Policy Briefs & Testimonies

10 Items

NATO’s new headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, January 14, 2018.

NATO Photo

Policy Brief - Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship and the German Council on Foreign Relations

Transatlantic Action Plan: Security and Defense

| February 2021

Within NATO, and in U.S.–EU and NATO–EU relations, considerable effort will have to go into: rebuilding trust; strengthening democratic governance and shared values; aligning threat perceptions; breaking down barriers to collaboration; maximizing defense value for money; and tackling new and emerging challenges collectively. No problem can be solved successfully by the U.S. alone, by NATO alone, or just in the U.S.–EU context. The most effective approaches will combine the institutional strengths of both NATO and the EU and all 36 of their respective member states.

Combined troops from Austria, Belgium, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom take part in the BLACK BLADE 2016 helicopter exercise organized by the European Defense Agency, November 17, 2016

EDA photo / Maximilian Fischer

Policy Brief

A Europe that Protects? U.S. Opportunities in EU Defense

| November 2019

Europe has embarked on a generationally significant increase in its defense ambition. New European Union defense policy, funding, and capability development initiatives, as well as closer EU-NATO cooperation, carry opportunities for the United States. Where EU defense efforts historically fell short, the United States can now focus on the overarching shared interest in a stronger Europe that is less dependent on the United States for its security and defense.

Testimony

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, and European Security

| July 7, 2016

On the eve of the Warsaw NATO Summit, Professor Burns and his Co-Chair of a recent Atlantic Council report on NATO, General Jim Jones, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. They described the current situation in Europe—including Putin's widespread aggression, a weakening European Union, the tsunami of instability from the Middle East and uncertain western leadership—as the greatest threat to peace since the end of the Cold War. 



They advocated strong measures in response including the permanent stationing of NATO forces in Poland, the Baltic States, the Black Sea and the Arctic.  We also advocated that the U.S. and EU maintain sanctions on Russia for its illegal division of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.

Supreme Allied Commander Europe Admiral James G. Stavridis, General David H. Petraeus (new Commander of ISAF) and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen during a news conference at NATO Headquarters, July 1, 2010.

DoD Photo

Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

NATO in Afghanistan: Turning Retreat into Victory

| December 2013

NATO after Afghanistan is an organization that suffers from a certain fatigue pertaining to future stabilization challenges. NATO will not automatically cease to conduct operations after 2014, but the level of ambition will be lower. The Afghanistan experience and the failures of the light footprint approach calls for a thinking that is less liberalist "in the abstract" and more focused on provision of basic services (security, development, and governance).

In this March 2, 2011 photo, Libyan protesters burn copies of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's "Green Book" during a demonstration against him in Benghazi, eastern Libya.

AP Photo/ Kevin Frayer

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene

| September 2013

"The biggest misconception about NATO's intervention is that it saved lives and benefited Libya and its neighbors. In reality, when NATO intervened in mid-March 2011, Qaddafi already had regained control of most of Libya, while the rebels were retreating rapidly toward Egypt. Thus, the conflict was about to end, barely six weeks after it started, at a toll of about 1,000 dead, including soldiers, rebels, and civilians caught in the crossfire. By intervening, NATO enabled the rebels to resume their attack, which prolonged the war for another seven months and caused at least 7,000 more deaths."

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Why America Should Not Retrench

| March 2013

The United States' extended system of security commitments creates a set of institutional relationships that foster political communication. Alliance institutions are first about security protection, but they also bind states together and create institutional channels of communication. For example, NATO has facilitated ties and associated institutions that increase the ability of the United States and Europe to talk to each other and to do business. Likewise, the bilateral alliances in East Asia also play a communication role beyond narrow security issues. Consultations and exchanges spill over into other policy areas. This gives the United States the capacity to work across issue areas, using assets and bargaining chips in one area to make progress in another.

The Euro sculpture sits in front of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, Germany, Apr. 28, 2010. Three weeks away from potential default, Greece saw its borrowing costs spiral higher, a day after Standard & Poor's downgraded its bonds to junk status.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

A Bleak Future for the European Project

| May 2011

"...[A]bsent an overwhelming threat, the Europeans have had little reason to maintain their economic union. This is not to argue that the demise of the Soviet Union has given them a reason to dismantle the EU—only that it has removed their incentive to preserve it. Consequently, the EU has started to fray as member states have put national interests ahead of those of the union."

China's President Hu Jintao, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin walk to their positions for a group photo at the Shanghai International Convention Center in China, June 15, 2006.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Prestige Matters: Chinese and Russian Status Concerns and U.S. Foreign Policy

    Authors:
  • Deborah Welch Larson
  • Alexei Shevchenko
| April 2010

"China and Russia are more likely to engage in constructive status-seeking behavior if the United States finds ways to recognize their international status and distinctive identities. For example, strategic dialogues, formal summits, and strategic partnerships can help to establish issue agendas for future collaboration and symbolize that states are political equals. Engagement through trade and investment does not resolve conflicting political goals."

Sniper James Sudlow of 1st The Queens Dragoon Guards trains his scope on the Nawar region of Helmand province, Afghanistan, to help locate enemy forces in a fire fight between the Taliban and the Afghan National Army, Dec. 18, 2008.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - UK National Defence Association

The Next Government Must Fund Britain's Armed Forces to Match the Many and Growing Threats to National Security

| September 2009

"The choice facing the next Prime Minister and government is clear. On the one hand, he can continue the policy of the present Government. This will result in a slow slide down the second division of nations, an inability to defend the sea passages on which our global trade and standard of living depend (ninety per cent of our trade still comes by sea), an inability to secure our growing imported energy supplies and the vital food supplies which we in this country take for granted.

Or, the next Government can resist this decline, hold firm against the pressure to reduce defence funding, and provide an adequate defence provision with contingency reserve capability for all three Services. If this decision is made, it should be done as a deliberate and well researched policy."