After Deployment: What? Russian Violations of the INF Treaty

| Mar. 30, 2017

Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members, I appreciate and am honored by the opportunity to testify before your joint subcommittees on such an important topic. As a former official of the Obama Administration, I wanted to note for the record that I am testifying today in my personal capacity, and not speaking for any organization or governmental agency or institution.

I was asked to address a series of questions regarding Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty, and I know my colleagues at the witness table will also provide their views on this issue.  We were asked to assess: the significance of Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty; why Russia is violating the treaty and what they hope to gain; how the United States should respond to this violation including all of the tools at its disposal; what is the future of the INF Treaty and does it make sense for the United States to remain a party to this agreement; and how should Russia’s violation be seen given its belligerent behavior around the world.  To help make my answers are clear as possible, I have framed my remarks within a set of guiding principles that I believe the United States should use as we decide how to manage the political, diplomatic and military consequences of Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty.

For more information on this publication: Belfer Communications Office
For Academic Citation: Wolfsthal, Jon. “After Deployment: What? Russian Violations of the INF Treaty.” March 30, 2017.

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