Discussion Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Why the United States Should Spread Democracy
After the Cold War ended, promoting the international spread of democracy seemed poised to replace containment as the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy. Scholars, policymakers, and commentators embraced the idea that democratization could become America's next mission. In recent years, however, critics have argued that spreading democracy may be unwise or even harmful. This paper addresses this debate. It argues that the United States should promote democracy and refutes some of the most important arguments against U.S. efforts to spread democracy. After a brief discussion of definitions of democracy and liberalism, the paper summarizes the reasons why the spread of democracy— especially liberal democracy— benefits the citizens of new democracies, promotes international peace, and serves U.S. interests. Because the case for democratization is rarely made comprehensively, the paper explicates the arguments for why democracy promotes liberty, prevents famines, and fosters economic development. The logic and evidence of a democratic peace are also summarized, as are the ways in which U.S. security and economic interests would be advanced in a world of democracies. These benefits to U.S. interests include a reduction in threats to the United States, fewer refugees attempting to enter the United States, and better economic partners for American trade and investment. The paper then turns to a rebuttal of four prominent recent arguments against the benefits of spreading democracy: (1) the claim that the democratic peace is a myth; (2) the argument that the process of democratization increases the risk of war; (3) arguments that democratic elections are harmful in societies that are not fully liberal; and (4) claims that "Asian values" can undergird polities based on "soft authoritarianism" that are superior to liberal democracies. The paper argues that these recent critiques of U.S. efforts to promote democracy have not presented a convincing case that spreading democracy is a bad idea. The internationa spread of democracy will offer many benefits to new democracies and to the United States. The democratic peace proposition appears robust, even if scholars need to continue to develop multiple explanations for why democracies rarely, if ever, go to war. The evidence on whether democratization increases the risk of war is mixed, at best, and policies can be crafted to minimize any risks of conflict in these cases. The problem of "illiberal democracy" has been exaggerated; democratic elections usually do more good than harm. The United States should, however, aim to promote liberal values as well as electoral democracy. And the "soft authoritarian" challenge to liberal democracy was not persuasive, even before the Asian economic turmoil of 1997 and 1998 undermined claims for the superiority of "Asian values."
In recent years, however, many writers have criticized the idea that the United States should attempt to spread democracy. The Clinton administration's commitment to spreading democracy seems to have faltered, and critics from across the political spectrum have argued that the United States should scale back or abandon efforts to foster global democratization.4 In a prominent article, Robert Kaplan has argued that holding democratic elections in many countries may actually hinder efforts to maintain ethnic peace, social stability, and economic development.5 Fareed Zakaria has suggested that elections in countries without liberal values create illiberal democracies, which pose grave threats to freedom.6
This paper argues that the United States should make promoting democracy abroad one of its central foreign-policy goals. Democracy is not an unalloyed good and the United States should not blindly attempt to spread democracy to the exclusion of all other goals, but U.S. and global interests would be advanced if the world contained more democracies. It often will be difficult for the United States and other actors to help countries to become democracies, but international efforts frequently can make a difference. The United States can promote democracy. In many cases it should.
I develop the argument for promoting democracy in three parts. The first section of this paper defines democracy and the closely related concept of liberalism. It distinguishes between democratic procedures of government and the political philosophy of liberalism, but also explains how the two are closely linked.
The second section outlines the main arguments for why spreading democracy benefits the inhabitants of newly democratizing states, promotes peace in the international system, and advances U.S. interests. This section presents logic and evidence that demonstrates that the spread of democracy consistently advances many important values, including individual freedom from political oppression, deadly violence, and hunger. It also will show how the spread of democracy promotes international peace and stability, and helps to ensure the security and prosperity of the United States.
The third section summarizes and rebuts some of the most prominent recent arguments against promoting democracy. These arguments include criticisms of the democratic peace hypothesis, the proposition that the process of democratization actually increases the risk of war, claims that in many countries democratic elections are at best irrelevant and at worst harmful, and the argument that the emergence of the "Asian model" of political and economic development demonstrates that liberal democracy is neither appropriate nor necessary in many countries.
I. Defining Democracy and Liberalism
A. Defining Democracy
"Democracy" is notoriously difficult to define. Some writers have simply defined it by what it is not: "Democracy is a system in which no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with the power to rule and, therefore, no one can abrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power."7 Other scholars have offered a variety of definitions. Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl offer the following definition: "Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives."8 Joseph Schumpeter's influential 1942 definition saw the "democratic method" as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."9 Samuel Huntington "defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote."10 The plethora of definitions of democracy has stimulated many scholars to analyze and compare how the term is defined.11
Attempts to define democracy are further complicated by the differences between the democracy of ancient Greece and contemporary democracy. Classical Athenian democracy was based on the ideals of full political participation of all citizens, a strong sense of community, the sovereignty of the people, and equality of all citizens under law.12 Modern democracy, on the other hand, relies on elected representatives and tends to draw a distinction between the public and private spheres, thereby eroding the bonds of community and fostering individualism. Because most writers use the term democracy to apply to modern, representative political systems, I will call such regimes democracies even if they fall short of the ancient Greek ideal of direct participatory democracy.
Most contemporary definitions of democracy have several common elements. First, democracies are countries in which there are institutional mechanisms, usually elections, that allow the people to choose their leaders. Second, prospective leaders must compete for public support. Third, the power of the government is restrained by its accountability to the people. These are the essential characteristics of political democracy.
Some writers add additional criteria to the list of what makes a polity a democracy. Larry Diamond argues that a democracy must have "extensive civil liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations)."13 Samuel Huntington recognizes that democracy "implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns."14
These attempts to expand the criteria for democracy reveal that it makes more sense to talk about degrees of democracy instead of neatly dividing states into democracies and nondemocracies. Some states may be more democratic than others; drawing the line between democracy and nondemocracy will usually be a matter of judgment. They also highlight the importance of the distinction between democracy and liberalism.
B. Liberalism and Democracy
Democracy can be defined as a set of political procedures involving participation and competition, but liberalism is a political philosophy that is based on the principle of individual freedom. As one scholar puts it, "liberalism's ends are life and property, and its means are liberty and toleration."15 Liberalism calls for guarantees of the rights of the individual, including freedom from arbitrary authority, freedom of religion, the right to own and exchange private property, rights to equal opportunity in health care, education, and employment, and the rights to political participation and representation.16 Only the last category of rights is necessarily guaranteed in polities that meet the procedural definition of democracy.
Most democracies are liberal democracies to some degree. The Western industrial countries combine procedural democracy with guarantees of civil liberties. Any state that embraces liberal principles is likely to become a democracy, because political participation, competition, and accountability are perhaps the best guarantees that individual freedoms will be preserved. Thus the terms "liberal" and "democracy" often go hand in hand. It is possible, however, that a country could be an illiberal democracy. For example, states with official racialist or nationalist ideologies might choose their leaders in elections but deny liberty to members of particular minority groups. Serbia and Iran are contemporary illiberal democracies. It is also possible-although unlikely-that a country could be a liberal state without being a democracy.17 The political philosopher Michael Walzer makes this point: "Even in the absence of free elections, it is possible to have a free press, religious freedom, associational pluralism, the right to organize unions, the right to move freely, and so on."18 In the 19th century Britain embraced liberal principles before it extended the franchise and became a democracy. In theory, a polity governed by a benevolent despot could respect most or all of the individual liberties associated with liberalism. In practice, relatively few contemporary states are liberal without being democratic.
C. America's Goal: Liberal Democracy
Given the variety of definitions of democracy and the distinction between democracy and liberalism, what type of government should the United States attempt to spread? Should it try to spread democracy, defined procedurally, liberalism, or both? Ultimately, U.S. policies should aim to encourage the spread of liberal democracy. Policies to promote democracy should attempt to increase the number of regimes that respect the individual liberties that lie at the heart of liberalism and elect their leaders. The United States therefore should attempt to build support for liberal principles-many of which are enshrined in international human-rights treaties-as well as encouraging states to hold free and fair elections.
Supporting the spread of liberal democracy does not, however, mean that the United States should give the promotion of liberalism priority over the growth of electoral democracy. In most cases, support for electoral democracy can contribute to the spread of liberalism and liberal democracy. Free and fair elections often remove leaders who are the biggest impediments to the spread of democracy. In Burma, for example, the people would almost certainly remove the authoritarian SLORC regime from power if they had a choice at the ballot box. In South Africa, Haiti, and Chile, for example, elections removed antidemocratic rulers and advanced the process of democratization. In most cases, the United States should support elections even in countries that are not fully liberal. Elections will generally initiate a process of change toward democratization. American policy should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good by insisting that countries embrace liberal principles before holding elections. Such a policy could be exploited by authoritarian rulers to justify their continued hold on power and to delay elections that they might lose. In addition, consistent U.S. support for electoral democracy will help to bolster the emerging international norm that leaders should be accountable to their people. Achieving this goal is worth the risk that some distasteful leaders will win elections and use these victories at the ballot box to legitimize their illiberal rule.
The United States also should attempt to build support for liberal principles, both before and after other countries hold elections. Policies that advance liberalism are harder to develop and pursue than those that aim to persuade states to hold free and fair elections, but the United States can promote liberalism as well as electoral democracy, as I argue below.
II. The Benefits of the Spread of Democracy
Most Americans assume that democracy is a good thing and that the spread of democracy will be beneficial. Because the virtues of democracy are taken for granted, they are rarely fully enumerated and considered. Democracy is not an unalloyed good, so it is important not to overstate or misrepresent the benefits of democratization. Nevertheless, the spread of democracy has many important benefits. This section enumerates how the spread of democracy will improve the lives of the citizens of new democracies, contribute to international peace, and directly advance the national interests of the United States.
A. Democracy is Good for the Citizens of New Democracies
The United States should attempt to spread democracy because people generally live better lives under democratic governments. Compared to inhabitants of nondemocracies, citizens of democracies enjoy greater individual liberty, political stability, freedom from governmental violence, enhanced quality of life, and a much lower risk of suffering a famine. Skeptics will immediately ask: Why should the United States attempt to improve the lives of non-Americans? Shouldn't this country focus on its own problems and interests? There are at least three answers to these questions.
