Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security
Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation
Summary
Given the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, understanding the views of China’s strategic community toward nuclear escalation is critical for both scholars and policymakers. China’s strategic community is confident that nuclear war can be avoided in a conventional conflict, but should deterrence fail, this same community believes that the ensuing nuclear conflict would be uncontrollable. U.S. decisionmakers, however, are more certain that nuclear conflict can be controlled and that limited nuclear war can be a tool of coercion. Taken together, these opposing beliefs increase the risk of nuclear escalation and can lead to greater crisis instability.
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The full text of this publication is available via MIT Press.
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For Academic Citation:
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation,” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Fall 2019), pp. 61–109, doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00359.
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Summary
Given the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, understanding the views of China’s strategic community toward nuclear escalation is critical for both scholars and policymakers. China’s strategic community is confident that nuclear war can be avoided in a conventional conflict, but should deterrence fail, this same community believes that the ensuing nuclear conflict would be uncontrollable. U.S. decisionmakers, however, are more certain that nuclear conflict can be controlled and that limited nuclear war can be a tool of coercion. Taken together, these opposing beliefs increase the risk of nuclear escalation and can lead to greater crisis instability.
Want to Read More?
The full text of this publication is available via MIT Press.Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation,” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Fall 2019), pp. 61–109, doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00359.
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The Stopping Power of Norms: Saturation Bombing, Civilian Immunity, and U.S. Attitudes toward the Laws of War
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The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy: The Case for No First Use
Discussion Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Why the United States Should Spread Democracy
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David Petraeus on Strategic Leadership


