A Good Agreement for Israel

Note

A Hebrew-language version of the op-ed appeared in Haaretz on December 2, 2013 and can be accessed here: http://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.2179432.

The translation was provided by the author.

The fundamental question regarding the interim nuclear deal is whether Iran can be delivered a knockout blow, as Prime Minister Netanyahu believes, and be left with no uranium enrichment capability at all, or whether a compromise is necessary, leaving it with limited enrichment under stringent inspections. If Netanyahu is correct, the agreement is truly an historic mistake as he is claims. The United States and other powers conducting the negotiations believe that a complete cessation of Iranian enrichment is not achievable and that there is thus no choice but to compromise.

By the very nature of compromise agreements, no side achieves all of its objectives. The danger is that by insisting on our maximum position, a complete elimination of the nuclear program, we will fail to achieve that which is feasible—freezing and rolling back the program and keeping it under inspection.

The Prime Minister deserves credit for his role in focusing international pressure on Iran. His intensive activity, which led to greatly overblown international fears of the ostensibly horrific consequences of an Israeli military attack, contributed significantly to the formation of the sanctions regime and to Iran's partial capitulation in the recent agreement. This should be Netanyahu's finest hour, instead he has chosen to emphasize only the dangers to Israel and not the benefits of the agreement, which greatly exceed them.

The interim agreement does not, indeed, dismantle a single centrifuge and it does not roll-back the Iranian program by more than a few months. Moreover, it includes explicit recognition of an ongoing Iranian civil nuclear program under the final agreement and provides Iran with limited sanctions relief.

Conversely, Iran is the side which had to make the primary concessions and they are significant. The agreement freezes the nuclear program and places it under unprecedented inspections. Iran will be forced to cease all enrichment at the dangerous 20 percent level and to neutralize its existing stockpile at this level. It will be forbidden to enrich uranium above the civil 5 percent level and to increase its existing stockpile. Approximately half of the centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility will cease to operate, as will some 75 percent of those at the Fordow facility, and both facilities will now be under daily inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The plutonium reactor at Arak will not be completed, and it too will be placed under inspections. All of this is in an interim agreement which is limited to six months and which can be amended in a final one.

So what is all the fuss about? Beyond the primary concern, that the final agreement will not bring about a complete end to the Iranian nuclear program, there is also concern that the parties will not ultimately even be able to reach a final agreement and that the interim one will end up becoming the final one. Should this happen, Iran will remain with its current capabilities impact, but with reduced international pressure. The danger certainly exists, but all sides, including the Iranians, who are suffocating under the weight of the sanctions, appear to have considerable interest in achieving a final agreement and if final negotiations fail, the sanctions will be renewed.

The P5+1's willingness to leave Iran with a nuclear program even under the final agreement, admittedly limited to civil purposes, raises the concern that Iran will actually remain a nuclear threshold state. This danger does exist, and even a final agreement will not provide a complete solution to the problem. Iran already has the necessary know-how to build a bomb and can always renew its efforts should it wish so, at the price of a conflict with the international community.

A further concern is that the sanctions regime will begin eroding now and collapse completely down the line. In the long term, should a final agreement not be achieved, this is certainly a justified concern, but during the period provided for by the interim agreement, even if renewed, the danger is limited. The figures thrown into the air by Israeli spokesman, regarding the extent of sanctions relief during the interim period, were greatly exaggerated

Finally, it must be admitted that there is a fundamental mistrust in Israel regarding President Obama's ability to deal with Middle Eastern issues in the resolute and determined manner warranted. This concern, based on his handling of the peace process, changes in Egypt and Syrian chemical weapons, which was actually a success in the end, was further exacerbated by the administration's apparent over-eagerness to sign a deal with Iran in the previous round of talks.

These concerns are not without basis, but most will probably not be realized and the dangers can be minimized if handled appropriately, through close coordination with the United States. Moreover, if a final agreement is not achieved, Israel will be left with just two bad options: living with a nuclear Iran or military action. Israel's lack of enthusiasm for both is clear. Netanyahu has refrained from attacking throughout his entire tenure and the heads of the defense establishment, according to press reports, strongly opposed such an attack, especially if conducted over U.S. opposition. In any event, a military operation can probably not achieve a postponement of more than a few years, during which time Iran can renew its efforts.

In these circumstances, we should focus on the positive sides of the interim deal and coordinate as closely and discreetly as possible with the United States to ensure that the final agreement is the best one possible. Instead of unrealistic dreams, the focus should be on what can be achieved in practice. The Prime Minister and his ministers are sowing unjustified fear: the interim agreement is good for Israel. Let us hope that it leads to a good final deal.