First, as human beings, American should and do feel some obligation to improve the well-being of other human beings. The bonds of common humanity do not stop at the borders of the United States.19 To be sure, these bonds and obligations are limited by the competitive nature of the international system. In a world where the use of force remains possible, no government can afford to pursue a foreign policy based on altruism. The human race is not about to embrace a cosmopolitan moral vision in which borders and national identities become irrelevant. But there are many possibilities for action motivated by concern for individuals in other countries. In the United States, continued public concern over human rights in other countries, as well as governmental and nongovernmental efforts to relieve hunger, poverty, and suffering overseas, suggest that Americans accept some bonds of common humanity and feel some obligations to foreigners. The emergence of the so-called "CNN Effect"-the tendency for Americans to be aroused to action by television images of suffering people overseas-is further evidence that cosmopolitan ethical sentiments exist. If Americans care about improving the lives of the citizens of other countries, then the case for promoting democracy grows stronger to the extent that promoting democracy is an effective means to achieve this end.
Second, Americans have a particular interest in promoting the spread of liberty. The United States was founded on the principle of securing liberty for its citizens. Its founding documents and institutions all emphasize that liberty is a core value. Among the many observers and political scientists who make this point is Samuel Huntington, who argues that America's "identity as a nation is inseparable from its commitment to liberal and democratic values."20 As I argue below, one of the most important benefits of the spread of democracy-and especially of liberal democracy-is an expansion of human liberty. Given its founding principles and very identity, the United States has a large stake in advancing its core value of liberty. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has argued: "The United States is uniquely and self-consciously a country founded on a set of ideas, and ideals, applicable to people everywhere. The Founding Fathers declared that all were created equal-not just those in Britain's 13 American colonies-and that to secure the 'unalienable rights' of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, people had the right to establish governments that derive 'their just powers from the consent of the governed.'"21
Third, improvements in the lives of individuals in other countries matter to Americans because the United States cannot insulate itself from the world. It may be a clichÃ© to say that the world is becoming more interdependent, but it is undeniable that changes in communications technologies, trade flows, and the environment have opened borders and created a more interconnected world. These trends give the United States a greater stake in the fate of other societies, because widespread misery abroad may create political turmoil, economic instability, refugee flows, and environmental damage that will affect Americans. As I argue below in my discussion of how promoting democracy serves U.S. interests, the spread of democracy will directly advance the national interests of the United States. The growing interconnectedness of international relations means that the United States also has an indirect stake in the well-being of those in other countries, because developments overseas can have unpredictable consequences for the United States.
For these three reasons, at least, Americans should care about how the spread of democracy can improve the lives of people in other countries.
1. Democracy Leads to Liberty and Liberty is Good
The first way in which the spread of democracy enhances the lives of those who live in democracies is by promoting individual liberty, including freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, and freedom to own private property.22 Respect for the liberty of individuals is an inherent feature of democratic politics. As Samuel Huntington has written, liberty is "the peculiar virtue of democracy."23 A democratic political process based on electoral competition depends on freedom of expression of political views and freedom to make electoral choices. Moreover, governments that are accountable to the public are less likely to deprive their citizens of human rights. The global spread of democracy is likely to bring greater individual liberty to more and more people. Even imperfect and illiberal democracies tend to offer more liberty than autocracies, and liberal democracies are very likely to promote liberty. Freedom House's 1997 survey of "Freedom in the World" found that 79 out of 118 democracies could be classified as "free" and 39 were "partly free" and, of those, 29 qualified as "high partly free." In contrast, only 20 of the world's 73 nondemocracies were "partly free" and 53 were "not free."24
The case for the maximum possible amount of individual freedom can be made on the basis of utilitarian calculations or in terms of natural rights. The utilitarian case for increasing the amount of individual liberty rests on the belief that increased liberty will enable more people to realize their full human potential, which will benefit not only themselves but all of humankind. This view holds that greater liberty will allow the human spirit to flourish, thereby unleashing greater intellectual, artistic, and productive energies that will ultimately benefit all of humankind. The rights-based case for liberty, on the other hand, does not focus on the consequences of increased liberty, but instead argues that all men and women, by virtue of their common humanity, have a right to freedom. This argument is most memorably expressed in the American Declaration of Independence: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness ..."
The virtues of greater individual liberty are not self-evident. Various political ideologies argue against making liberty the paramount goal of any political system. Some do not deny that individual liberty is an important goal, but call for limiting it so that other goals may be achieved. Others place greater emphasis on obligations to the community. The British Fabian Socialist Sidney Webb, for example, articulated this view clearly: "The perfect and fitting development of each individual is not necessarily the utmost and highest cultivation of his own personality, but the filling, in the best possible way, of his humble function in the great social machine."25 To debate these issues thoroughly would require a paper far longer than this one.26 The short response to most critiques of liberty is that there appears to be a universal demand for liberty among human beings. Particularly as socioeconomic development elevates societies above subsistence levels, individuals desire more choice and autonomy in their lives. More important, most political systems that have been founded on principles explicitly opposed to liberty have tended to devolve into tyrannies or to suffer economic, political, or social collapse.
2. Liberal Democracies are Less Likely to Use Violence Against Their Own People.
Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.27 These two findings are supported by many studies, but particularly by the work of R.J. Rummel. Rummel finds that democracies-by which he means liberal democracies-between 1900 and 1987 saw only 0.14% of their populations (on average) die annually in internal violence. The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0.59% and for totalitarian regimes 1.48%.28 Rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to die at the hands of their governments. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth century. The states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Nazi Germany, Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. Democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale, although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime. The American and British bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, massacres of Filipinos during the guerrilla war that followed U.S. colonization of the Philippines after 1898, and French killings of Algerians during the Algerian War are some prominent examples.29
There are two reasons for the relative absence of civil violence in democracies: (1) Democratic political systems-especially those of liberal democracies constrain the power of governments, reducing their ability to commit mass murders of their own populations. As Rummel concludes, "Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely ... The more freely a political elite can control the power of the state apparatus, the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects."30 (2) Democratic polities allow opposition to be expressed openly and have regular processes for the peaceful transfer of power. If all participants in the political process remain committed to democratic principles, critics of the government need not stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents.31
3. Democracy Enhances Long-Run Economic Performance
A third reason for promoting democracy is that democracies tend to enjoy greater prosperity over long periods of time. As democracy spreads, more individuals are likely to enjoy greater economic benefits. Democracy does not necessarily usher in prosperity, although some observers claim that "a close correlation with prosperity" is one of the "overwhelming advantages" of democracy.32 Some democracies, including India and the Philippines, have languished economically, at least until the last few years. Others are among the most prosperous societies on earth. Nevertheless, over the long haul democracies generally prosper. As Mancur Olson points out: "It is no accident that the countries that have reached the highest level of economic performance across generations are all stable democracies."33
Authoritarian regimes often compile impressive short-run economic records. For several decades, the Soviet Union's annual growth in gross national product (GNP) exceeded that of the United States, leading Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to pronounce "we will bury you." China has posted double-digit annual GNP increases in recent years. But autocratic countries rarely can sustain these rates of growth for long. As Mancur Olson notes, "experience shows that relatively poor countries can grow extraordinarily rapidly when they have a strong dictator who happens to have unusually good economic policies, such growth lasts only for the ruling span of one or two dictators."34 The Soviet Union was unable to sustain its rapid growth; its economic failings ultimately caused the country to disintegrate in the throes of political and economic turmoil. Most experts doubt that China will continue its rapid economic expansion. Economist Jagdish Bhagwati argues that "no one can maintain these growth rates in the long term. Sooner or later China will have to rejoin the human race."35 Some observers predict that the stresses of high rates of economic growth will cause political fragmentation in China.36
Why do democracies perform better than autocracies over the long run? Two reasons are particularly persuasive explanations. First, democracies-especially liberal democracies-are more likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth over the long run. Most of the world's leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia, and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. Freedom House conducted a World Survey of Economic Freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the world's population and 99% of the world's wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union. It found that the countries rated "free" generated 81% of the world's output even though they had only 17% of the world's population.37 A second recent study confirms the connection between economic freedom and economic growth. The Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It has found that countries classified as "free" had annual 1980-1993 real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (expressed in terms of purchasing power parities) growth rates of 2.88%. In "mostly free" countries the rate was
0.97%, in "mostly not free" ones -0.32%, and in "repressed" countries -1.44%.38 Of course, some democracies do not adopt market economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more likely to pursue liberal economic policies.
Second, democracies that embrace liberal principles of government are likely to create a stable foundation for long-term economic growth. Individuals will only make long-term investments when they are confident that their investments will not be expropriated. These and other economic decisions require assurances that private property will be respected and that contracts will be enforced. These conditions are likely to be met when an impartial court system exists and can require individuals to enforce contracts. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has argued that: "The guiding mechanism of a free market economy ... is a bill of rights, enforced by an impartial judiciary."39 These conditions also happen to be those that are necessary to maintain a stable system of free and fair elections and to uphold liberal principles of individual rights. Mancur Olson thus points out that "the conditions that are needed to have the individual rights needed for maximum economic development are exactly the same conditions that are needed to have a lasting democracy. ... the same court system, independent judiciary, and respect for law and individual rights that are needed for a lasting democracy are also required for security of property and contract rights."40 Thus liberal democracy is the basis for long-term economic growth.
A third reason may operate in some circumstances: democratic governments are more likely to have the political legitimacy necessary to embark on difficult and painful economic reforms.41 This factor is particularly likely to be important in former communist countries, but it also appears to have played a role in the decisions India and the Philippines have taken in recent years to pursue difficult economic reforms.42
4. Democracies Never Have Famines
Fourth, the United States should spread democracy because the citizens of democracies do not suffer from famines. The economist Amartya Sen concludes that "one of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press."43 This striking empirical regularity has been overshadowed by the apparent existence of a "democratic peace" (see below), but it provides a powerful argument for promoting democracy. Although this claim has been most closely identified with Sen, other scholars who have studied famines and hunger reach similar conclusions. Joseph Collins, for example, argues that: "Wherever political rights for all citizens truly flourish, people will see to it that, in due course, they share in control over economic resources vital to their survival. Lasting food security thus requires real and sustained democracy."44 Most of the countries that have experienced severe famines in recent decades have been among the world's least democratic: the Soviet Union (Ukraine in the early 1930s), China, Ethiopia, Somalia, Cambodia and Sudan. Throughout history, famines have occurred in many different types of countries, but never in a democracy.
