Belfer Center Scholars Consider Potential Effects of A Failure of Negotiations with Iran

What could happen if the Iranian nuclear talks fail?

Along with President Obama, four members of the Belfer Center's Iran Working Group--Graham Allison, Nader Habibi, Payam Mohseni, and William Tobey--answer the vital question of what scenarios are possible if the negotiations fail, both sides declare diplomacy finished, and the commitments from the interim Joint Plan of Action are voided. 

"The alternative that the prime minister offers is no deal, in which case Iran will immediately begin once again pursuing its nuclear program, accelerate its nuclear program, without us having any insight into what they’re doing, and without constraint."
-President Barack Obama, March 3rd, 2015

Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center and Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School:

If negotiations fail, and the parties acknowledge that fact, then we should presume that the United States and Iran will go back to what they were doing prior to the freeze imposed by the Interim Agreement: Iran installing and enriching, the US sanctioning. 

A collapse in talks will undoubtedly strengthen Congressmen aiming to impose harsher sanctions on Iran, such as the Kirk-Menendez legislation that seeks to reduce Iranian oil sales to zero and imposes stricter limits on Iran’s access to the international financial system.

On the other side, Iran will likely resume its production of 20% enriched uranium, and regime hawks will be emboldened to call for additional nuclear advancements. Iranian lawmakers have already prepared legislation to require the government to begin enriching to 60%, another major step towards 90% enriched uranium, which is bomb usable. In other words, Iran will advance even closer toward the nuclear goal-line.

Of course, it depends: on who is judged to be at fault for the failure of talks; on whether Putin chooses to undermine the sanctions regime; on whether Israel takes Iranian resumption of 20% enrichment or other actions crowding its last red line as an occasion for airstrikes; and a dozen other variables.

Since acknowledgment of failure would be worse for both parties than continuing negotiations, my best bet is that negotiations will continue at least through June.

Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir professor of the economics of the Middle East in the Crown Center at Brandeis University, senior lecturer in the Department of Economics:

Impact on Iran’s domestic politics: President Rouhani and his faction have invested heavily in negotiations although they have taken every step with the approval of the supreme leader. If the negotiations are abandoned without any agreement in June 2015, it will be a heavy political setback for Rouhani. In the immediate months following the termination of the negotiations the economic conditions inside Iran are likely to deteriorate as the positive expectations about an agreement will give way to fears of more sanctions and possible military confrontations. These developments will further weaken Rouhani.

The Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and their conservative allies will play a more active role in domestic and foreign affairs in anticipation of a) more economic sanctions, b) potential military and sabotage operations by Israel and the United States. The power and authority of President Rouhani will diminish. At the same time the political polarization between his supporters and opponents are likely to intensify as the economic hardships continue.

Impact on Iran’s foreign policy: Iran will try convince the world public opinion that it offered significant concessions but the United States insisted on maximalist demands that were unacceptable. Iran is likely to release the details of negotiations to support its claim. This will be a part of an overall Iranian strategy to convince some industrial countries not to go along with new economic sanctions against Iran after June 2015. It is hard to predict how some European and Asian countries will modify their participation in the international and unilateral sanctions against Iran?

Iran is also likely to seek stronger military and security ties with Russia to boost its defensive capabilities against military attacks. To a large extent Russia’s response to such an Iranian initiative will depend on political and military developments in Ukraine.  If current tensions between Russia and the United States continue, Russia will veto any Western proposals in the UN for international sanctions against Iran. The United States will be left with the option of intensifying the unilateral sanctions with the support of a limited international coalition. If these sanctions cause significant hardship Iran is likely to resume nuclear enrichment as an act of defiance.

