China Holds the Key to Unlocking the North Korean Crisis

Last week, when the government of North Korea finally agreed to participate in multilateral talks to resolve the crisis over the country's nuclear-weapons program, the Bush administration was quick to claim victory for its hard-line approach toward the Kim Jong Il regime. (Former CIA director and current Pentagon adviser, James Woolsey, wrote menacingly in The Wall Street Journal this week, for example, about the U.S. plans for going to war if Korea did not disarm.)

However, a close examination of the diplomatic activity in the region over the last few months shows that the breakthrough in getting Pyongyang to the table was due more to concerted Chinese efforts to facilitate a comprehensive resolution to the crisis, than it was to U.S. sabre rattling.

Traditionally a behind-the-scenes power broker, Beijing has taken a more visible role in encouraging Kim Jong Il to re-engage in negotiations with the United States. While its efforts bore fruit with the April trilateral talks among U.S., North Korean and Chinese representatives in Beijing, the opportunity was squandered because of a lack of an overall negotiating framework for the talks. The North Koreans and the Americans had rigid points from which they would not budge — Pyongyang wanted concessions for freezing and then dismantling its nuclear-weapons programs while Washington wanted the nuclear rollback prior to the beginning of any substantive talks to resolve the nuclear imbroglio.

With the agreement to hold six-sided talks (among North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the United States), an opportunity again exists for resolving the crisis. Provided, that is, that the parties this time have a comprehensive road map for addressing the nuclear issues and for putting North Korea on a path of substantive economic reform. The goal would be, in effect, to facilitate the transformation of North Korea into a large economic development zone rather than an assembly line for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

In drawing such a road map, Beijing again has a crucial role to play. The Chinese will not have to reinvent the wheel but rather can innovate on previous efforts at dealing with North Korea.

For Beijing, the building blocks with which it can assemble a road map are the following. The first is a U.S. non-aggression assurance to North Korea, co-sponsored by China. The second is South Korean and Japanese economic aid in the form of development project funding. The third comprises nuclear inspections conducted by China and Russia — in close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency — to verify the complete dismantling of North Korea's plutonium and uranium-based weapons programs. Each of the above countries is singularly suited to carry out the specified activities based on an assessment of political feasibility and capabilities. For example, it would be politically unfeasible for Japan to participate in nuclear inspections in North Korea, given the intrusive nature of such an activity. Furthermore, the Pyongyang regime would not agree to the presence of Japanese inspectors, but would be less objectionable to Chinese or Russian inspectors if the incentives were deemed acceptable.

Overall, the manner and sequence in which these building blocks are aligned would be the subject of multilateral discussions. The basic fact of this current nuclear crisis is that Pyongyang needs assistance for its economic reform while Washington requires strict verification of North Korea's nuclear rollback. Left to these two parties, however, a long-term resolution would be remote and the nuclear crisis will increasingly threaten stability in Northeast Asia.

If China were to sponsor a multilaterally agreed road map as discussed above, it would become more difficult for either side to renege on core commitments. The primary benefit of a Chinese road map would be a continuity of political support — a feature that the ill-fated 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework lacked from its inception when the Republicans won control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The ensuing Republican effort to undermine the nuclear accord — combined with North Korea cheating on its obligations — contributed to the agreement's demise.

A co-ordinated, multiparty policy for ending the crisis is long overdue. Until now, the U.S. approach to dealing with North Korea has centred on largely ignoring the reclusive regime and gradually cutting off its overseas sources of illicit funds. An approach, however, is not a policy.

The announcement that six-sided talks will be held in Beijing is encouraging news. Should the talks commence without a firm game plan, however, a repetition of the collapse of the April trilateral talks may very well be revisited.