Democracies do not experience famines for two reasons. First, in democracies governments are accountable to their populations and their leaders have electoral incentives to prevent mass starvation. The need to be reelected impels politicians to ensure that their people do not starve. As Sen points out, "the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize" and "the effectiveness of democracy in the prevention of famine has tended to depend on the politicization of the plight of famine victims, through the process of public discussion, which generates political solidarity."45 On the other hand, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are not accountable to the public; they are less likely to pay a political price for failing to prevent famines. Moreover, authoritarian and totalitarian rulers often have political incentives to use famine as a means of exterminating their domestic opponents.
Second, the existence of a free press and the free flow of information in democracies prevents famine by serving as an early warning system on the effects of natural catastrophes such as floods and droughts that may cause food scarcities. A free press that criticizes government policies also can publicize the true level of food stocks and reveal problems of distribution that might cause famines even when food is plentiful.46 Inadequate information has contributed to several famines. During the 1958-61 famine in China that killed 20-30 million people, the Chinese authorities overestimated the country's grain reserves by 100 million metric tons. This disaster later led Mao Zedong to concede that "Without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below."47 The 1974 Bangladesh famine also could have been avoided if the government had had better information. The food supply was high, but floods, unemployment, and panic made it harder for those in need to obtain food.48
The two factors that prevent famines in democracies-electoral incentives and the free flow of information-are likely to be present even in democracies that do not have a liberal political culture. These factors exist when leaders face periodic elections and when the press is free to report information that might embarrass the government. A full-fledged liberal democracy with guarantees of civil liberties, a relatively free economic market, and an independent judiciary might be even less likely to suffer famines, but it appears that the rudiments of electoral democracy will suffice to prevent famines.
The ability of democracies to avoid famines cannot be attributed to any tendency of democracies to fare better economically. Poor democracies as well as rich ones have not had famines. India, Botswana, and Zimbabwe have avoided famines, even when they have suffered large crop shortfalls. In fact, the evidence suggests that democracies can avoid famines in the face of large crop failures, whereas nondemocracies plunge into famine after smaller shortfalls. Botswana's food production fell by 17% and Zimbabwe's by 38% between 1979-81 and 1983-84, whereas Sudan and Ethiopia saw a decline in food production of 11-12% during the same period. Sudan and Ethiopia, which were nondemocracies, suffered major famines, whereas the democracies of Botswana and Zimbabwe did not.49 If, as I have argued, democracies enjoy better long-run economic performance than nondemocracies, higher levels of economic development may help democracies to avoid famines. But the absence of famines in new, poor democracies suggests that democratic governance itself is sufficient to prevent famines.
The case of India before and after independence provides further evidence that democratic rule is a key factor in preventing famines. Prior to independence in 1947, India suffered frequent famines. Shortly before India became independent, the Bengal famine of 1943 killed 2-3 million people. Since India became independent and democratic, the country has suffered severe crop failures and food shortages in 1968, 1973, 1979, and 1987, but it has never suffered a famine.50
B. Democracy is Good for the International System
In addition to improving the lives of individual citizens in new democracies, the spread of democracy will benefit the international system by reducing the likelihood of war. Democracies do not wage war on other democracies. This absence-or near absence, depending on the definitions of "war" and "democracy" used-has been called "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations."51 One scholar argues that "the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."52 If the number of democracies in the international system continues to grow, the number of potential conflicts that might escalate to war will diminish. Although wars between democracies and nondemocracies would persist in the short run, in the long run an international system composed of democracies would be a peaceful world. At the very least, adding to the number of democracies would gradually enlarge the democratic "zone of peace."
1. The Evidence for the Democratic Peace
Many studies have found that there are virtually no historical cases of democracies going to war with one another. In an important two-part article published in 1983, Michael Doyle compares all international wars between 1816 and 1980 and a list of liberal states.53 Doyle concludes that "constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another."54 Subsequent statistical studies have found that this absence of war between democracies is statistically significant and is not the result of random chance.55 Other analyses have concluded that the influence of other variables, including geographical proximity and wealth, do not detract from the significance of the finding that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another.56
Most studies of the democratic-peace proposition have argued that democracies only enjoy a state of peace with other democracies; they are just as likely as other states to go to war with nondemocracies.57 There are, however, several scholars who argue that democracies are inherently less likely to go to war than other types of states.58 The evidence for this claim remains in dispute, however, so it would be premature to claim that spreading democracy will do more than to enlarge the democratic zone of peace.
2. Why there is a Democratic Peace: The Causal Logic
Two types of explanations have been offered for the absence of wars between democracies. The first argues that shared norms prevent democracies from fighting one another. The second claims that institutional (or structural) constraints make it difficult or impossible for a democracy to wage war on another democracy.
a. Normative Explanations
The normative explanation of the democratic peace argues that norms that democracies share preclude wars between democracies. One version of this argument contends that liberal states do not fight other liberal states because to do so would be to violate the principles of liberalism. Liberal states only wage war when it advances the liberal ends of increased individual freedom. A liberal state cannot advance liberal ends by fighting another liberal state, because that state already upholds the principles of liberalism. In other words, democracies do not fight because liberal ideology provides no justification for wars between liberal democracies.59 A second version of the normative explanation claims that democracies share a norm of peaceful conflict resolution. This norm applies between and within democratic states. Democracies resolve their domestic conflicts without violence, and they expect that other democracies will resolve inter-democratic international disputes peacefully.60
b. Institutional/Structural Explanations
Institutional/structural explanations for the democratic peace contend that democratic decision-making procedures and institutional constraints prevent democracies from waging war on one another. At the most general level, democratic leaders are constrained by the public, which is sometimes pacific and generally slow to mobilize for war. In most democracies, the legislative and executive branches check the war-making power of each other. These constraints may prevent democracies from launching wars. When two democracies confront one another internationally, they are not likely to rush into war. Their leaders will have more time to resolve disputes peacefully.61 A different sort of institutional argument suggests that democratic processes and freedom of speech make democracies better at avoiding myths and misperceptions that cause wars.62
c. Combining Normative and Structural Explanations
Some studies have attempted to test the relative power of the normative and institutional/structural explanations of the democratic peace.63 It might make more sense, however, to specify how the two work in combination or separately under different conditions. For example, in liberal democracies liberal norms and democratic processes probably work in tandem to synergistically produce the democratic peace.64 Liberal states are unlikely to even contemplate war with one another. They thus will have few crises and wars. In illiberal or semiliberal democracies, norms play a lesser role and crises are more likely, but democratic institutions and processes may still make wars between illiberal democracies rare. Finally, state-level factors like norms and domestic structures may interact with international-systemic factors to prevent wars between democracies. If democracies are better at information-processing, they may be better than nondemocracies at recognizing international situations where war would be foolish. Thus the logic of the democratic peace may explain why democracies sometimes behave according to realist (systemic) predictions.
C. The Spread of Democracy is Good for the United States
The United States will have an interest in promoting democracy because further democratization enhances the lives of citizens of other countries and contributes to a more peaceful international system. To the extent that Americans care about citizens of other countries and international peace, they will see benefits from the continued spread of democracy. Spreading democracy also will directly advance the national interests of the United States, because democracies will not launch wars or terrorist attacks against the United States, will not produce refugees seeking asylum in the United States, and will tend to ally with the United States.
1. Democracies Will Not Go to War with the United States
First, democracies will not go to war against the United States, provided, of course, that the United States remains a democracy. The logic of the democratic peace suggests that the United States will have fewer enemies in a world of more democracies. If democracies virtually never go to war with one another, no democracy will wage war against the United States. Democracies are unlikely to get into crises or militarized disputes with the United States. Promoting democracy may usher in a more peaceful world; it also will enhance the national security of the United States by eliminating potential military threats. The United States would be more secure if Russia, China, and at least some countries in the Arab and Islamic worlds became stable democracies.
2. Democracies Don't Support Terrorism Against the United States
Second, spreading democracy is likely to enhance U.S. national security because democracies will not support terrorist acts against the United States. The world's principal sponsors of international terrorism are harsh, authoritarian regimes, including Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Sudan.65
Some skeptics of the democratic-peace proposition point out that democracies sometimes have sponsored covert action or "state terrorism" against other democracies. Examples include U.S. actions in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973.66 This argument does not undermine the claim that democracies will not sponsor terrorism against the United States. In each case, the target state had dubious democratic credentials. U.S. actions amounted to interference in internal affairs, but not terrorism as it is commonly understood. And the perpetrator of the alleged "state terrorist" acts in each case was the United States itself, which suggests that the United States has little to fear from other democracies.
3. Democracies Produce Fewer Refugees
Third, the spread of democracy will serve American interests by reducing the number of refugees who flee to the United States. The countries that generate the most refugees are usually the least democratic. The absence of democracy tends to lead to internal conflicts, ethnic strife, political oppression, and rapid population growth-all of which encourage the flight of refugees.67 The spread of democracy can reduce refugee flows to the United States by removing the political sources of decisions to flee.
The results of the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti demonstrate how U.S. efforts to promote democratization can reduce refugee flows. The number of refugees attempting to flee Haiti for the United States dropped dramatically after U.S. forces deposed the junta led by General Raoul Cedras and restored the democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, even though Haiti's economic fortunes did not immediately improve.68
In addition to reducing the number of countries that generate refugees, the spread of democracy is likely to increase the number of countries that accept refugees, thereby reducing the number of refugees who will attempt to enter the United States.69
4. Democracies will Ally with the United States
Fourth, the global spread of democracy will advance American interests by creating more potential allies for the United States. Historically, most of America's allies have been democracies. In general, democracies are much more likely to ally with one another than with nondemocracies.70 Even scholars who doubt the statistical evidence for the democratic-peace proposition, agree that "the nature of regimes ... is an important variable in the understanding the composition of alliances ... democracies have allied with one another."71 Thus spreading democracy will produce more and better alliance partners for the United States.
