Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union: Direct Measures to Prevent Theft and Smuggling

DIRECT MEASURES TO PREVENT THEFT AND SMUGGLING

Bunn, Matthew, and John P. Holdren. "Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union." Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 22 (1997): 403-486.

Because it is far easier to prevent theft of fissile material than to find and recover stolen material, the most efficient approach to reducing the risk of nuclear theft is to control the fissile material at its source. Therefore, the first priority is to ensure that all nuclear weapons and weapon-usable materials are secure and accounted for, i.e. to establish effective MPC&A. This involves facility-level security and accounting systems for both weapon-usable materials and nuclear weapons themselves; new, secure storage facilities; consolidation of weapons and materials at fewer locations; high security for transport of weapons and materials (often the most vulnerable point in their life cycles); national-level systems of accounting, control, and regulation; and ultimately, more stringent international standards. Should material nonetheless be stolen, programs to prevent nuclear smuggling provide a second line of defense.

Upgrading Security and Accounting at Nuclear Material Sites

In the United States, the number of facilities with kilogram-quantities of plutonium or HEU is declining as the nuclear weapons complex consolidates and fewer civilian facilities choose to make use of weapon-usable nuclear materials. As noted above, US MPC&A programs for these materials have been upgraded substantially in recent years and are now among the most stringent in the world. Nevertheless, debate continues as to whether the shrinking resources being applied to security for these materials are sufficient, given what some argue is a substantially increased terrorist threat in recent years (for a sample of this discussion see 56).

More than 50 locations in the former Soviet Union handle kilogram-quantities of weapon-usable nuclear materials.20 Approximately a dozen of these— all research or training reactors using relatively modest amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU)--are outside Russia (including facilities in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan). The facilities within Russia include the nuclear weapons complex of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), with its 10 "closed cities"; the civilian facilities of MINATOM; independent civilian research centers; and the facilities handling HEU for propulsion of naval ships and submarines and civilian icebreakers.

Russia has undertaken significant domestic efforts to upgrade security and accounting at nuclear sites but has been limited by severe economic constraints; the other former Soviet states have much less indigenous capability to implement effective safeguards (19). Accordingly, DOE has established a major program to cooperate with the states of the former Soviet Union in upgrading security and accounting systems at these sites. The program includes formal government-to-government efforts (originally funded by the Defense Department's Nunn-Lugar program but now funded from the DOE budget), a complementary lab-to-lab program, and work with nuclear regulatory agencies in the former Soviet states (pursued in cooperation with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission).

This cooperative program has grown with remarkable speed as success was demonstrated and trust built. In early 1994, the Russian government was refusing to allow access to any of the facilities where separated plutonium or HEU were stored (arguing that these facilities, even the civilian ones, were too sensitive for such visits), and the United States had spent less than $3 million cooperating with Russia on MPC&A. Today, despite continuing sensitivities surrounding some sites and activities, cooperative work is underway at 44 of the locations in the former Soviet Union where weapon-usable materials are held (over 80% of the total), and the budget for the US side of this cooperative program has mushroomed by almost two orders of magnitude to $113 million in the current fiscal year, with a request of $137 million for Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 (DOE, unpublished data).21 New fences, alarms, and personnel access systems are being installed, computerized accounting systems are being established, portal monitors are being deployed, operators and regulators are being trained, and new regulations are being written. Many tons of weapon-usable nuclear material are now demonstrably better protected and accounted for.

DOE has developed a classified, comprehensive program plan under which modern safeguards and security systems are expected to be in place at all of the facilities handling weapon-usable materials in the former Soviet Union by 2002, if Congressional funding at projected levels and cooperation with the former Soviet states both continue (57). Installation of such modern systems at all of the former Soviet facilities with weapon-usable material outside of Russia is expected to be completed during 1997 (although that schedule may slip in the case of Kazakhstan owing to funding delays on the US side that were only recently resolved). The total remaining cost of the US contribution to the program is expected to be somewhat more than half a billion dollars, but that estimate will surely be modified as the program proceeds.

Currently, however, the vast majority of the fissile material in the former Soviet Union remains dangerously insecure; for a very large fraction of the material, all of the conditions described above still apply— and with the continuing budget crisis facing the Russian government, the prospect for financing such basic measures as regular payment of wages and maintenance of security systems does not appear bright. DOE's projected schedule is likely to be optimistic, given the vast scale and complexity of the nuclear complex in Russia— and even if the schedule were met, it would mean that for five more years, substantial quantities of nuclear material will not have effective modern safeguards systems in place, and the risk of theft will remain high. Even when the new systems are in place, it is not obvious that systems designed to meet US and international standards will be sufficient to reduce to low levels the threat of theft, as the severe economic crisis in Russia is creating potential motivations for "insider" conspiracies larger and more determined than standard safeguards systems could handle.

