Iran at the Nuclear Threshold

For the past decade, Iran's nuclear program has been a proliferation concern to the United States. Given that Iran is awash with oil and gas reserves, Tehran's decision to allocate a major portion of its infrastructure investment to develop nuclear power plants has been puzzling. Until the spring of this year, the United States was practically alone in pressing for limits on Iranian access to nuclear weapons-related technology and materials. Western European states and Russia have differed with the United States in their assessment of the extent of Iran's nuclear program and its intentions to develop nuclear weapons. Europe, Russia, and Japan have also been reluctant to upset bilateral trade and political relations with Iran as a lever to prevent proliferation.

This spring, a spate of revelations, from undeclared importation of nuclear materials and equipment to covert uranium-enrichment activity, convinced key states that Iran has not been forthcoming about the intents and extent of its nuclear program and that the program must be stopped. The resulting tide of international pressure crested with a September 12 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution demanding that Tehran come clean. This added to the pressure on Iran's unpopular government to weigh its next steps carefully and spurred a strong and unprecedented public debate about the nuclear program.

Iran's October 21 announcement that it intends to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection and to suspend uranium enrichment has the potential to be constructive. This initiative could provide the face-saving mechanism for Iran to shift away from the nuclear weapons path, but Iran has not been forthcoming about a variety of aspects of its nuclear program and has used the cover of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to advance its weapons program throughout the most of the past decade. Tehran has not yet made the political decision to cross the nuclear threshold, and both external and internal pressure must be harnessed to sway Iran's future decision on its nuclear future.

Iran became a signatory of the NPT in 1968. In 1984, Iran's Islamic Republic government, spurred by the Iran-Iraq War, allegedly resuscitated the nuclear weapons program, which had begun under and ended with Shah Reza Pahlavi's regime. The USSR signed a nuclear technology cooperation agreement with Iran in 1989, and this protocol was expanded in 1992 when two intergovernmental agreements were signed with Russia: one for nuclear energy cooperation and another for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

The strategic rationale for the Iranian nuclear program has been to bolster its role as a regional power in the nuclear neighborhood of Russia, Pakistan, and India and to counter Iraq, Iran's principal threat until this year. The current strategic rationale may have changed, and it seems that in 2003, Tehran even flaunted its progress in its nuclear program as a way to deter the United States from creating a fate for the Iranian government similar to that of Hussein's regime. In addition, domestically, the regime seems to be using the nuclear program as a nationalistic rallying issue.

Recent revelations indicate that Iran's nuclear program is expansive and that it encompasses three different routes to obtain the fissile material needed to build nuclear weapons. Tehran could use the spent fuel from either the light-water reactor (LWR) at Bushehr or the heavy-water reactor (HWR) at Arak to obtain plutonium, or it could opt for a uranium-based program employing the enrichment facilities at Natanz and domestic mining and processing of uranium ore. President Mohammed Khatami broke with previous Iranian remarks in February by stating emphatically that Tehran should control the entire fuel cycle of the nearly finished Bushehr LWR, developing the indigenous ability to fuel that reactor and refusing to return the spent fuel to Russia, as Moscow has demanded.

In recent months, the cooperation among the European Union (EU), Russia, Japan, and the United States has been unprecedented in efforts to curb the Iranian nuclear program. The major nuclear powers supported the unprecedented September 12 IAEA demand for full cooperation from Tehran. Otherwise, the IAEA implicitly threatened that the matter would be referred to the UN Security Council, and Russia, the EU, and Japan suspended significant spheres of cooperation with Iran.

A separate European initiative succeeded in breaking apart this united front. France, the United Kingdom, and Germany concurrently launched a separate diplomatic initiative, eventually convincing Tehran on October 21 to address all "IAEA requirements and outstanding issues," sign an IAEA additional protocol on inspections, and halt its uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities. In exchange, the European ministers offered further assistance to Iran's civilian nuclear program and support for turning the Middle East into a non-nuclear zone.

