Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security
Limited National and Allied Missile Defense
Abstract
In an exchange of letters, James Lindsay and Michael O’Hanlon claim that in arguing that the costs of a national missile defense outweigh the benefits, Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter underestimate or ignore three possible scenarios that support the development of a limited NMD system: (1) nuclear deterrence alone may fail, (2) the existence of an NMD system may have a coercive value, and (3) preemption of an enemy’s intercontinental ballistic missiles before they reach the United States may be harder than assumed. Glaser and Fetter respond.
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For Academic Citation:
Fetter, Steve, Charles L. Glaser, Michael O'Hanlon and James M. Lindsay. “Limited National and Allied Missile Defense.” Quarterly Journal: International Security, vol. 26. no. 4. (Spring 2002): 190-201 .
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