The Flawed Case for Missile Defense

The Flawed Case for Missile Defence

Steven E. Miller
Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government

The Bush administration assumed office deeply committed to the deployment of missile defence and eager to modify substantially or even to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to achieve that objective. The president and his team, naturally, are eager to persuade sceptics at home and abroad of the merits of their approach to missile defence or, at least, to minimise the diplomatic costs of and the domestic political opposition to their preferred course of action. However, it seems more likely that other powers, whether friends and allies or potential adversaries, will bow to the inevitable rather than being genuinely persuaded by the case for missile defence. The case the Bush administration has put before the world is not compelling. Even those who share the administration's concern about the future missile threat could conclude that it is premature to race ahead with immature missile-defence technologies in order to offset speculative missile threats. Even those who share the administration's willingness to consider seriously the eventual utility of missile defences could conclude that it is not desirable to press urgently forward now.