Unfortunately, modernization of MPC&A in the former Soviet Union could not be accomplished overnight even if budgets far larger than those now contemplated were available. New technologies and approaches take time to introduce in such a massive nuclear complex, and a new "safeguards culture" of scrupulous implementation of these new security and accounting procedures can only be developed over time. To help build the needed safeguards culture, a continued focus on genuine participation and engagement by users at facilities in states receiving US assistance is critical— as a recent National Research Council report emphasized (27). The participants in the DOE program currently believe that the program's pace is now constrained not as much by US funding as by "absorptive capacity"— the limited size of the cadre of people at the individual sites who can effectively be employed in designing and implementing security system upgrades (M Mullen & S Mladineo, personal communication). To have any hope of meeting the projected schedule for upgrades would require full funding for the $137 million request for FY 1998, and the similar or larger requests expected in subsequent years. Some continued funding after 2002 is also likely to be necessary in order to continue the cooperation, maintain US-supplied equipment, and help ensure the rooting and maintenance of a far-reaching safeguards culture. It remains possible that the timetable for success could be modestly accelerated if efforts are made to identify creative means for further speeding progress and overcoming the "absorptive capacity" constraints— including additional emphasis on training of personnel and on providing resources and incentives for redirecting more personnel from other areas to the safeguards mission.

As the PCAST report concludes, these programs can only succeed if they are based on genuine cooperation and mutual trust and respect. Maximum success requires maximum flexibility; hence, the PCAST report recommends that Congress resist the temptation to impose burdensome restrictions on how business can be conducted, such as "buy American" requirements, and specified audit and examination procedures (10). During 1996-1997, progress on several projects was greatly slowed by another example of inflexibility: Application of export control restraints intended to control proliferation has prevented the delivery of equipment urgently needed to control proliferation. As of mid-1997, however, it was expected that a general license permitting the delivery of all needed MPC&A equipment would soon be approved (DOE and Russian institute officials, personal communications).

Building New Storage Facilities

New storage facilities can be important supplements to MPC&A upgrades at existing sites. The United States, however, has announced its decision not to build major new storage facilities for its plutonium and HEU but rather to upgrade facilities at Pantex, Savannah River, and Oak Ridge for this purpose (58).

Russia, by contrast, has concluded that its current storage facilities are inadequate, and the United States and Russia are cooperating to build a secure storage facility for plutonium and HEU from dismantled weapons at the site once known as Chelyabinsk-65 (now renamed Ozersk and also frequently known as Mayak, the name of the nuclear production association located there). The Japanese government has also agreed to contribute to this facility, primarily by providing additional fissile material storage containers above and beyond those being provided by the United States. The new facility would offer greatly improved security and accounting compared to the current storage locations, and the United States would be offered transparency measures in return for its assistance. An initial design has been completed, allowing construction to proceed; the foundation for the facility has been laid; and construction is actively underway, with a projected opening of the first phase of the storage facility (offering half of its eventual 50,000 container capacity) in mid-1999. The specific transparency measures to be applied at this facility have not yet been agreed to, however, and there have been some suggestions that modifications to the thermal design would be useful to allow more of the container spaces to be devoted to plutonium rather than HEU.22

Additional new storage facilities may be needed for the material from dismantled weapons beyond what can be accommodated in the first Mayak facility, for the 30 tons of civilian plutonium now stored in an inadequate facility at Mayak, and for other stocks. One approach to increasing secure storage space would be to use existing unused concrete-lined rooms (estimated at 500 m x 16 m) in the underground nuclear production facility at Krasnoyarsk-26, now known as Zheleznogorsk (59). Large-scale fissile material-storage facilities could potentially be installed in these highly secure facilities at relatively modest cost.

Upgrading Security for Nuclear Weapons Storage Facilities

Nuclear weapons in both the United States and Russia are held in secure vaults under heavy guard. No major changes or upgrades in security measures for nuclear weapons storage within the United States are planned.

In Russia although nuclear weapons are believed to be substantially more secure than some of that country's stockpiles of weapon-usable materials, the grave consequences that could result if a nuclear weapon were actually stolen are motivating cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program to further improve security. Efforts to upgrade security for nuclear warhead storage are slated to receive $15 million in the FY 1997 Nunn-Lugar budget, and the request for FY 1998 includes $36 million for this purpose (Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, unpublished data).