5. American Ideals Flourish When Others Adopt Them
Fifth, the spread of democracy internationally is likely to increase Americans' psychological sense of well-being about their own democratic institutions. Part of the impetus behind American attempts to spread democracy has always come from the belief that American democracy will be healthier when other countries adopt similar political systems. To some extent, this belief reflects the conviction that democracies will be friendly toward the United States. But it also reflects the fact that democratic principles are an integral part of America's national identity. The United States thus has a special interest in seeing its ideals spread.72
6. Democracies Make Better Economic Partners
Finally, the United States will benefit from the spread of democracy because democracies will make better economic partners. Democracies are more likely to adopt market economies, so democracies will tend to have more prosperous and open economies. The United States generally will be able to establish mutually beneficial trading relationships with democracies. And democracies provide better climates for American overseas investment, by virtue of their political stability and market economies.
III. Responses to Criticisms of U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy
A. The Controversy Over the Democratic Peace
Although many political scientists accept the proposition that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another, several critics have challenged claims of a democratic peace. By the late 1990s, proponents and critics of the democratic peace were engaged in a vigorous and sometimes heated debate.73 Participants on both sides claimed that their opponents had been blinded by ideology and refused to view the evidence objectively.74 Because of this intense and ongoing controversy, establishing the case for the democratic peace now requires rebutting some of the most prominent criticisms.
Critics have presented several important challenges to the deductive logic and empirical bases of the democratic peace proposition. They have argued that there is not a convincing theoretical explanation of the apparent absence of war between democracies, that democracies actually have fought one another, that the absence of wars between democracies is not statistically significant, and that factors other than shared democratic institutions or values have caused the democratic peace.
The critics of the democratic peace have presented vigorous arguments that have forced the proposition's proponents to refine and qualify the case for the democratic peace. These criticisms do not, however, refute the principal arguments for the democratic peace. As I argue below, there is still a compelling deductive and empirical case that democracies are extremely unlikely to fight one another. Moreover, the case for spreading democracy does not rest entirely on the democratic-peace proposition. Although those who favor promoting democracy often invoke the democratic peace, the debate over whether the United States should spread democracy is not the same as the debate over the democratic peace. Even if the critics were able to undermine the democratic-peace proposition, their arguments would not negate the case for spreading democracy, because there are other reasons for promoting democracy. More important, the case for promoting democracy as a means of building peace remains sound if the spread of democracy merely reduces the probability of war between democracies, whereas "proving" the democratic peace proposition requires showing that the probability of such wars is at or close to zero.
1. Criticisms of the Deductive Logic of the Democratic Peace
Several criticisms of the democratic peace proposition fault the logic that has been advanced to explain the apparent absence of war between democracies. These arguments do not rest on an assessment of the empirical evidence, but instead rely on analyses and critiques of the internal consistency and persuasiveness of the theoretical explanations of the democratic peace. Critics have offered four major challenges to the logic of the democratic peace: (a) there is no consensus on the causal mechanisms that keep democracies at peace: (b) the possibility that democracies may turn into nondemocracies means that even democracies operate according to realist principles; (c) the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace is flawed, not least because its logic also would predict that democracies are less likely to be involved in any wars, not just wars with other democracies; and (d) the normative explanation of the democratic peace is unpersuasive.
a. Absence of Consensus on what Explains the Democratic Peace
The Argument: The first, and most general criticism of the deductive logic of the democratic peace proposition holds that the lack of agreement on what causes democracies to avoid war with one another calls the proposition into question.75 This argument suggests that scholars cannot be confident in an empirical finding when they cannot agree on its causes.
Response: The fact that several theories have been advanced to explain the democratic peace does not mean that we cannot be confident that democracies are unlikely to fight one another. There is no reason to assume that a single theory explains all the cases in which democracies have avoided war with one another. It is possible to be confident in an empirical finding even when many different explanations account for it. For example, it is empirically true that all human beings eventually die. (The discovery of evidence to refute this proposition would have profound biological, philosophical, and theological implications, not to mention its effects on retirement planning and the future of the Social Security system.) But there are many causes of death, each of which rests on a different logic of explanation. People die in wars, accidents, and violent crimes, as well as from AIDS, heart disease, numerous types of cancer, and Alzheimer's Disease, among many other factors. In some cases, the causal logic of the explanation of death is very clear. It is well understood how a bullet through the heart leads to death. In other cases, including many infectious and chronic diseases, the precise biological and physiological processes that cause death are not fully understood. Nevertheless, the variety of causal mechanisms and our incomplete understanding of many of them do not lead us to the conclusion that some human beings will not die.
Accounting for the absence of wars between democracies is somewhat similar to explaining why people die. Several causal mechanisms explain the absence of wars between democracies. In some cases, democracies avoid war because the distribution of power in the international system gives them strong incentives to remain at peace. In at least some of these cases, democratic decision-making processes may make democracies "smarter" and better able to recognize systemic incentives. When states share liberal values, they are unlikely to go to war because fighting one another would undermine liberal values such as respect for individual freedom. As John Owen has argued, democratic institutions may reinforce the incentives for peace provided by shared liberal principles.76 And there are probably additional explanations for why at least some democratic dyads have remained at peace. Proponents of the democratic peace need to refine the logic of each explanation and identify the conditions under which they apply, but the multiplicity of explanations does not mean that the democratic peace is invalid.
b. Democracies may Revert to Autocracy
The Argument: A second criticism of the logic of the democratic peace argues that democracies cannot enjoy a perpetual peace among themselves because there is always a possibility that a democratic state will become nondemocratic. This possibility means that even democracies must be concerned about the potential threat posed by other democracies. John Mearsheimer argues that: "Liberal democracies must therefore worry about relative power among themselves, which is tantamount to saying that each has an incentive to consider aggression against the other to forestall future trouble."77 In other words, the realist logic of anarchy, which posits that states exist in a Hobbesian world of fear, suspicion and potential war, applies even to relations between democracies.78
Response: There are four reasons for rejecting claims that fears of democratic backsliding compel democracies to treat other democracies as they would treat any nondemocratic state. First, the historical record shows that mature, stable democracies rarely become autocracies.79
Second, democracies are able to recognize and respond to states that are making a transition from democracy to authoritarianism. Democratic states thus can pursue a policy of accommodation toward other democracies, hedge their bets with more cautious policies toward unstable or uncertain democracies, and abandon accommodation when democracies turn into nondemocracies. There is no reason to assume that democracies will become autocracies overnight and then immediately launch attacks on democracies.
Third, like some other realist arguments, the claim that states must give priority to preparing for an unlikely dangerous future development rests on flawed logic. It assumes that states must base their foreign policies almost entirely on worst-case scenarios. Similar logic would imply that, for example, citizens in any country should act on the basis of the assumption that domestic law and order might collapse into anarchy and violence.
Fourth, the claim that democracies must worry about the relative power of other democracies (which may become autocracies) relies on the same shaky logic that predicts that states cannot cooperate because they need to worry about the relative gains achieved by other states. The relative-gains argument holds that in international politics, cooperation is rare because it often gives greater gains to one state, and these relative disparities in gains can be turned into advantages in power than can be used to threaten the state that gains less.80 The relative-gains argument sometimes assumes that states have high and constant concerns about relative gains. In practice, however, relative-gains concerns vary and are often almost nonexistent.81
c. Criticisms of the Structural-Institutional Explanation
The Argument: Critics of the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace make the following arguments. First, the structural-institutional model fails to explain why democracies go to war with nondemocracies, even though they do not fight other democracies. If leaders of democracies are constrained from going to war by the public, this constraint would also prevent democracies from fighting nondemocracies.82 Many studies report, however, that democracies have the same rate of war involvement as nondemocracies.
Second, critics argue that the public is often just as warlike as the leaders that they are supposed to constrain. Public jingoism and enthusiasm for war accompanied the outbreak of World War One and helped cause the Spanish-American War. The structural-institutional model thus erroneously assumes that the people are usually more pacific than their leaders.83 A related argument suggests that recent extended intervals of peace may have led publics to forget the horrors of war. The end of conscription in many countries and the tendency for wars to be fought by volunteer professional armies may further erode public opposition to the use of force.84
Response: The criticisms of the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace are not persuasive, for four reasons. First, this explanation can account for why democracies only avoid wars with other democracies, because democracies may behave differently toward states (i.e., democracies) with domestic institutions that constrain their ability to go to war quickly. Democracies may distinguish between states on the basis of their political institutions, and pursue different policies toward those that are constrained by democratic institutions. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman argue that "some political institutions help foster beliefs ... about the dovish inclinations of certain states. Democratic institutions are visible signs that the state in question is likely to face high political costs for using force in its diplomacy."85 A slightly different form of the argument suggests that the constraints of democratic decision-making become much more severe when the government of a democracy attempts to mobilize the country for war against a fellow democracy. Thus the institutional argument does not actually predict that democracies will pursue peaceful policies toward all types of states.
Second, the institutional-structural explanation, properly formulated, need not rest on the assumption that the public is peace-loving while leaders are eager to go to war. Some proponents of the democratic peace proposition, including Immanuel Kant, have assumed that the people are less eager to favor war, because they will ultimately be forced to pay its costs.86 The logic of the theory, however, can be recast in terms of checks and balances. In a democracy, the executive branch, legislative branch, and the public all constrain each other's ability to make rash and hasty decisions for war.
