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Ebrahim Karkhaneyee, the hardline chairman of the Iranian parliament’s Nuclear Committee released, his own “fact sheet” about the framework nuclear accord, outlining proposed revisions to the framework agreement.
Ebrahim Karkhaneyee, the hardline chairman of the Iranian parliament’s Nuclear Committee released, his own “fact sheet” about the framework nuclear accord, outlining proposed revisions to the framework agreement.
The fact sheet was published unilaterally by Ebrahim Karkhaneyee, a representative from Hamedan province who ran for elections under the joint list of the United Principalist Front and the more hard-line Steadfastness Front. The document makes a number of suggestions, including limiting the term of the agreement to five years and not reducing the number of active centrifuges.
The article from Fars News announcing the fact sheet, in addition to the text itself, is included below.
Wed Apr 15, 2015 5:34
Updated:
EXCLUSIVE: Iranian Parliament Releases "Factsheet" for Revision of Lausanne
Statement
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940126001122
TEHRAN (FNA - Fars News Agency)- The Iranian parliament's Nuclear Committee on Wednesday released a factsheet to declare the revisions needed to be made in the Lausanne statement that was issued by Tehran and the world powers as a framework understanding at the end of their nuclear talks in Switzerland earlier this month.
The factsheet which was presented by Head of the Nuclear Committee Ebrahim
Karkhaneyee on Wednesday stresses the necessity for respecting the redlines
and guidelines specified by Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution
Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, making Iran's decisions and undertakings
reversible to enable the country to resume its nuclear operations in case of
the other side's non-commitment to its undertakings, and immediate
termination of all sanctions in a single step and on the first day of the
implementation of the final agreement.
The factsheet also necessitates commitment of both sides to their
undertakings based on the Geneva agreement, a fair and reasonable balance
between the gives and takes, taking good care not to impair the country's
security and military boundaries and national interests, providing 190,000
SWUs (Separative Work Units) of nuclear fuel enrichment capability needed by
Iran to produce fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant immediately after
the end of contract with Russia, safeguarding the nuclear achievements,
actual operation of all nuclear facilities of Iran not in words, but in
action, continued Research and Development (R&D) works and scientific and
technological progress in Iran and immediate application of R&D findings in
the country's industrial-scale uranium enrichment cycle.
The factsheet urges operation of 10,000 centrifuge machines at Natanz and
Fordo, a maximum 5-year-long duration for the deal and for Iran's nuclear
limitations, replacement of the current centrifuges with the latest
generation of home-made centrifuge machines at the end of the five-year
period.
Enrichment Program
The period for the Join Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) should be
limited to five years, in which about 10,000 active centrifuges operating at
Natanz and Fordo now will continue nuclear fuel production by enriching
uranium below the 5% grade.
The UF6 enriched reserves which are under the supervision of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be kept at Fordo nuclear
plant and will be turned into nuclear fuel complex based on the existing
capabilities.
During the five-year period, the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue to
keep the excess centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordo or will gradually
dismantle them, and at the end of the 5-year period, it will replace all the
existing centrifuges, including the active or inactive ones, with the new
generation of (IR-N) centrifuge machines with the help of the new spaces and
infrastructures which will have been already prepared and will use them
without any limitation.
Justification:
Based on the Geneva agreement, the period for the final step should merely
include a single period which has been considered as to be five years in the
present factsheet. But in the Lausanne statement, different periods of 10,
20, 25 years and higher have been considered.
Given the Geneva agreement, the amount of enrichment should be specified
based on the country's practical needs and the number of 10,000 centrifuges
has also been specified on this basis.
The 5-year period in this factsheet has been has been specified with respect
to the date when Iran's nuclear fuel contract with Russia for the Bushehr
nuclear power plant will end; hence, the rules and limitations for the
components of the enrichment cycle should be set in such a way that the
Islamic Republic of Iran will be able to supply the fuel needed for the
power plant after the end of the contract with Russia.
Operation of 10,000 centrifuges and developing and having a 10-ton enriched
uranium stockpile will enable the Islamic Republic of Iran to supply the
fuel needed for the Bushehr power plant in the year when the fuel supply
contract with Russia (28-30 tons) ends.
Fordo installations:
Fordo nuclear facility will remain an enrichment and nuclear Research and
Development (R&D) center. 4 enrichment cascades with 656 centrifuges will
continue operation and production of fuel for purity levels lower than 5% by
maintaining the current chain arrangements.
If the country would need 20%-degree (enriched) uranium, the nuclear fuel
production line for purity levels lower than 5% will be altered to enrich
uranium to the 20%-grade after connecting the centrifuge cascades to each
other again.
Justification:
Based on the above, Fordo will remain an actual and active center, and the
Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain its capability to reverse its
decision and restore the 20%-grade enrichment.