Because neither the United States nor Russia has permitted visits by the other country's representatives to nuclear warhead storage sites, in this program Russian experts will determine what upgrades are needed, the United States will provide equipment (as well as a physical-protection training facility), and Russian personnel will do the necessary installations. Flexible procedures, acceptable to both parties, will be needed to ensure that US-provided material is used appropriately, without unduly compromising sensitive information (Department of Defense officials, personal communications). Because security at these facilities is already substantial and no complex accounting of difficult-to-measure materials is required, upgrades in the security of warhead storage are expected to cost less than MPC&A upgrades, even if they are implemented at all of the roughly 100 remaining storage sites with nuclear weapons [this figure has been reduced from roughly 600 in 1989 (60)].

Consolidating Storage and Converting Research Reactors

In the United States, the nuclear-weapons complex is undergoing a substantial consolidation, and with this contraction the number of sites with plutonium and HEU is being steadily reduced. In addition, most US research reactors (and most US-designed research reactors in other countries) have converted from HEU fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, greatly reducing the proliferation hazard from these civilian facilities. Indeed, in recent years the United States has revitalized its program to convert research reactors to LEU fuel, including its offer to take back spent fuel containing US-enriched uranium from foreign research reactors that have either converted to LEU fuel, agreed to do so in the future, or agreed to shut down (61).

In Russia, as just noted, a drastic reduction in the number of sites where nuclear weapons are stored has already been accomplished. But MINATOM is struggling to keep the major sites of the nuclear weapons complex open, despite the drastic decline in state funding; consolidation has yet to take hold in a serious way. The PCAST report recommends that DOE take every opportunity to emphasize to the former Soviet states, especially Russia, the need for a substantial consolidation in the number of sites with weapon-usable nuclear materials and in the number of separate areas containing such materials within each of those sites, and the recent National Research Council report on MPC&A emphasizes the same point (10, 27). Such consolidation has the potential to greatly reduce the costs of ensuring adequate safeguards and security.

With severe cutbacks in the funding of science in Russia, a considerable contraction in the number of civilian research centers using HEU— sites where security is particularly lax— is also inevitable. Encouraging research centers to eliminate their HEU stocks (perhaps by offering to purchase those stocks) and to convert whatever research reactors continue running to low-enriched fuels would help reduce current security risks. Cooperative US-Russian efforts are currently underway to develop and implement proliferation-resistant low-enriched fuels for Soviet-designed research reactors, and the recent National Research Council report recommends that additional efforts be made to convert these reactors and to purchase small insecure stocks of HEU in the former Soviet Union (27).

Upgrading Transport Security

During transport, nuclear weapons and weapon-usable nuclear materials must be heavily protected against overt theft by armed groups. DOE has long used a system of heavily guarded "Safe, Secure Transports" (SSTs) equipped with special security technologies to transport nuclear weapons, and the Department plans to use the same approach for shipments of fissile material required as part of the disposition program.

In Russia too, new attention is being paid to upgrading transport security. The US Department of Defense has been providing warhead-transportation equipment (including railcar security upgrade kits and "supercontainers" for warhead transport), and the Russian Ministry of Defense has indicated that this equipment has already substantially improved the security of Russian warhead transport (62). Delivery of this equipment is expected to be completed during 1997. Lab-to-lab cooperation on improving security of fissile-material transport is now also underway.

Improving National-Level Regulatory and Accounting Systems

Efforts at individual sites require coordination so that they fit together into national systems providing a generally consistent level of MPC&A for all weapon-usable materials. Improving national-level tracking and accounting systems is an essential element of any comprehensive MPC&A program, as is improvement of national regulatory functions. While regulations are often thought to be less urgent than securing materials on the ground, the fact is that only a sound set of regulations requiring effective MPC&A, backed up by realistic enforcement, will provide facility managers the necessary incentives to invest in, operate, and maintain MPC&A systems.

As noted above, regulation in the United States has long been split between commercial activities regulated independently by the NRC and self-regulated government activities, but a single computerized data base, the NMMSS, is kept for accounting of nuclear materials nationwide.

In most states of the former Soviet Union, the few nuclear regulatory agencies that do exist are new and suffering the growing pains of fledgling organizations with large mandates and small staffs. In the case of Russia, the balance of power between the nuclear regulatory agency— GOSATOMNADZOR (GAN)--and the ministries it is supposed to be regulating (including MINATOM) is still evolving, and MINATOM is far from enthusiastic about independent regulation. President Yeltsin, after initially giving GAN authority to regulate safety and security of both military and civilian nuclear activities, signed a decree in mid-1995 removing GAN's authority to regulate the activities of the Ministry of Defense (63). Ultimately, MINATOM and the Ministry of Defense themselves must have effective internal regulatory programs, in addition to independent regulation.

