Middle East & North Africa

"...[A]s disconcerting as the overcrowding and financial strain are, they are not as troubling as the prospect of the prison system becoming a breeding ground for a new insurgency, as was the case with the U.S. prison system in Iraq. There, incarcerated insurgent leaders used their time to develop strategies and recruit new fighters for radical groups."

"What happens when, after another dozen major attacks, the chain of their barbarism outpaces the chain of our human solidarity? When is the permissible moment to start asking if we can muster as much wisdom and realism to fight terror as we do to harness emotions of solidarity? The recent increasing pace and widening geographic scope of terror suggest we are dealing with a qualitatively new kinds of terrorists — but the policy responses of governments and the emotional responses of entire societies suggest we have no idea how to respond to quell this monster."

Faced with an extremist prisoner population numbered in the thousands, Saudi officials developed tools intending to prevent prisoner radicalization, to mitigate the risk when an alleged or convicted terrorist was released, and to deal with domestic political concerns about prisoner treatment. What emerged was a unique and highly tailored approach that included rehabilitation-oriented programs in prisons and at prisoner rehabilitation centers, and 'aftercare' support for recently released prisoners.

The dramatic developments in Egypt since June 30 will continue to unfold at a brisk pace and many outcomes are possible, but we can draw four main lessons from the events to date, related to the Muslim Brotherhood, the opposition, the armed forces, and the citizenry as a whole and its determination to complete the democratic transition that started in January 2011. This week’s events and what is to follow are the inevitable attempt by masses of ordinary Egyptians to transform the “popular legitimacy” that was born in January 2011 into institutions of participation and accountability in the public political realm.

The risks posed by the proliferation of cyber weapons are gaining wide recognition among security planners. Yet the general reaction of scholars of international relations has been to neglect the cyber peril owing to its technical novelties and intricacies. This attitude amounts to either one or both of two claims: the problem is not of sufficient scale to warrant close inspection, or it is not comprehensible to a non-technical observer. This seminar challenged both assertions.

"The recent hacker exchange should also remind us that just as hacking could escalate to the use of conventional force in the Middle East, the reverse is also true. Bombing Iran, for example, could unleash an Iranian government cyber attack. Israelis say they could handle that, despite the recent evidence to the contrary. Unfortunately, much of the critical infrastructure in the U.S. is still not ready for a sophisticated nation-state cyber attack either."

"Instead of calling for military action to replace slow diplomatic efforts, Obama is using the case to justify harsher diplomatic efforts. Until more facts are disclosed, the true nature of Iran's intentions are merely subject for speculation. Was it an assassination attempt? Was it a ruse? Was it a crazy overreach by low-level officials? Until we know more, tougher economic sanctions are justified, while rumors about the stability of the regime and its control over subordinates can flourish. In any case, US interest is being served."

"Cybersecurity is a means to enable social stability and promote digital democracy; a method by which to govern the Internet; and a process by which to secure critical infrastructure from cybercrime, cyberespionage, cyberterrorism and cyberwar. As nations and corporations recognize their dependence on ICT, policymakers must find the proper balance in protecting their investments without strangling future growth."

"If we accept the charges made in the complaint and take Arbabsiar's words at face-value, we know that two Quds Force officers unsuccessfully and sloppily arranged, through intermediaries they thought to be associates of a Mexican drug cartel, to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, D.C.  There is no evidence in the complaint to support the claim that other elements of the Iranian government knew about, approved of, or ordered this plot."