Because of its direct nuclear cooperation with Iran, Russia holds the most direct influence over Iran's nuclear future, and loss of Russia's strategic backing in a variety of international fora would also be a crucial loss to Tehran. Russia does not seem willing to cancel construction of the Bushehr reactor voluntarily, yet in recent months, Russia has been steadfast in refusing to fuel the reactor until Iran reaffirms its agreement to return the spent fuel to Russia. For Moscow, the dispute is about more than nonproliferation: supply of fuel and storage of the spent fuel from the reactor have been long-term prime financial incentives of this deal.

U.S. policy on the Iranian nuclear program is less than clear ? in the George W. Bush administration's view, a new regime may decide not to pursue a nuclear weapons program or may not use those weapons to threaten the United States and its allies. In addition, a new regime in Iran may be more stable, and concerns about control of the fissile materials in Iran's domain may be reduced. Within the administration, some propose a wait-and-see attitude on regime change in Iran while others argue that the United States should actively promote and accelerate regime change.

Both the EU and Japan have linked economic cooperation with Iran upon the signing of the additional protocol. Europe's next steps and the anticipated degree of its cooperation with the United States are not clear.

The debate in Iran has been strongly affected by the growing international concern over Tehran's nuclear program; the potentially drastic foreign consequences of Iran?s nuclear program have opened a wider debate on the whole question of the secrecy surrounding Iran's foreign and security policy decision-making. The debate over the nuclear weapons program is not a particularly informed debate, and it seems that many government officials are not even aware of Iran's NPT obligations or the dangers inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons and how Tehran's actions can actually spur an arms race in its vicinity.

The Iranian case is a crucial test for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Holding Tehran to its commitments will clearly require constant vigilance and determination from the United States and its allies. The measure of successful nonproliferation policies will not be concluded agreements between the international community and potential proliferators or the establishment of inspections missions in these states, but rather whether these policies actually succeed in preventing proliferation.

Correct policies may deter Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. Iran's implementation of an NPT additional protocol can further complicate its ability to conduct further clandestine activities, although it will not serve as a serious obstacle to Iran's nuclear weapons program if Tehran decides to continue pursuing it. A new crisis could later resurface if the results of the IAEA testing continue to testify to prohibited activity. However, if Iran decides to curtail its nuclear weapons program, the European-led October 21 initiative could give it the proper face-saving framework to do so.

The European-led agreement, even if fully implemented, can help limit the uranium route to nuclear weapons but will have little impact on the plutonium-based aspects of Iran's nuclear program. In addition, the European deal with Tehran will weaken Russia's newfound will to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran, making the completion of the Bushehr reactor by Russia more feasible regardless of Iran's behavior and thus potentially increasing the chances of proliferation through the plutonium route.

In order to ensure that Tehran's pledge to the European foreign ministers is turned into an effective tool to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, a number of steps should be taken. One, intelligence on Iran's nuclear program must be increased and deepened. Two, potential plutonium routes must be addressed. Three, pressure on Russia to hold to its stated policy of refusing to provide fuel for the Bushehr reactor until an agreement on the return of the spent fuel is in place and is enforceable must be maintained. To minimize proliferation dangers further, Moscow should ensure that the spent fuel is not allowed to accumulate in Iran and is frequently transferred to Russia. Russian shifts in policy must also be presented as not a concession to Washington but as a choice of Moscow. Russian state companies should receive priority in receiving any new civilian nuclear cooperation contracts in order to allay Moscow's suspicions that the European states are using the October 21 deal as a way to gain a foothold in the Iranian nuclear market.

Unity and cooperation are essential? the unprecedented cooperation this last year between Russia, the United States, Europe, and Japan is what brought Tehran to terms with the Europeans. The united front must be restored.

The Iranian public must also be encouraged to be more active in preventing the current regime from acquiring nuclear weapons, and IAEA officials and members of the world scientific community should weigh in on that debate and help shape it. In debating its nuclear options, the regime itself in Tehran should be aware that the largest threat to its power is internal?the large Soviet nuclear arsenal in no way saved Mikhail Gorbachev and friends from the collapse of the USSR.