Nuclear Issues

Aaron Arnold, Associate of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes that while Iran may receive sanctions relief as part of a final nuclear deal, it needs to take actions to strengthen its financial laws and regulations in order for it to truly be integrated into the global economy. He argues that Iranian financial laws, specifically those relating to money-laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing, remain weak and do not meet the standard of the international financial community. These legal weaknesses have caused Iran to remain designated by the U.S. Treasury as a "jurisdiction of primary money-laundering concern," making it much harder for the Iranian financial sector to operate using American currency or the American financial system, which, despite recent developments such as the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, maintains the dominant role in global finance. He concludes that without these reforms to Iran's banking sector, its benefits from the ending of sanctions will be much smaller than desired by Iranian policymakers.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved a revised version of the Corker-Menendez bill this week, and the White House confirmed that President Obama would not veto the measure. The revised version differs from its predecessor in two main ways: the length of time for Congressional review is reduced and the terrorism certification provision is removed.

Aaron Arnold, Research Associate with the Program on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center, writes in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that U.S. lawmakers advocating a continuation and strengthening of the sanctions program against Iran are operating on a series of misperceptions and myths about sanctions. Specifically, he argues that the United States cannot operate under the belief that international partners will automatically a continuation of sanctions, that snap-back sanctions will not be effective in hurting the Iranian economy in the event of a violation of the terms of a nuclear deal, and that the United States will continue to dominate the international financial system. This myths are out of sync with international realities, and domestic politics needs to catch up to this fact, he concludes.

Aaron Arnold provides a crucial update on the status of the economic sanctions placed on Iran. He argues that in the short term, a lack of sanctions relief will continue to damage the Iranian economy and undercut efforts by the Rouhani Administration to revitalize growth. However, he points out that new developments in the global economy, such as the creation of an alternative to the SWIFT financial messaging system pushed by Russia and China, will possibly degrade the effectiveness of sanctions in the long run.

Henry Rome analyzes the new Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, sponsored by Senator Bob Corker (R, Tenn.), and assesses how it will allow for Congressional review of a nuclear deal with Iran.

Henry Rome analyzes the new Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, sponsored by Senator Bob Corker (R, Tenn.), and assesses how it will allow for Congressional review of a nuclear deal with Iran.

Senate Republicans released an open letter to Iran’s leadership on Monday explaining that any nuclear arrangement reached without the approval of Congress could be revoked by the next president “with the stroke of a pen.”

James Sebenius, the Gordon Donaldson Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School, writes in The National Interest that the U.S. should offer a stronger batch of carrots and sticks when negotiating with Tehran. These carrots and sticks would come in the form of legislation pre-negotiated between Congress and the White House that would, on the one hand, offer phased, permanent sanctions relief if Iran complies with agreement, or, on the other hand, trigger swift implementation of harsh sanctions if no agreement is reached. “On balance,” Sebenius writes, “this approach offers the prospect of a president with every incentive to hang tough with Iran as well as the ability to offer inducements to that country in return for a more satisfactory nuclear deal.”

What could happen if the Iranian nuclear talks fail?

Along with President Obama, four members of the Belfer Center's Iran Working Group--Graham Allison, Nader Habibi, Payam Mohseni, and William Tobey--answer the vital question of what scenarios are possible if the negotiations fail, both sides declare diplomacy finished, and the commitments from the interim Joint Plan of Action are voided. 

On Tuesday, January 27th, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Banking held hearings on the prospects for the continued negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program and efficacy of additional sanctions, respectively.