Third, the critics overlook how the existence of domestic constraints in a pair of democratic states can enable a democratic dyad to spend more time seeking a peaceful settlement of a conflict than a dyad with one or no democracies. If both states in a crisis are unable to mobilize quickly, they will have more time to resolve the crisis without war. Bruce Russett argues: "If another nation's leaders regard a state as democratic, they will anticipate a difficult and lengthy process before the democracy is likely to use significant military force against them. They will expect an opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement."87
Finally, critics of the institutional-structural explanation have not addressed the claim that democratic institutions endow democracies with better information-processing capabilities that enable democracies to limit the myths that cause war and to avoid wars when international circumstances render war unwise.
d. Criticisms of the Normative Explanation
The Argument: Scholars skeptical of the democratic peace proposition have not criticized the normative explanation for the democratic peace as much as they have argued against the structural-institutional explanation. Several skeptics have not attacked the logic of the normative explanation, preferring to argue against the democratic peace on empirical grounds.88 There is, nevertheless, at least one prominent argument against the normative explanation. Some critics claim that democratic norms should preclude the use of threats or covert action by democracies against other democracies. Norms of trust and respect for the autonomy of liberal regimes would rule out such behavior, just as they proscribe war. But democracies often have threatened war or engaged in covert actions against other democracies.89 These hostilities between democracies fall short of war, but they call into question whether shared norms can explain the absence of wars between democracies.90
Response: Proponents of the democratic peace counter that the involvement of the United States in Chile in 1973 is usually the only example of covert intervention by a democracy in another democracy and that democracies as a group are actually less likely to engage in covert or overt interventions.91 More generally, they argue that the normative explanation is not undermined by hostilities short of war. If democracies (or liberal states) fail to recognize one another or temporarily adopt illiberal policies, they may find themselves at odds with other democracies (or liberal states). But as crises develop between liberal democracies, they tend to act on the basis of their shared norms and draw back from the brink of war.92
2. Empirical Criticisms
a. Democracies Sometimes Fight
The Argument: Critics of the democratic peace point to apparent wars between democracies as evidence that there is no democratic peace. They frequently cite the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, Finland's decision to align with Germany against the Western powers and the Soviet Union during World War Two, the American Civil War, World War One, and the wars that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. At least 17 conflicts have been cited as potential wars between democracies.93
Responses: There are three reasons to reject the claim that the democratic peace proposition is invalid because democracies may have fought some wars. First, the democratic peace propositionCcorrectly formulated-holds that democracies rarely fight, not that they never fight. In social science it is probably impossible to generate laws with 100% accuracy. Thus the correct formulation of the democratic peace proposition is the statement that democracies almost never go to war with one another.94
Second, many of the cases cited do not qualify as "wars" between "democracies." A closer examination of the conflicts in question reveals that the apparent exceptions do not refute the democratic peace proposition. In some cases, one of the participants was not a democracy. In 1812, Britain was not a democracy. Spain's democratic credentials in 1898 were dubious. Germany in 1914 was not governed by liberal principles and its foreign policy was directed by the Kaiser, not the elected Reichstag.95 In other cases, no international war took place. The American Civil War was not an international war. Finland engaged in virtually no direct hostilities with the Western allies during World War Two; it fought almost entirely against communist Russia.96
Third, the criticism that democracies have fought one another is irrelevant to deciding whether the United States should export democracy. The spread of democracy makes sense as long as democracies are significantly less likely to go to war with one another. A policy of spreading democracy would be justified if democracies have, for example, avoided war 99.9% of the time; we can decide to spread democracy without debating whether the figure is 99.9% or 100%.
b. The Absence of War is not Statistically Significant
The Argument: Statistical critiques of the evidence for the democratic peace proposition generally argue that there is not enough evidence to conclude that the absence of wars between democracies is statistically significant. There are two underlying logics behind most of these quantitative arguments. The first suggests that wars between a given pair of states are relatively rare in international politics, so the absence of wars between democracies might be a coincidence.97 The second argument claims that the absence of war between democracies is only statistically significant after World War II, and that the democratic peace since 1945 has been a product of the alignment of most democracies against the Soviet Union.98
Responses: Many quantitative analyses conclude that challenges to the statistical significance of the democratic peace do not withstand close scrutiny.99 Zeev Maoz has offered one of the most comprehensive rebuttals of these arguments.100 He argues that Spiro's own analysis predicts far more wars between liberal dyads that actually occurred. Maoz also argues that it is misleading to count all parties in large, multi-state wars as being at war with one another. (E.g., Japan was not really "at war" with Bulgaria in World War I.) He notes that Spiro changes the counting rule for the Korean War. Maoz and Russett focused on the "politically-relevant" dyads, which account for most wars. Maoz also claims that slicing the data into one-year segments makes finding any war statistically insignificant. Such slicing is like testing whether a bowl of sugar will attract ants by assessing the statistical significance of finding an ant on an individual grain of sugar. The odds that ants will be in the sugar bowl are high; the chances of an ant being on a given grain of sugar, however, are so low that finding one on a grain would not be statistically significant. When Maoz looks at politically-relevant dyads, he finds that one would expect 57.63 liberal dyads at war between 1816 and 1986, but they find only one: the Spanish-American War.101 He offers similar figures for the 20th century and for militarized disputes. And when Maoz adopts Spiro's suggestion to look at dyads over their entire history, he finds that conflict actually fell when both countries in a dyad became democratic.
The second argument also is unpersuasive, because Farber and Gowa make an arbitrary decision to slice up the data into different periods and categories. Moreover, Maoz is unable to replicate their results. Farber and Gowa appear to have miscounted the total number of dyads.102
c. Other Causes Account for the Apparent Democratic Peace
An additional set of arguments suggests other factors besides shared democracy have caused democracies to remain at peace with one another. Such claims are implicit in some critiques of the logic and evidence, but not all such critiques identify the factors that are alleged to count for the absence of wars between democracies.
(1) Alliances Against Common Threats Cause Democratic Peace
The Argument: Several critics of the democratic peace proposition claim that the absence of war among democracies can be explained by the fact that democracies often have allied against common threats. Democracies have avoided wars with one another not because they share democratic forms of government, but because they have had a common interest in defeating a common enemy. Thus the realist logic of balancing against threats explains the democratic peace.103
Responses: There are three responses to the claim that allying against common threats is a more important cause of peace among democracies. First, those who make this argument overlook the fact that threat perceptions and alliance choice often reflect shared values and political principles. These critics assume that alliance formation proceeds in strict accordance with realist logic and that regime type plays no role. Democracies, however, may have found themselves allied to one another against nondemocracies because they share a commitment to democratic values and want to defend them against threats from nondemocracies. Indeed, if the democratic peace proposition is only partially valid and if it is at least dimly understood by decisionmakers, democracies will find other democracies less threatening than nondemocracies and therefore will tend to align with them against nondemocracies. This argument is consistent with Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory, which identifies offensive intentions as element of threat.104 If democracies regard one another as having no offensive intentions toward democracies, they are likely to align against nondemocracies.
Second, the tendency of democracies to ally with one another is further evidence of the special characteristics of democratic foreign policy.105 The normative explanation for the democratic peace would predict that democracies would be more likely to form alliances. Instead of being a refutation of the democratic peace, the tendency of democracies to ally with one another is actually an additional piece of confirming evidence.
Third, Maoz does an interesting test, examining whether states were allied before they became democracies or allied only after they became democracies. He finds that "Non-aligned democracies are considerably less likely to fight each other than aligned non-democracies."106 This finding suggests that shared democracy-not alignment against a common threat-has the most explanatory power in accounting for the absence of wars between democracies.
(2) Democracies Have not had much Opportunity to Fight
The Argument: Some critics of the democratic peace proposition claim that democracies have not fought one another because they have not had the opportunity. Until recently, there were relatively few democracies in the international system. Many were geographically remote from each other.107
Response: The most sophisticated statistical analyses of the evidence for the democratic peace take these variables into account and still conclude that there is a strong relationship between democracy and peace.108
(3) Process-Tracing does not Reveal Evidence of Democracy as a Cause of the Democratic Peace.
The Argument: Skeptics suggest that, if the democratic peace proposition is valid, we should find that pairs of democracies behave in crises in way that reveals that shared democracy, not considerations of power and interest, caused them to avoid war. For example, tracing the process of how events unfolded should reveal that the publics in democracies did not want war with other democracies, that leaders did not make military threats against other democracies, and that democracies adopted accommodating behavior toward other democracies.109 Examination of historical crises, however, reveals that democratic decisionmakers avoided war because they feared defeat or that their states would be weakened in a conflict.110
Response: Proponents of the democratic-peace proposition do not deny that considerations of power and interest often motivate states.111 In the anarchic and competitive realm of international politics, democracies cannot avoid making such calculations. Thus evidence that democracies are sensitive to power and interest does not refute the democratic-peace proposition.
In addition, critics of the democratic-peace proposition have not tested it fairly; they have not deduced the full range of predictions that the normative and institutional model makes about how democracies will avoid war. More comprehensive tests would also deduce and test hypotheses about how many political and diplomatic aspects of crises between democratic states differ from other crises. Such tests would also compare pairs of democratic states to mixed and nondemocratic pairs. John Owen has conducted such tests and finds considerable evidence to support the democratic-peace proposition.112
B. The Democratization Process Increases the Risk of War
The Argument: One of the most important arguments against U.S. efforts to promote democracy is the claim that countries engaged in transitions to democracy become more likely to be involved in war. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder make this argument and support it with statistical evidence that shows a correlation between democratization and war. They suggest that several causal mechanisms explain why democratization tends to lead to war. First, old elites play the nationalist card in an effort to incite conflict so that they can retain power. Second, in emerging democracies without strong democratic institutions new rulers compete for support by playing the nationalist card and search for foreign scapegoats for failures.113 This type of electoral competition increases the risk of internal and international conflict.
The argument that democratization causes war does not directly challenge the usual form of the democratic peace proposition. Mansfield and Snyder recognize that "It is probably true that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States."114 Instead, the arguments suggests that attempts to spread democracy have significant risks, including the risk of war.
Responses: Mansfield and Snyder have advanced an important new argument, but even if partially true, it does not refute the case for spreading democracy internationally. Taken to extremes, the Mansfield/Snyder argument would amount to a case for opposing all political change on the grounds that it might cause instability. Promoting democracy makes more sense than this course, because the risks of democratization are not so high and uncontrollable that we should give up on attempts to spread democracy.
First, there are reasons to doubt the strength of the relationship between democratization and war. Other quantitative studies challenge the statistical significance of Mansfield and Snyder's results, suggest that there is an even stronger connection between movements toward autocracy and the onset of war, find that it is actually unstable transitions and reversals of democratization that increase the probability of war, and argue that democratization diminishes the likelihood of militarized international disputes.115 In particular, autocracies are likely to exploit nationalism and manipulate public opinion to launch diversionary wars-the same causal mechanisms that Mansfield and Snyder claim are at work in democratizing states. Mansfield and Snyder themselves point out that "reversals of democratization are nearly as risky as democratization itself," thereby bolstering the case for assisting the consolidation of new democracies.116 In addition, very few of the most recent additions to the ranks of democracies have engaged in wars. In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have avoided major internal and external conflicts. Of these countries, only Slovenia was involved in brief series of military skirmishes with Serbia.117 Russia has been involved in a number of small wars on or near its borders, but so far it has undergone a dramatic transition toward democracy without becoming very warlike.118 There is little evidence of international war in Latin America, which also has witnessed a large-scale transition to democracy in recent years. Countries such as Mongolia and South Africa appear to have made the transition to democracy without going to war. The new democracies plagued by the most violence, including some former Soviet republics and the republics of the former Yugoslavia, are those that are the least democratic and may not qualify as democracies at all.