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and DOE have established promising programs of regulatory support for the countries of the former Soviet Union, including work with GAN in Russia. Nevertheless, GAN has been making only slow progress toward establishing an effective set of regulations and an effective cadre of regulators and inspectors to implement them— and the effort to establish a national inventory system in Russia similar to the US NMMSS is proceeding slowly. Development of a strong regulatory system in this area will take many years and tens of millions of dollars in support from the international community.

Equally fundamental to any comprehensive MPC&A program is training of the operators and regulators who must carry out the program. The United States has several major training programs for domestic safeguards. Russia, the United States, and the European Union have cooperated in establishing a national MPC&A training center at Obninsk, near Moscow.

Creating Tougher International Standards

The need to modernize MPC&A systems is a global issue, not limited to the states of the former Soviet Union. Visits to sites handling weapon-usable materials indicate that materials in many countries do not have MPC&A systems that would be proof against theft by knowledgeable insiders or against attack by determined and well-trained terrorist groups. For these reasons, the NAS report recommends that the United States pursue new international arrangements to improve safeguards and physical security for all forms of plutonium and HEU worldwide, coming as close as possible to the stringent standards of security and accounting applied to nuclear weapons themselves (the "stored weapons standard"). An international panel of experts convened by the American Nuclear Society, including US, Russian, French, British, German, and Japanese representatives, made similar recommendations in 1995 (8, 9, 33). The NAS study also recommends increasing the international role in this area, including giving an international organization authority to carry out inspections to ensure that agreed standards of protection are being met. Negotiation of modified or new agreements will be necessary to meet these objectives.

Stopping Nuclear Smuggling

Although keeping fissile materials secure and accounted for at their source is the most critical part of the effort to reduce the global threat of nuclear smuggling, anti-smuggling efforts form an important second line of defense. Efforts are being pursued to exchange intelligence, coordinate responses, and train and equip police, investigators, customs officials, and border guards in the relevant states; these efforts could be substantially expanded. This is a global problem requiring intensive international cooperation.

At the 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, the assembled leaders of the P-8 countries (the "Political Eight," consisting of the traditional Group of Seven countries and Russia) announced an "action plan" on nuclear smuggling. So far, however, implementation of that plan has lagged, with most of the work focused on developing mechanisms for improved exchange of information among the participating countries (still a very difficult problem whenever sensitive sources and activities are involved) and on bringing additional countries into the plan. A variety of US agencies have programs in this area, but progress has been slow.

The US Customs Service, for example, has provided limited training and equipment to selected customs and border patrol officials in a few key states (focusing on Eastern Europe) and, in cooperation with DOE, has worked to develop equipment that is simple and cheap enough for customs agents to use (such as a "radiation pager," worn on the belt, capable of detecting unshielded plutonium and HEU in passing baggage). This effort was substantially limited by lack of funds until late 1996 (15), when Congress provided $9 million to the Department of Defense for cooperation with Customs in nuclear smuggling programs. Under current plans, this money will be spent over several years, initially focusing on completing previous Customs efforts in Eastern Europe.

Previously, in FY 1995, Congress authorized the Department of Defense to reprogram $10 million for a joint Defense-Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) program to address nuclear smuggling— but the joint Defense-FBI report on what would be done with the money (required before the funds could be spent) was not completed until nearly two years later, and the envisioned program of training and provision of equipment is only slowly getting underway. Visits to key states near Russia's borders (through which nuclear material might transit) to assess their needs are being conducted, several major international conferences on this subject have been held, and the first courses on nuclear smuggling under this program have been scheduled for mid-1997 at the FBI's International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest. This Defense-FBI program also plans to spend the limited funds available over several years, with its initial focus on the states to Russia's south. Overall, efforts to date have been piecemeal and have not yet gelled into a comprehensive plan. As in the MPC&A case, such a plan would specify all the states and organizations that would receive assistance, the specific capabilities they would be encouraged and assisted to acquire, and the target dates for making these improvements.

Elements of a Comprehensive Nuclear Smuggling Prevention Program

INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND INFORMATION SHARING . . . All of the major seizures of nuclear materials so far have been the result of having good information— from tips, stings, and intelligence work. One of the highest-leverage areas for improvement, therefore, is to increase cooperation between US intelligence and law-enforcement agencies and their counterparts in Russia and other relevant states, including creating mechanisms for exchanging sensitive law-enforcement and intelligence information on ongoing cases. This is an extremely difficult approach to pursue, given the deeply ingrained reluctance of these organizations to exchange information that could compromise sources and methods or ongoing investigations, but there is nonetheless the potential, particularly through building personal relationships and habits of exchanging routine information, to significantly improve information flows when compared to the current state of affairs. Hence, a comprehensive approach would include, among other efforts in this area, stationing nuclear smuggling experts permanently with the FBI or intelligence contingents at the US embassy in Moscow, to cooperate with their Russian counterparts.

LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS . . . Another key element of a comprehensive approach would be ensuring that each of the relevant states has at least a small police unit trained and equipped to investigate and respond to nuclear smuggling cases, with other law enforcement agencies trained to call them in when appropriate. The cost of providing limited training and equipment to such small units would be extremely modest for each country.

BORDER CONTROLS . . . A comprehensive effort would include providing training and simple nuclear detection equipment to border guards and customs agents at key entry and exit points throughout the former Soviet Union (including particularly the southern tier states) and Central Europe. The immense volume of traffic that crosses international borders every day, and the vast and sparsely populated length of the borders between some of the key countries, makes the task of interdicting nuclear materials extremely difficult— as evidenced by the massive flows of drugs and other contraband that governments around the world have so far been unable to stop. But a carefully targeted training and equipment program could have a significant deterrent effect and greatly increase the chance of catching the "amateur" smugglers who account for nearly all of the nuclear smuggling detected to date. In close cooperation with DOE, US Customs has developed a training program and basic equipment suited to customs officers who typically have little technical training. Such equipment is surprisingly inexpensive: Customs agents and border guards at all the largest crossing points in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (including the critical states to Russia's south) could probably be provided with basic training and equipment for a cost of less than $50 million.

ANALYSIS CENTERS . . . There is a need for a small number of regional analysis centers in Eurasia, capable of both nuclear and traditional forensic analysis, to which material seized in nearby countries could be sent. These centers could provide isotopic analyses detailed enough that the countries where the material originated might be able to recognize their material (if they had sufficiently well-organized records of their material to attempt to make a match). The United States could assist other countries in establishing such centers or, where centers already exist, provide additional training and equipment as needed and help establish mechanisms for sending seized material to these centers.

Of course, ongoing efforts to improve export licensing and enforcement in the former Soviet states are also critical. Trained and equipped customs officers are of little use if they have no legal authority to seize nuclear materials or other materials and technologies whose export should be strictly controlled. A recent National Research Council review concludes that such export-control support programs, after initial delays, have been effective in stimulating new interest and action on the part of the recipient states; the review recommends continued and potentially increased financing for these programs (27).

In general, increasing the incentives for states to devote resources to this problem will be a critical part of the answer. For example, the European Union, after stepping up its own efforts to ensure that its member states have at least a minimal ability to monitor key transit points into its economic area, could consider making establishment of such a capability a condition of membership (while providing assistance to states to help them meet this condition)--a potentially significant incentive for states eager to join the union (JR Weeks, personal communication).

A possibility for the longer term is an international treaty on nuclear smuggling. Such a treaty could (a) mandate and otherwise encourage a variety of forms of cooperation in dealing with this threat, (b) require states to meet minimum standards for control of their borders, (c) require states that have not yet done so to pass domestic legislation imposing stiff penalties on unauthorized possession and transfer of weapon-usable nuclear materials, (d) perhaps include more stringent security requirements for nuclear material than the Physical Protection Convention, along with new requirements for control and accounting of nuclear materials, and (e) give the IAEA a mandate to establish a global data base of domestic safeguards practices and to begin a program of voluntary visits to provide advice on security for nuclear-material facilities, as has been done in the case of nuclear safety.

20 There has been some confusion over this figure. This figure refers to separate sites with HEU or plutonium, each of which may contain a large number of individual buildings and fenced areas. The larger figure of 80-100 that is sometimes used refers to the number of individually fenced areas; a single site may contain several such areas. If every building where plutonium or HEU is located were counted, the figure would be in the many hundreds.
21 Although some form of cooperative work is underway at over 80% of the locations, at many of them the initial projects focus on only one or two of the many buildings at that site holding weapon-usable material. For a map of the sites where cooperation is underway and brief descriptions of the status of work at each site as of January 1997 see (25); for a collection of technical papers on activities at individual sites see (26).
22 Because much of the excess Russian HEU is expected to be sold to the United States over the next 20 years, it may be desirable to build in some flexibility to deviate from the initial Russian design specifications calling for two thirds of the container spaces to hold HEU and only one third to hold plutonium, in order to avoid the possibility that two thirds of the facility would be empty for much of its design life. Allowing more plutonium would require changes to the thermal design (particularly if reactor-grade plutonium were also to be included) because plutonium gives off more heat than HEU.