To compete and thrive in the 21st century, democracies, and the United States in particular, must develop new national security and economic strategies that address the geopolitics of information. In the 20th century, market capitalist democracies geared infrastructure, energy, trade, and even social policy to protect and advance that era’s key source of power—manufacturing. In this century, democracies must better account for information geopolitics across all dimensions of domestic policy and national strategy.
In 1998, when India tested nuclear weapons, the U.S. President said that the country was "on the wrong side of history." Only seven years later, the United States recognized India as a responsible holder of nuclear weapons. Similarly, in the early 1960s, China was considered to be incapable of deterrence and unwilling to stem proliferation. China is now an integral part of the Nuclear Weapon States club.
By investigating the ways in which China and India, on acquiring nuclear weapons, engaged in the project of reassurance, scholars and policymakers can draw out implications for disarmament and global stability.
Theorizing about deterrence has focused on ways in which states establish that they have the capability and will for retaliation. Less attention has been paid to the ways in which states credibly communicate that they can—and will—use their nuclear arsenals as deterrents (not adventurism or coercion). Even less effort is devoted to understanding reassurance that is targeted not at specific adversaries but at the international community in general.
This seminar presents the project's theoretical framework, research methodology, and preliminary hypotheses about the Indian case.
PLEASE NOTE NEW LOCATION!
Co-sponsored by Project on Managing the Atom
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.