All of this evidence suggests that whatever may have increased the war-proneness of democratizing states in the past may not be present in the contemporary international system. It may be that states making the transition from feudalism to democracy became more war-prone or that the emerging democracies of the 19th century were European great powers that embarked on imperial wars of conquest. These factors will not lead today's new democracies into war. Finally, if the democratic peace proposition is correct, the higher proportion of democracies in the current international system may further reduce the risk that new democracies will not engage in war, because they will find themselves in a world of many democracies instead of one of many potentially hostile nondemocracies.
Second, it is possible to control any risks of war posed by democratization. Mansfield and Snyder identify several useful policies to mitigate any potential risks of democratization. Old elites that are threatened by democratization can be given "golden parachutes" that enable them to at least retain some of their wealth and to stay out of jail.119 New democracies also need external assistance to build up the journalistic infrastructure that will support a "marketplace of ideas" that can prevent manipulation of public opinion and nationalistic mythmaking.120 Finally, an international environment conducive to free trade can help to move new democracies in a benign direction.121
C. Promoting Elections may be Harmful or Irrelevant
The Arguments: One of the most prominent recent criticisms of attempts to promote democracy claims that democratic elections often have few positive effects, especially in countries that do not have liberal societies or other socioeconomic conditions such as a large middle class and a high level of economic development. These arguments imply that electoral democracy may be undesirable in many countries and that the United States should not encourage its spread. Democratically elected governments may turn out to be illiberal regimes that oppress their citizens.122 The process of holding democratic elections in multiethnic societies can fan the flames of ethnic conflict.123 Democracy does not guarantee economic success and may even hinder it.124
Responses: These criticisms of electoral democracy are important reminders that democracy is imperfect and so are democracies. They also call attention to the need to promote the spread of liberal principles, as well as democratic electoral procedures. They do not, however, amount to a persuasive case against U.S. support for elections in other countries, for the following reasons. First, Zakaria overstates the extent to which new democracies are illiberal or are becoming so. He argues that the Freedom House ratings show that 50% of democratizing countries are illiberal democracies. He classifies countries as "democratizing" if their combined Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties (each measured on a 7-point scale with 1 denoting the most freedom and 7 the least) fall between 5 and 10. He regards countries as illiberal if they have a greater degree of political freedom than civil liberties. Zakaria's claim that there is a growing number of illiberal democracies may be correct. After all, there are now more emerging democracies. But whether states have fewer civil liberties than political rights is a problematic way to distinguish between liberal and illiberal democracies. In 65% of the states classified as illiberal democracies by Zakaria, the difference between civil liberties and political rights is only one point on the 7-point Freedom House scale. In no case is the difference greater than 2 points. Moreover, classifying countries as illiberal on the basis of whether they have more civil liberties than political rights leads to some absurd distinctions. For example, Zakaria's criteria would classify France as an illiberal democracy because it scores higher on political rights (1) than civil liberties (2), and Gabon as a liberal democracy because its civil liberties score (4) is higher than its political rights (5). Zakaria notes that he does not rely on Freedom House for classifications of individual states, only for overall statistical measures. Freedom House's 1997 ratings show that civil liberties have improved in 10 of the countries Zakaria identifies as "democratizing" and fallen in only 4. The most recent Freedom House ratings also show that 81 of 117 democracies are now classified as "free" whereas only 76 of 117 were "free" in 1995. Thus there actually seems to be a slight trend toward liberalization, even as the overall number of democracies remains constant.125 In light of the absence of democratic and liberal traditions in many new democracies (particularly in the former Soviet Union and Africa), it is remarkable that freedom continues to flourish to the extent that it does.126
Second, Zakaria and Kaplan overlook the extent to which the holding of elections is (a) an important way of removing authoritarian leaders, and (b) part of the process of encouraging the growth of liberal values. The principle that leaders should be selected in free and fair elections can become an international norm that can be used to persuade authoritarian leaders to step aside, sometimes gracefully. Marcos in the Philippines and Pinochet in Chile were removed from power largely because of the growing international belief in the electoral principle. It is hard to imagine that elections in Burma, for example, could produce an outcome worse than the current SLORC regime. Elections do not only remove unpopular authoritarians, however; they also encourage the development of liberal habits and principles such as freedom of speech and of the press. Holding a free and fair election requires that these principles be followed. Elections alone do not guarantee that constitutional liberalism and the rule of law will be adopted, but they do focus the attention of the voting public on the process of freely electing their governments.
Third, it is not clear what forms of government the United States should support instead of democracy. Zakaria believes the United States should "encourage the gradual development of constitutional liberalism across the globe."127 Most proponents of promoting democracy would agree that this is a worthy goal, but it is hard to promote liberalism without promoting democracy. There are few contemporary examples of liberal countries that are not democracies. Zakaria cites Hong Kong under British rule as an example, but this experience of a liberal imperial power engaging in a rather benign authoritarian rule over a flourishing free-market economy has already ended and is unlikely to be repeated. Earlier historical examples of liberal nondemocracies include Britain in the early 19th century, and possibly other European constitutional monarchies of that century. As Marc Plattner and Carl Gershman of the National Endowment for Democracy point out, none of the examples is a "practical vision" for the 21st century.128 Zakaria praises East Asian countries on the grounds that they "have accorded their citizens a widening sphere of economic, civil, religious and limited political rights," and suggests that they, much like Western countries around 1900, are on the road to liberty.129 But most observers-including some East Asians-would argue that these countries have curtailed political liberties (and sometimes bragged about it in the debate over "Asian values") and are hardly a model of liberalization that the United States should encourage. Thus it is difficult to see how Zakaria's analysis can support a viable U.S. policy of supporting liberalism without also supporting democratic elections.
Fourth, Kaplan and, to a lesser extent, Zakaria, exaggerate the degree to which elections per se are responsible for the problems of new democracies, many of which had the same problems before elections were held. In the area of ethnic conflict, for example, democratic elections may ameliorate existing conflicts instead of exacerbating them. The evidence is mixed, but the need to build electoral coalitions and the liberal practices of free speech and freedom of association necessary to hold elections may promote ethnic accommodation, not hostility.130
These arguments suggest that Zakaria, Kaplan, and other critics of electoral democracy have taken the valid point that "elections are not enough" too far. The United States should support democracy and liberalism; supporting only the latter risks not achieving either.
D. The Challenge from "Asian Values"
The most important contemporary ideological challenge to democracy comes from East Asia and has been called "soft authoritarianism" or the "Asian values" argument.131 This school of thought argues that countries should be ruled by a wise and authoritarian elite, that individual rights often need to be limited for the sake of the broader community, and that the state should play a leading role in economic development.132 In practice, it is approximated by Singapore's political system, but elements of it have been embraced by Malaysia, China, and Indonesia. Many African countries are reportedly attracted by this model of government.133 Although this perspective has yet to become a coherent and unified political ideology, recent writings and statements from East Asian leaders, government officials, and intellectuals contain several recurring arguments for the superiority of East Asian political systems over Western democracy.
Asian "soft authoritarianism" merits attention for two reasons. First, it is emerging as the most prominent, articulate, and comprehensive critique of liberal democracy. Second, the countries that advocate it were, at least until the second half of 1997, among the most dynamic economies in the world. Singapore, Malaysia, China, Indonesia, and other Asian economies achieved annual growth rates of 10% or higher in the 1980s and most of 1990s. Their growing economic power has increased their influence in international affairs. Their recent economic turmoil is probably only a temporary setback, and the fact that it disrupted financial markets around the world testifies to the growing economic importance of these countries.
Asian attempts to articulate a distinctive "Asian way" and to criticize liberal democratic principles have provoked broader debates on the difference between Asian and Western cultures, whether there is a uniquely Asian approach to politics and economics, and the international implications of East Asia's rise.134 Many of these questions are beyond the scope of this paper, so I will focus on the East Asian arguments against U.S. attempts to spread democracy.
The Arguments: East Asian critics of democracy make the following arguments for why the spread of democracy-particularly to East Asia-is not desirable. First, Western democracy allows for too much liberty, and this excessive individual freedom causes moral decline and social collapse. U.S. divorce rates, out-of-wedlock births, and crime rates, are evidence of liberty run wild.135 Second, some Asians argue that the spread democracy would aggravate ethnic tensions and increase ethnic conflict within Asian countries. Third, and most generally, some East Asians claim that liberal democracy is not a suitable form of government for Asian countries, because Asia has a different set of cultural values that include a strong emphasis on communalism.
Responses: Each of these arguments for the undesirability of democracy is seriously flawed. The first argument-that democracy causes moral decline and social disintegration-is not persuasive, because not all liberal democracies suffer such ills. Canada and most European countries demonstrate that liberal democracy does not cause social collapse. These countries are indisputably democratic, but they are far less violent than the United States, and they do not have America's social problems. In 1995, the Population Reference Bureau reported that Americans kill each other at a rate 17 times higher than in Japan and Ireland, 10 times the rates in Germany and France, and five times the rate in Canada. The United Nations Demographic Yearbook shows homicide rates per 100,000 population for several countries in 1991, the most recent year available. Canada's was 2.2, Japan's 0.6, Austria's 1.3, the Netherlands' 1.2, and Norway's 1.9. Portugal and Spain came in at 1.6 and 0.9, respectively, while Italy's was 2.9 The United Kingdom's was 4.8 versus 10.4 for the United States.136 These differences between the United States reflect deep-seated cultural differences. The American culture of individualism, not more universal liberal and democratic values, is responsible for many U.S. social problems.
