America and the World in 2002: Preserving Superiority in the Age of Terror

Viewed from Washington, the year 2002 was above all the first full year of the war against terrorism.  American perspectives on international politics and US policies toward the external world are still dominated by the impact of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.  Those attacks cast a powerful shadow over developments in 2002, determining Washington’s agenda, shaping its priorities, and influencing its foreign and defense policies.  For the Bush Administration, the post-Cold War era came to an end on September 11 and we now live in a new era: the age of terror.

One clear indication of this is a tremendous preoccupation with the issue of homeland security.  This concern is almost entirely new.  Before September 11, there was no widespread concern about homeland security; indeed, the issue was almost completely invisible in the public arena.  But the attacks of September 11 revealed America’s vulnerability to terrorists and the Bush Administration has faced an overpowering imperative to reduce that vulnerability.  In 2002, the centerpiece of this effort was major legislation creating a huge new cabinet office, the Department of Homeland Security, whose purpose is to enhance security against terrorists and to improve the government’s ability to respond to terrorist attacks if they occur.  Though many experts doubted that this massive reorganization of the federal government (the biggest change in decades) was the most effective response to the threat of terrorism, the legislation creating the new department passed Congress in the fall of 2002 and the new institution now exists.

In addition, a major focus of US security policy is hunting down and capturing or killing members of threatening terrorist organizations.  Obviously, particular emphasis is placed on the elimination of Al Qaeda operatives, especially those who might have played some role in planning the September 11 terrorist attacks.  This new American policy is exemplified by the recent killing in Yemen of a key Al Qaeda figure.  This action required not only close collaboration with the government of Yemen, but elaborate exploitation of US intelligence assets and advanced air power.  Such is security policy in the age of terror.

Washington has also seen its foreign policy interests dramatically altered in the period since September 11.  Countries that were once of little importance to the United States (such as Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen) and countries whose importance to the United States had greatly declined after the Cold War (such as Pakistan and Russia) are now vital in the context of the war against terrorism.  No one could have imagined two years ago that the Bush Administration would be deeply entangled in Afghanistan, for example, and engaged in an activity – nationbuilding – for which President Bush had repeatedly expressed great disdain.  No one could have imagined two years ago that Pakistan and Russia would end up being Washington’s critical partners in pursuing its number one priority, but such was the case in 2002.  Indeed, Moscow and Islamabad are more important in the war against terrorism than Washington’s traditional allies.  The war on terrorism has had an enormous impact on US foreign policy.

In the United States, the most prominent and controversial international issue of 2002 has been the question of whether to launch a preventive war against Iraq.  For the Bush Administration, this too was simply a logical extension of the war against terrorism.  It fears Saddam Hussein’s appetite for weapons of mass destruction and worries that he will share his potentially devastating weapons with his friends among international terrorists.  To the Bush Administration, this prospect is intolerable.  Accordingly, during 2002 it was preoccupied with the threat from Iraq and spent enormous energy and political capital both to make the case for war to audiences at home and abroad and to prepare for war by building up US military forces in the Persian Gulf.  For many months, it appeared that the Bush Administration intended to initiate this war unilaterally, without wide international support or the blessing of the United Nations (UN).  In fact, some in Washington were openly contemptuous of the idea that the United States should let the UN influence the Bush Administration’s choices about an urgent national priority.

In the end, however, President Bush decided to contain the diplomatic costs of his Iraq policy by acting through the UN.  This led to the reintroduction of UN inspectors in Iraq and to renewed confrontation with Saddam Hussein.  Left unresolved so far is the question of war.  There can be no doubt, however, that in 2002 the Bush Administration created something very valuable: the credible threat of war against Iraq.  The first great strategic question for 2003 is whether the Bush Administration chooses to use its credible threat of war as a steppingstone to attack, or whether it will prefer to convert this threat into an acceptable diplomatic solution.  The smart money in Washington says: don’t bet against war.

Though the war against terrorism has captured most of the headlines in 2002, this year also witnessed a number of other significant strategic developments, many of which may have fundamental long-term consequences for the international security order.  Most broadly, in September, the Bush Administration published its “National Security Strategy” for the United States.  It is notable for its commitment to maintain American supremacy “beyond challenge” and to base US external policy on the foundation of this superiority.  It also betrays a skepticism of arms control and a preference for unilateral options in the face of serious threats.  Most controversially, it proclaimed a wide doctrine of preemptive war, asserting that the United States simply will not tolerate the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by hostile states and is prepared to use force to prevent the emergence of WMD threats.  This doctrine is clearly relevant to the ongoing crisis over Iraq and may face another severe test in North Korea, where the government has openly admitted that it possesses an illegal nuclear weapons program.

In nuclear affairs, the Bush Administration is relentlessly effecting a revolution.  It completed a Nuclear Posture Review whose results were made public in January 2002.  This document committed the United States to smaller but modernized forces that are permanently enshrined at the center of the US defense posture.  It raised the possibility that the United States will need to resume nuclear testing in order to enhance its ability to destroy hardened or mobile targets.  It openly proclaimed deterrent threats against America’s enemies, including several states that should be exempt from such threats by virtue of their membership in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  It stated unambiguously that the United States could use nuclear weapons in reply to attacks involving chemical and biological weapons.  It also elevated missile defenses to a core position in the US concept for the emerging strategic environment.  Consistent with this edict, in the spring the ABM Treaty died a quiet death caused by Washington’s unilateral renunciation of the treaty.  And in December, President Bush officially announced that the United States was going to proceed immediately with the deployment of a missile defense installation in Alaska.  Thus, with little fanfare, the strategic environment is being remade.

In the long run, the broader strategic inclinations that are emerging in Washington may be more important.  But for 2002, by far the main strategic development was the war on terrorism.  The driving force behind current American policy is identified by a single fact: President Bush regards himself as a war president and believes his place in history will be determined by his success or failure in the war against terrorism.