The Iran Op-Ed's Fatal Flaw

As nuclear negotiations with Iran stretch into early July, scholars and politicians have published a stream of analyses of the costs, benefits and risks of a deal. The winner of our prize of the week for confusing and clouding public debate on this critical issue is an op-ed published in The New York Times on June 23, “The Iran Deal’s Fatal Flaw.” (Despite a certain hesitancy about criticizing colleagues,  this example was so clear a winner that we are making an exception.)

Written by Alan Kuperman of the University of Texas at Austin —  and a former Belfer Center fellow whose scholarship we admire —  the op-ed venture into punditry or polemics falls short.  The op-ed’s central assertion is that the nuclear deal under consideration would yield a “breakout time” of “approximately three months,” not the 12 months announced by President Barack Obama. In Kuperman’s words: “Mr. Obama’s main argument for the agreement — extending Iran’s breakout time — turns out to be effectively worthless.”

Say what?  If this claim were true, it would be highly significant.  But in fact it is false. Not even the most skeptical analysts in the Netanyahu government, which has been working overtime to marshal arguments against the deal, has made that extreme a claim about breakout time.

Breakout time is defined as the amount of time required for Iran to produce one bombs-worth of highly enriched uranium, known as a “significant quantity.” Currently, US intelligence estimates Iran’s breakout time to be two-to-three months. That means that if Iran began a dash, it could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by Labor Day.  If Secretary Kerry brings back a final written deal, it will require Iran to reduce its centrifuges by 70% (from more than 19,000 installed today to 6,104) and its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 96%, from the current 6 bombs-worth (after further enrichment) to 1/5^th of a bombs-worth.

 To make his incredible claim, Kuperman relies on “three primary factors.”  Each factor is badly flawed.

Factor 1: “Mr. Obama’s argument assumes that Iran would employ only the 5,060 centrifuges that the deal would allow for uranium enrichment, not the roughly 14,000 additional centrifuges that Iran would be permitted to keep mainly for spare parts. Such an assumption is laughable. In a real-world breakout, Iran would race, not crawl, to the bomb.”

Kuperman is right that Iran would only be permitted to keep 5,060 first generation (IR-1) centrifuges running (plus an additional 1,044 centrifuges operating without uranium). But under the agreement, Iran would be required to decommission all of its other centrifuges — about 12,000 IR-1’s and 1,000 second generation (IR-2m) centrifuges. These centrifuges would be removed from Natanz and Fordow and stored in a warehouse under 24/7 surveillance by the IAEA.

Thus the claim that Iran would instantly be able to use all its centrifuges to break out is mistaken. It presumes that the decommissioned IR-1 centrifuges would be immediately ready to begin enriching uranium. But the IR-1 centrifuges will have been mothballed. In fact, Iran is likely to disassemble the centrifuges to facilitate storage. That means Iran would need to re-assemble the centrifuges and repair damaged ones — not a prohibitively lengthy task, but one certain to take weeks or even months.  Moreover, if Iran were to try to reinstall these centrifuges,  it would be caught immediately — both when removing the centrifuges from sealed storage and when attempting to install them at a monitored facility.

Factor 2: “Mr. Obama assumes that a dash for the bomb would start mainly from unenriched uranium, thereby lengthening the breakout time. But the deal would appear to also permit Iran to keep large amounts of enriched uranium in solid form (as opposed to gas), which could be reconverted to gas within weeks, thus providing a substantial head-start to producing weapons-grade uranium.”

Kuperman is right that if Iran were permitted  to keep uranium  in solid form, it could be reconverted to gas within weeks. But he is wrong in asserting that this will be allowed by the deal. In fact, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz spoke directly to this point in April, explicitly ruling out the scenario Kuperman imagines.  Instead, Iran will be required to either dilute the uranium stockpile or ship it to another country. Thus if Iran were to try to break out, it would be starting more-or-less from scratch.

Factor 3: “Mr. Obama’s argument assumes that Iran would require 59 pounds of weapons-grade uranium to make an atomic bomb. In reality, nuclear weapons can be made from much smaller amounts of uranium (as experts assume North Korea does in its rudimentary arsenal). A 1995 study by the Natural Resources Defense Council concluded that even a ‘low technical capability’ nuclear weapon could produce an explosion with a force approaching that of the Hiroshima bomb — using just 29 pounds of weapons-grade uranium.”

 Kuperman knows that the agreed definition of a bombs-worth of HEU (90% enriched uranium) is 25 kilograms (55 pounds). While it is possible for an expert bomb maker to succeed with a smaller amount, the consensus among experts is that building the first bomb would require more material. And beyond that, what state would break out to a single bomb? If they did, what would happen if they tested it?

 The Iran negotiations and potential agreement are genuinely complex.  Many serious issues remain and are worthy of debate: assuring IAEA access to Iranian military facilities, scientists and documents; designing an effective “snap back” mechanism if Iran cheats; and aggressively countering Iran’s destabilizing activity throughout the region. But by introducing  a series of flawed assumptions to support a flashy but inaccurate headline, this op-ed not only muddies the debate about breakout time but distracts from these other serious issues.