The argument that democracy exacerbates ethnic tensions also is unpersuasive. Managing ethnic tensions in multiethnic societies isn't easy, but democratic approaches may be at least as successful as authoritarian ones. Authoritarian states that appeared to control ethnic tensions often did so at a high price in human life. The Soviet Union avoided ethnic civil war, but under Stalin it decimated or deported many ethnic minorities. Tito's Yugoslavia avoided violent disintegration, but hundreds of thousands of suspected separatists were killed on Tito's orders, particularly in the late 1940s. Considerable evidence indicates that liberal democracy, with its emphasis on tolerance, cooperation, political accommodation, and respect for civil liberties, provides the best recipe for long-term domestic stability.
The third argument's assertion that democratic government is incompatible with East Asian values is belied by the relatively successful growth of democracy in Japan, South Korea, and, more recently, Taiwan and the Philippines. These states have not emulated the Western model of democracy in all respects, but they are almost universally classified as democracies. In addition to conducting multiparty elections and maintaining civil liberties, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all have impressive economic records. Some East Asians point to the Philippines and argue that democracy is responsible for its domestic instability and economic malaise, but that country's economic performance has improved dramatically in recent years. In addition, the Korean and Japanese cases show that democracy and growth can go hand in hand. The former problems of the Philippines may be attributable to the Spanish colonial legacy, not the flaws of democratic political systems.
The economic and financial crises that swept across many Asian countries in 1997 and 1998 have muted many of the loudest voices that argued for "Asian values" and "soft authoritarianism." Many commentators have argued that the answer to Asia's economic difficulties would be greater acceptance of democratic values.137 Claims that the Asian model is in a crisis and will be abandoned are probably overstated, just as Asian leaders tended to overstate the virtues of their approach when their economies were flourishing. Nevertheless, it seems likely that proponents of "Asian values" will offer a less strident challenge to liberal and democratic values in the future and that Asian countries will pursue political liberalization as part of their economic reforms. At least some of the current economic difficulties in Asian countries can be attributed to a lack of public accountability.
The recent critiques of U.S. efforts to promote democracy have not presented a convincing case that spreading democracy is a bad idea. The international spread of democracy will offer many benefits to new democracies and to the United States. The democratic peace proposition appears robust, even if scholars need to continue to develop multiple explanations for why democracies rarely, if ever, go to war. The evidence on whether democratization increases the risk of war is mixed, at best, and policies can be crafted to minimize any risks of conflict in these cases. The problem of "illiberal democracy" has been exaggerated; democratic elections usually do more good than harm. The United States should, however, aim to promote liberal values as well as electoral democracy. And the "soft authoritarian" challenge to liberal democracy was not persuasive, even before the Asian economic turmoil of 1997 and 1998 undermined claims for the superiority of "Asian values."
Establishing that promoting democracy is beneficial does not, however, resolve all the questions that surround U.S. attempts to spread democracy. These questions include: Can the United States encourage the spread of democracy or must democracy always develop indigenously? How can the United States promote democracy in other countries? Which policies work and under what circumstances do they work? Any comprehensive case for why the United States should promote democracy must address these questions.138
Note 1: See, for example, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 138; Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy, No. 87 (Summer 1992), pp. 25-46; and Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1991).
Note 2: See Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine," Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 111-127.
Note 3: Quoted in Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996), p. 239.
Note 4: See Robert Kagan, "Democracies and Double Standards," Commentary, August 1997, pp. 19-26 for the argument that the Clinton administration is showing less enthusiasm for promoting democracy, and for a summary and critique of recent arguments against promoting democracy. At least some members of the Clinton administration continue to argue for promoting democracy. See Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996), pp. 47-63.
Note 5: Robert D. Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?", Atlantic Monthly, December 1997, pp. 55-80.
Note 6: Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6 (November/December 1997), pp. 22-43.
Note 7: Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1987), p. 206.
Note 8: Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is ... and Is Not," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy, second edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 50.
Note 9: Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1943), p. 269.
Note 10: Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 7.
Note 11: See, for example, James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 89-102; and David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 430-451.
Note 12: For discussions of the differences between ancient and modern conceptions of democracy, see M.I. Finley, Democracy: Ancient and Modern (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973); David Stockton, Classical Athenian Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick, eds., Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 1996). I am indebted to Bradley A. Thayer for reminding me of this important distinction.
Note 13: Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York, December 1995, p. 10.
Note 14: Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 7
Note 15: John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, p. 123.
Note 16: Although the term "liberal" has become an epithet hurled at those on the left of the American political spectrum, virtually all American politicians and most of those in Europe embrace the basic principles of liberalism. Liberalism is most closely associated with the political thought of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, although Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith also contributed to its development. For discussions of liberty and liberalism, see "Liberalism Defined: The Perils of Complacency," The Economist, December 21, 1996; Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Berlin, Four Essays on Liberalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; and Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 3-4.
Note 17: Some liberals, however, regard electoral democracy as one of the "core norms" of liberalism. See, for example, Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, p. 4
Note 18: Michael Walzer, "Vote Early," The New Republic, October 28, 1996, p. 29.
Note 19: Many political and moral philosophers have addressed this issue and it would be impossible to do full justice to their arguments in this essay. Two good places to start exploring these issues are Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), and Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981). For a brief overview and evaluation of the contending positions in the debate over whether there are moral obligations to foreigners, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: The Free Press, 1986), chap. 3.
Note 20: Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 30.
Note 21: Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," pp. 49-50.
Note 22: For definitions of liberty and classic discussions of the topic, see the writings of Immanuel Kant, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and the Federalist papers. Recent important discussions of liberty include Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty; and Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
Note 23: Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 28.
Note 24: Adrian Karatnycky, "Freedom on the March," in Freedom Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January-February 1997), pp. 7, 11.
Note 25: Quoted in Geoffrey Wheatcroft, "The Paradoxical Case of Tony Blair," The Atlantic Monthly, June 1996, pp. 22-40 at 26.
Note 26: For some discussions of liberalism and its critics, see Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism; and Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
Note 27: More generally, democracies are more likely to enjoy political stability. Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 28-29.
Note 28: R.J. Rummel, Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1997), pp. 87-88. Rummel presents his definition explicitly: "By democracy is meant liberal democracy, where those who hold power are elected in competitive elections with a secret ballot and wide franchise (loosely understood as including at least two-thirds of adult males); where there is freedom of speech, religion, and organization; and a constitutional framework of law to which the government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights." (p. 11) On p. 86 of Power Kills, Rummel lists additional studies that confirm the proposition that democracies have the least internal violence, but it is not clear whether those studies considered all democracies or only states that Rummel classifies as liberal democracies.
Note 29: See Rudolph J. Rummel, "Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 1994), pp. 1-10. Rummel calls genocide and mass murder "democide," and distinguishes such killings from battle deaths. He reports that between 1900 and 1987 over 169 million people died in democides, compared to about 34 million battle death in wars. See also Rummel, Power Kills, chap. 6.
Note 30: Rummel, "Power, Genocide and Mass Murder," p. 8. Emphasis in original. For a more detailed elaboration of Rummel's explanation, see Power Kills, especially chapter 11.
Note 31: See Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 28-29.
Note 32: "The Politics of Peace," Economist, April 1, 1995, p. 18.
Note 33: Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 572-573.
Note 34: Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," p. 572.
Note 35: Barbara Crosette, "The 21st Century Belongs to ..." New York Times, October 19, 1997, Week in Review section, p. 3.
Note 36: See Gerald Segal, China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy, Adelphi Paper No. 287 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1994); and Jack A. Goldstone, "The Coming Chinese Collapse," Foreign Policy, No. 99 (Summer 1995), pp. 35-52.
Note 37: Joshua Gordon, "Asian Growth Needs Democracy," Wall Street Journal, Interactive Edition,, August 12, 1996.
Note 38: Kim R. Holmes and Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Freedom and Growth," Wall Street Journal, Interactive Edition, December 16, 1996.
Note 39: Quoted in Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," p. 34.
Note 40: Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," p. 572. Emphasis in original.
Note 41: Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," p. 51;
Note 42: Adrian Karatnycky, "Still the Bedrock of a Better World," Washington Post, December 29, 1997, p. A17.
Note 43: Amartya Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," The New Republic, January 10 and 17, 1994, p. 34. See also Jean DrÃ¨ze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Sen makes it clear that democracy may not be a necessary condition for preventing famines, it does appear to be sufficient. See Amartya Sen, "War and Famines: On Divisions and Incentives," Discussion Paper No. 33, The Development Economics Research Programme, London School of Economics, October 1991, p. 19 note 28.
Note 44: Joseph Collins, "World Hunger: A Scarcity of Food or a Scarcity of Democracy?" in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., World Security: Challenges for a New Century, 2nd edition (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), p. 368.
Note 45: Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," pp. 35, 36. Sen points out that the democratic political processes that prevent famines may be less effective in avoiding less urgent problems such as nonextreme hunger, illiteracy, and gender discrimination. Ibid., p. 35.
Note 46: Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," p. 34. A considerable body of opinion suggests that famines and hunger are not caused by a global or country-by-country shortage of food but by the failure to distribute food to those who most need it. See Collins, "World Hunger," pp. 357-360; and Amartya Sen, Food, Economics and Entitlements (Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economic Research, 1986).
Note 47: Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," p. 34.
Note 48: Amartya Sen, "The Economics of Life and Death," Scientific American, May 1993, pp. 40-47. See also Mohiuddin Alamgir, Famine in South Asia: Political Economy of Mass Starvation in Bangladesh (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschalger, Gunn and Hain, 1980).
Note 49: Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," p. 35. For additional data, see Amartya Sen, "The Economics of Life and Death," Scientific American, May 1993, pp. 40-47; and DrPze and Sen, Hunger and Public Action.
Note 50: Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," p. 34. Many Indians have, however, suffered from hunger and malnutrition since 1947, but the country has avoided the catastrophic famines that previously plagued it.
Note 51: Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 123.
Note 52: Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 88.
Note 53: Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, Nos. 3 and 4 (Summer and Fall 1983). Reprinted in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 3-57.
Note 54: Ibid., p. 10. Emphasis in original.
Note 55: See Stuart A. Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 309-341; Bremer, "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965," International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1993), pp. 231-249; Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall ... Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 617-648; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Type and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 3-35; Erich Weede, "Democracy and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 649-664; and Weede, "Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 4 (November 1992), pp. 377-383.
Note 56: Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" International Interactions, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1992), pp. 245-267.
Note 57: For one of the earliest statements of this finding, see Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Summer 1976), pp. 50-69.
