Articles

Pakistan has developed tactical nuclear weapons to deter India from executing its Cold Start war doctrine. India, however, has disavowed that doctrine. Further, the use of such weapons against Indian troops inside Pakistan would kill and injure countless civilians, while risking massive nuclear retaliation by India. In this International Security article, Jaganath Sankaran argues Pakistan should reconsider the role of tactical nuclear weapons in its military strategy.

Anit Mukherjee and George Perkovich respond to Gaurav Kampani's spring 2014 International Security article, "New Delhi's Long Nuclear Journey: How Secrecy and International Roadblocks Delayed India's Weaponization."

When do states acquire nuclear weapons? History shows that only two types of states decide that the bomb is essential to their security: 1) very powerful states; and 2) weak states that lack ironclad security guarantees.

"Gaurav Kampani investigates a crucial research puzzle in nuclear proliferation literature, namely, the possible underpinnings of India's slow weaponization process. Addressing the period 1989-1999, he argues that despite acquiring nuclear weapons in 1989–1990, New Delhi lacked the capability to 'deliver them reliably or safely until 1994–95 or possibly 1996.'"...

Policymakers have long focused on preventing nuclear weapons proliferation by controlling technology. Even developing countries, however, may now possess the technical ability to create nuclear weapons. The history of gas centrifuge development in twenty countries supports this perspective. To reduce the demand for nuclear weapons, policymakers will have look toward the cultural, normative, and political organization of the world.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many international observers came to perceive India as a de facto nuclear power. New evidence shows, however, that India lacked the technical means to deliver nuclear weapons reliably until 1994–95. Further, political leaders did not render the weapons militarily operational until 1999. These deficiencies can be traced to a regime of secrecy stemming from Indian decisionmakers’ fear of international pressures for nuclear rollback.

Expanding energy access to the rural population of India presents a critical challenge for its government. The presence of 364 million people without access to electricity and 726 million who rely on biomass for cooking indicate both the failure of past policies and programs, and the need for a radical redesign of the current system. We propose an integrated implementation framework with recommendations for adopting business principles with innovative institutional, regulatory, financing and delivery mechanisms.

India's rural energy challenges are formidable with the presence of majority energy poor. In 2005, out of a rural population of 809 million, 364 million lacked access to electricity and 726 million to modern cooking fuels. This indicates low effectiveness of government policies and programs of the past, and need for a more effective approach to bridge this gap. However, before the government can address this challenge, it is essential that it gain a deeper insight into prevailing status of energy access and reasons for such outcomes. Toward this, we perform a critical analysis of the dynamics of energy access status with respect to time, income and regions, and present the results as possible indicators of effectiveness of policies/programmes.

In 1985, researchers at the Harvard Kennedy School published a book called “Hawks, Doves, and Owls,” and gave it an ambitious subtitle: “An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War.” Those scholars gathered again at the School on Monday (May 16) for a seminar on the current challenges in avoiding nuclear war — and to marvel at just how drastically the nuclear threat has morphed in the two decades since the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed.

Recent national trends in investments in global energy research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) are inconsistent around the world. Public RD&D investments in energy are the metric most commonly used in international comparative assessments of energy-technology innovation, and the metric employed in this article. Overall, the data indicate that International Energy Agency (IEA) member country government investments have been volatile: they peaked in the late 1970s, declined during the subsequent two decades, bottomed out in 1997, and then began to gradually grow again during the 2000s.