Payam Mohseni, director of the Iran Project and fellow of Iran studies at the Belfer Center:

The breakdown of nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran would have immediate and far-reaching consequences that would be detrimental to both US and Iranian interests.  Namely, it would trigger a new period of political brinkmanship between the respective parties internationally, while simultaneously bringing about a shift towards a more hardline posture in Iranian politics domestically. On the domestic front, President Rouhani and his factional allies—the moderates and reformists—will see a significant setback in their power and legitimacy. Unable to deliver on their electoral promises to lift sanctions and resolve the nuclear stalemate, their hand will be significantly curtailed as they enter the campaign season for both the parliamentary elections and the election of the Council of Experts, the body which oversees and appoints the position of the Supreme Leader.

 Likewise, a breakdown in talks will strengthen the hand of domestic hardliners who have been both highly critical of the negotiations and suspicious of the return of the moderate and reformist factions to power—potentially igniting a period of clamp down on governmental administrative appointments, reformist organizations and media outlets. Rouhani, who will see a decline in his influence in the system, will most likely attempt to move toward the right to secure his position rather than confront the hardliners. Ayatollah Khamenei, on the other hand has positioned himself to be a winner irrespective of success or failure of the talks as he has supported the negotiations while simultaneously expressing pessimism and distrust of the outcome. He would, however, be relatively more empowered if the talks collapse as it would confirm the revolutionary path of the state and reflect his wariness to integrate into the international community.

Hardliners also feel confident about their position if talks collapse and believe that sanctions are not necessarily impediments to Iranian power and regional standing. They are prepared for brinkmanship and believe that Iran has generally benefited more than the United States at times of confrontation in the past. The recent military drills in the Persian Gulf are signals of Iran’s preparedness for brinkmanship and possible escalation. Additionally, Iran’s past record in the nuclear arena has demonstrated how it has used such opportunities to push forward its nuclear program and expand its nuclear capabilities, which would have been significantly diminished if an agreement had been reached a decade ago.  Regardless of the results of the negotiations, the hardliners see regional and international developments in their favor, from Yemen to Iraq and Ukraine.  They also have their eyes on closer links with Russia to mitigate the costs of international sanctions. The breakdown of talks would however further cement the strategic interests of the two states on the regional and international scene. 

Will Tobey, senior fellow at the Belfer Center and former Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration:

If the Iran talks fail, it will not be for lack of concessions by the United States and its allies.  According to press reports on the emerging deal, the U.S. position has gone from:

• Zero enrichment, to allowing Iran to operate 1500 centrifuges, to 4500 centrifuges, to 6500 centrifuges, to perhaps even more in a reconfigured mode;

• No heavy water reactor at Arak, to a lightly modified reactor;

• Insistence on resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s concerns about the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program before an agreement is concluded, to treatment of the matter as an implementation issue, to be resolved later (if ever);

• Closure of the deep underground facility at Fordow, to some modification of it;

• An agreement of indefinite duration, to one lasting 20 years, to 15 years, to 10 years with a 5-year phase out of restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program, after which Tehran would be free to return to the 2 month (or less) break out period described by Secretary of State John Kerry as unacceptable;

• Seeking parallels between sanctions removal and restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, to trading permanent concessions for temporary restrictions.

Thus, the main question if the Iran talks fail, would be, “Why didn’t Tehran take ‘yes’ for an answer?”  Such an outcome seems unlikely, but if it were to occur, President Obama’s suspicions about Iranian intentions might be raised.

The United States and some of its allies would likely vigorously pursue sanctions.  In the financial and oil sectors, these could take a severe toll on the Iranian economy, even with no or half-hearted participation by the Russians or Chinese.

Iran would likely resume production of 20 percent enriched uranium, although it might keep inventories below the red line cited by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his 2012 United Nations General Assembly speech.  It would also likely resume construction of the reactor at Arak and increase its centrifuge enrichment capacity. 

In short, the situation would resemble the period after the attempted agreement would have expired in ten or fifteen years, except that sanctions would remain in place, denying Iran access to capital markets, much arms trade, full integration into the international community, and legitimacy for its nuclear programs