with the Defense Ministry in the first six months of 2026. He cited this figure to argue additional mobilization is unnecessary. (Meduza, 07.28.26)
• Moscow will not declare full-scale mobilization after September elections to the State Duma, Russian political scientist Ivan Preobrazhensky told NV Radio on July 28. (NV.ua, 07.28.26)
• “There is absolutely no need for mobilization today. The military commissariats are coping with the tasks assigned to them,” Viktor Sobolev, a member of the State Duma's Defense Committee, told NEWS.ru. (News.ru, 07.29.26) Note the word “today.” It reminds one of Peskov’s assurance a week ahead of the launch of partial mobilization in September 2022 that no partial or full mobilization is being discussed “in the current moment.” It is also worth noting that Sobolev believes the Russian armed forces should reach Ukraine’s Western borders. Doing so without significant reinforcements would be difficult along the current trends.

Ukrainian sources

• None found.

Western sources

• Maksym Beznosiuk and William Dixon wrote: “The [Russian] state treasury, already strained, cannot fund any new serious mobilization or breakthrough in the Donbas.” (Foreign Policy, 07.28.26)

Question 5: Of those who said there is not going to be a mobilization in Russia this year, did any say why it would not happen?

Russian sources 

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev said mobilization was unnecessary because the number of contract soldiers and volunteers was sufficient to accomplish Russia’s military tasks. He said Russia had recruited more than 400,000 contract personnel in 2025 and over 80,000 contract soldiers since the beginning of 2026, in addition to volunteers. (Meduza, 03.27.26)
• Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said force generation through contract recruitment was continuing at a satisfactory pace and that the available personnel were sufficient for current combat tasks. (The Moscow Times, 03.30.26)
• Russian political scientist Ivan Preobrazhensky said he is skeptical that a major mobilization wave is in the cards. He argued that Russian authorities are currently supplying enough fighters to the front through volunteer contracts and other means and are increasingly pressuring people to sign up. In some cases, he said, enlistment results from coercion; in others, people sign up after losing businesses or livelihoods. (NV.ua, 07.28.26)

Ukrainian sources

• Maksym Beznosiuk and William Dixon wrote: “The state treasury, already strained, cannot fund any new serious mobilization or breakthrough in the Donbas.” (Foreign Policy, 07.28.26)

Western sources

• None found.

Endnotes

1. I would note that de jure Putin would not have to announce a new mobilization, because the one he ordered to commence on Sept. 21, 2022, mobilizing more than 300,000, never formally ended as it included no expiration date.  
2. I would also note that at minimum, rudimentary re-training of mobilized soldiers will take around four weeks, so it won’t be until mid-October that the first of those mobilized right after the Duma elections would arrive at the front.
3. To seize all of the remaining Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donbas, Russian forces will need to replace at least 55,000–60,000 casualties per month, according to an anonymous Russian general cited by The Moscow Times last month.
4. Russia’s Labor Ministry is estimating that the country will need 10.9 million new workers by 2030.
5. One should not expect, however, a wonder weapon of the kind that first Javelins, then HIMARS, F-16s and now Patriots, among other systems, were hoped to become.
6. Prior to the domination of drones in this war  one reason Putin may have wanted mobilization to resume sooner rather than later this year, is that fall is traditionally the mud season in Ukraine, which used to slow ground operations. However, with drones all but ending large mechanized offensives and forcing the attacking side to infiltrate in small numbers, that factor’s importance has diminished.

Opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author. Photo: Russian recruits take a train at a railway station in Prudboi, in Russia’s Volgograd region, Thursday, Sept. 29, 2022. President Vladimir Putin announced a partial mobilization, the first since World War II, amid the war in Ukraine. (AP Photo, File)

Simon Saradzhyan is the founding director of Russia Matters.