Research and Development (R&D)
In a bid to use R&D findings in the country's industrial-scale enrichment
chain, R&D should be planned in a way that the necessary possibilities and
infrastructures will be provided for replacing the first generation of
centrifuges with the latest generation of centrifuge machines (IR-N) when
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action comes to an end after 5 years.
The R&D program should undergo no limitation before it comes into use for
industrial-scale operation.
Justification:
Accordingly, the advanced centrifuges will enter the chain of nuclear fuel
production without any restriction at the end of the 5-year deal.
Arak Heavy Water Reactor
Given the Group 5+1 countries' mere concern about the plutonium existing in
the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of the Arak 40-MW heavy water reactor, the fuel
used by the reactor will be sent abroad.
The G5+1 states will be committed to cooperate and take the necessary
measures for relevant international licensing and permissions.
Justification:
Given the SNF export abroad, the insistence of the G5+1, specially the US,
on redesigning the said reactor is merely a pretext and doesn’t have any
scientific rationale.
What is more important than the heavy water nature of Arak reactor is the
core of the reactor which is due to be taken out and then be redesigned and
renovated. Such a move is irreversible in nature, and thus means crossing
the specified redlines.
Supervision and Inspection
Supervision and inspections of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear
program should be carried out within the framework of the the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreements.
Justification:
Once done, the principle stated by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic
Revolution - that security and military sanctities and boundaries shouldn’t
be violated and that the inspections should be carried out at conventional
levels similar to all other countries - will be respected and materialized.
Given the Islamic Republic of Iran's opposition to the world arrogance,
endorsing and implementing the Additional Protocol will provide the world
arrogance (a term normally used for the US and its western allies) with
legal grounds to stage their preplanned plots against the Islamic Republic
of Iran.
Sanctions
Concurrently with the start of the JCPOA, all the US and EU sanctions will
be terminated and Iran will start fulfilling its undertakings based on the
verification of the IAEA.
The UN Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran will be annulled
and all nuclear-related sanctions will be terminated and the Islamic
Republic of Iran's case will be normalized.
The G5+1 countries, the EU and the UNSC will avoid imposition of new
nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.
Justification:
By terminating all sanctions in a single step right at the start of the
implementation of the final comprehensive agreement, the Supreme Leader's
statement that termination of sanctions is part of the agreement and not its
result will be materialized.
Based on the Geneva agreement, after the implementation of the JCPOA, all
UNSC, US and EU sanctions should be terminated and no new (UNSC) resolution
would be needed in this regard; Hence, terminating the UNSC sanctions will
close the case and no new resolution which would pave the ground for new
plots will be issued.
International cooperation
The Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear cooperation with the world states,
including the G5+1 members, in areas of building nuclear power plants,
research reactors, nuclear fuel production, nuclear safety medicine and
nuclear agriculture, etc. will be possible and will improve. Based on the
JCPOA, Iran will be provided with access to the global market, trade and
finance and technical know-how and energy.
Reversibility:
In case of the two sides' non-commitment to their undertakings, there will
be a possibility for reversing all measures.
Justification:
Based on the aforementioned proposal, the Islamic Republic of Iran will be
provided with reversible measures at the lowest level of damage and,
therefore, the G5+1's commitment to its undertakings will be in fair balance
(with those of Iran).
Duration of the JCPOA
After the end of the five-year period and the JCPOA exercise, all
restrictions will be lifted and based on the Geneva agreement, the case with
the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program will be similar to that of
the other NPT member states.
The Iranian Parliament factsheet for a revision to the Lausanne agreement
came after the US released a factsheet different from the joint statement
issued by Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Federica
Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs
and head of the G5+1 in nuclear talks with Iran, at the end of the latest
round of Iran-world powers nuclear talks in Switzerland on April 2, known as
the Lausanne statement.
The US factsheet that was released only a few hours after the Lausanne
framework understanding caused fury in Iran, encouraging many to raise deep
doubt about the results of the talks and US accountability and
trustworthiness.
In only a few weeks, a bipartisan bill was also presented to the Congress
for vote that would give the US legislature oversight of a final deal, a
move seen by many across the globe, including both Iran and the US, as
furthering impediments to the endorsement of a final deal between Iran and
the sextet.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker, who wrote
the bill, said the White House had agreed to go along with the bill only
after it was clear there was strong Democratic support. The legislation was
passed unanimously by the committee and is expected to pass the full Senate
and then the House of Representatives.
"That change occurred only when they saw how many senators were going to
vote for this," Corker said.
Bipartisan support for the bill had grown in recent weeks to near the 67
votes needed to override any presidential veto. But senators from Obama's
Democratic Party did succeed in adding amendments to water down the bill,
making it more palatable to the White House
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