Note 58: R.J. Rummel, for example, claims that libertarian states, which tend to be more democratic than others, are less likely to resort to international violence. Such states will at least inflict fewer casualties in wars, even if they go to war as often as other types of states. See Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 1983), pp. 27-71; and Rummel, "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 457-479. Some studies find that disputes between democracies and nondemocracies are less likely to escalate to war that disputes between nondemocracies, See Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolai, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1817-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 3-35. For a reconsideration of the claim that democracies are as war-prone as other types of states, see James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 17-21.
Note 59: This type of argument appears in Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 10, 20-27; and Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," pp. 122-125.
Note 60: For examples of this argument, see Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 30-38; and William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 14-32.
Note 61: For examples of institutional/structural arguments, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and Institutional Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); T. Clifton Morgan and Sally H. Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 187-211; and Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), pp. 235-269.
Note 62: Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, expanded edition (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 213. David Lake also suggests that democracies have advantages in the conduct of international politics, but concludes that this advantage makes democracies more likely to win wars. See David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37.
Note 63: See Bruce Russett and Zeev Maoz, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 624-638. Russett and Maoz find that the normative model is more powerful.
Note 64: See Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace."
Note 65: Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, pp. 4-5.
Note 66: David P. Forsythe, "Democracy, War, and Covert Action," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 4 (August 1992), pp. 385-395.
Note 67: Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, p. 5. For the argument that population growth is higher in authoritarian regimes, regardless of their level of wealth, see Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Democracy and Development," paper presented to the Nobel Symposium on Democracy's Victory and Crisis, Uppsala University, Sweden, August 27-30, 1994, pp. 9, 10, and 18, cited in Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, p. 69 note 4. For a survey of the causes of refugee flows that emphasizes that refugees flee mainly for political, not economic reasons, see Myron Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 5-42.
Note 68: See Robert I. Rotberg, "Clinton Was Right," Foreign Policy, No. 102 (Spring 1996), pp. 135-141.
Note 69: I am indebted to Sumit Ganguly for bringing this point to my attention.
Note 70: Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 285-306.
Note 71: David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, p. 231.
Note 72: Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 30; and John Gerard Ruggie, "The Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 89-125.
Note 73: See the essays by Layne, Spiro, Farber and Gowa, and Oren in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace; Raymond Cohen, "Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that Democracies do not Fight One Another," Review of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (August 1994), pp. 207-224; Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, Mass. The MIT Press, 1997); Scott Gates, et al., Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 1-10; Joanne Gowa, "Democratic States and International Disputes," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 511-522; Arie M. Kacowicz, "Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?" Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 265-276; Susan Peterson, "How Democracies Differ: Public Opinion, State Structure, and the Lessons of the Fashoda Crisis," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), 3-37; Bruce D. Porter, "Is the Zone of Peace Stable? Sources of Stress and Conflict in Industrial Democracies of Post-Cold War Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 520-551; William R. Thompson, "Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse?" International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 141-174; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "America as Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective." PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 667-670.
Note 74: Compare, for example, Zeev Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), p. 179, and Christopher Layne, "Lord Palmerston and the Triumph of Realism: Anglo-French Relations, 1830-48," in Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?, p. 99.
Note 75: An earlier criticism claimed that proponents of the democratic peace had failed to develop a theoretical explanation of the empirical finding that democracies do not fight each other. This criticism is no longer valid, because there is no longer any shortage of explanations. Instead, proponents of the democratic peace have advanced several explanations and they continue to explicate and refine the logic of each.
Note 76: See Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace."
Note 77: John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," in Lynn-Jones and Miller, eds., The Cold War and After, p. 186.
Note 78: For this variant of realism, see Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future." Some realists do not paint such a stark picture of the implications of international anarchy. See, for example, Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90. On balance, realist theories lead to the conclusion that democracies cannot enjoy a perpetual peace, not that democracies often will be at war. Recently, some scholars have combined realist theories with elements of explanations of the democratic peace. See, for example, Andrew Kydd, "Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155.
Note 79: See Huntington, The Third Wave, especially pp. 259-263.
Note 80: For contending perspectives on relative gains, see David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For a pessimistic realist view of how concern over relative gains inhibits cooperation, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 19-24.
Note 81: See Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism; John C. Matthews, III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 112-146; and Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains." in ibid., pp. 147-175.
Note 82: See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 185; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, p. 164; Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," p. 205; Farber and Gowa, "Polities and Peace," p. 243; Gates, et al., "Democracy and Peace," p. 4; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace-Warlike Democracies: A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Democratic Peace," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 491-517 at 498-499. Note that proponents of the institutional-structural explanation agree that the logic of the model predicts that democracies will be less belligerent toward all types of states. See Morgan and Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies," p. 318.
Note 83: Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 185; Layne, "Kant or Cant," p. 164.
Note 84: "The Politics of Peace," Economist, April 1, 1995, p. 17.
Note 85: Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason p. 272.
Note 86: Kant argued: "If the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game." Quoted in "The Politics of Peace," p. 17.
Note 87: Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 39.
Note 88: Layne, "Kant or Cant," p. 165; Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," p. 205.
Note 89: See Forsythe, "Democracy, War, and Covert Action"; and Patrick James and Glenn E. Mitchell, II, "Targets of Covert Pressure: The Hidden Victims of the Democratic Peace," International Interactions, Vol. 21, No. 1 (July 1995).
Note 90: On the weaknesses of the normative explanation more generally, see Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, pp. 34-37.
Note 91: Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace," p. 179.
Note 92: See Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace."
Note 93: See Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, chap. 3. In addition to above cases, others that are mentioned frequently include: Lebanon-Israel, 1948; Germany in the 1930s; and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon.
Note 94: See Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 169 (note 2), and Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, "Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives," Review of International Studies, Vol. 21 (1995), pp. 319 (note 2) and 322.
Note 95: Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs."
Note 96: See Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace; and James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.
Note 97: Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace"; and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, pp. 27, 152-153, 159.
Note 98: See Farber and Gowa, "Polities and Peace."
Note 99: See, for example, Bruce Russett, "The Democratic Peace: And Yet it Moves," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 337-350.
Note 100: Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace," especially pp. 164-173
Note 101: Ibid., pp. 165-166. See Zeev Maoz, Domestic Sources of Global Change (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chap. 2, appendix, for his current coding rules.
Note 102: See Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace," p. 167.
Note 103: See Farber and Gowa, "Polities and Peace"; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 186-187.
Note 104: Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
Note 105: See Siverson and Emmons, "Birds of a Feather," and Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 109-139. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," also finds that democracies have a strong tendency to ally with other democracies.
Note 106: Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace," p. 176.
Note 107: See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 186.
Note 108: See Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, and Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace" for summaries of these studies.
Note 109: See Layne, "Kant or Cant," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 165-166.
Note 110: Ibid., pp. 168-190.
Note 111: See Russett, "And Yet it Moves," p. 350.
Note 112: See Owen, "How Liberalism Causes Democratic Peace"; and Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
Note 113: Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 301-334.
Note 114: Ibid., p. 301.
Note 115: The most important challenge to Mansfield and Snyder is Michael D. Ward and Kristian Gleditsch, "Democratizing for Peace," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 51-61. Ward and Gleditsch find that democratization reduces the probability of war by about 50%. See also Andrew J. Enterline, "Driving While Democratizing," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 183-196. Mansfield and Snyder reply in ibid., pp. 199-207. Mansfield and Snyder object to Enterline's focus on militarized international disputes (MIDs) instead of wars, but a strong case can be made for this choice. Wars usually come out of MIDs, which create the opportunity for leaders to play nationalist cards and to otherwise behave and Mansfield and Snyder fear. Mansfield and Snyder are working on a book (forthcoming from The MIT Press in the BCSIA Studies in International Security series) that will present their arguments more comprehensively and with additional data and case studies.
Note 116: Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," p. 332.
Note 117: See Reinhard Wolf, "Correspondence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 176-180.
Note 118: For a discussion of Russia that takes the Mansfield/Snyder thesis into account and explains why Russia's democratization has not cause much war, see Michael McFaul, "A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics and the Making of Russian Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 5-35.
Note 119: Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," pp. 332-333.
Note 120: Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," p. 333. See also Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 5-40.
Note 121: Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," p. 334.
Note 122: Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," p. 22.
Note 123: Ibid., p. 35; and Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?", pp. 60-61.
Note 124: Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?", pp. 64-69.
Note 125: See Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," pp. 23-24; Karatnycky, "Freedom on the March," pp. 21-22; and Karatnycky, "Still the Bedrock of a Better World."
Note 126: Kagan, "Democracies and Double Standards," p. 24.
Note 127: Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," p. 42.
Note 128: Marc F. Plattner and Carl Gershman, "Democracy Gets a Bum Rap," Wall Street Journal, Interactive Edition, January 26, 1998.
Note 129: Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," p. 27.
Note 130: The relationship between liberalism, democracy, and ethnic conflict is complex. See Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996), pp. 19-20, 577, and 609; Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, pp. 5-6; Donald L. Horowitz, "The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990); Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict and World Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994); and Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
Note 131: Historically, of course, democracy has faced ideological challenges from Marxism, Fascism, and Monarchism. None of these is a significant force in contemporary world politics, so I have focused on the challenge from proponents of "Asian Values."
Note 132: For examples of these views, see Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kwan Yew," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 109-126; Kishore Mahbubani, "`The Pacific Impulse,'" Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 105-120; Bilahari Kausikan, "Asia's Different Standard," Foreign Policy, No. 92 (Fall 1993), pp. 24-41; and Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), pp. 75-85.
Note 133: Howard W. French, "Africans Look East for a New Model," New York Times, February 4, 1996.
Note 134: Alan Dupont, "Is There An 'Asian Way'?" Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 13-33.
Note 135: See, for example, Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kwan Yew," pp. 111-112.
Note 136: Gregory Kane, "Violence as a Cultural Imperative," Boston Globe, October 6, 1996, p. D2.
Note 137: See, for example, Steve Lohr, "Business, Asian Style: A Revaluing of Values," New York Times, February 7, 1998, pp. A17-A19.
Note 138: I attempt to answer these questions in my contribution to Christopher Layne and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Should America Spread Democracy? A Debate (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, forthcoming 1998). For some other attempts, see Muravchik, Exporting Democracy; Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s; Graham T. Allison, Jr., and Robert P. Beschel, Jr., "Can the United States Promote Democracy?" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 81-98; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1996), pp. 3-13.
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