The New Influencers: A Primer on the Expanding Role of Middle Powers in Africa

This original primer, conducted as research for The Africa Futures Project, is an initial exploration into the evolving roles and increasing influence of “middle powers” in Africa. It covers a diverse array of existing and aspiring middle powers, presenting key points for each nation under four distinct analytical lenses. The goal of this primer is to provide a foundational overview rather than an exhaustive analysis. Inspired by our preliminary findings, we hope that future research will deepen this analysis, including further studies on how middle powers’ policies in Africa influence the rivalry between the United States (U.S.) and China.

Defining a Middle Power

The term “middle power” is both useful and contested. There is no universally accepted set of middle powers; this largely subjective term generally refers to states that are not considered “great powers” but still exert significant international influence.

This primer examines eight nations that command analytical attention due to their political, economic, or geographic importance toward Africa: Brazil, India, Japan, North Korea (formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or simply DPRK), Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar.

Although some of these eight nations would not be considered middle powers in a classical definition, as they wield their influence in Africa, they exhibit attributes of middle or regional powers.^[i] They leverage their unique positions among great powers, sometimes below the radar, to amplify their influence with African countries and shape the continent’s future. We describe our chosen countries of analysis as “non-great power states with significant influence in Africa,” a description that, while accurate, is less succinct.

Finally, this primer focuses on the actions of selected middle power nations toward the continent, not the actions of African countries toward these selected middle powers. We also acknowledge that several African countries—such as Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa—could be considered middle powers; however, this primer focuses on external middle powers and their engagement with the continent and African nations rather than intra-African affairs. 

Why a Primer?

For a continent historically shaped by Western European colonizers, our analysis of middle powers extends beyond traditional research. There is an extensive analysis of Russia’s security interests and China’s economic investments in Africa, but there is a limited consolidated analysis of other strategically significant, non-Western actors on the continent. Furthermore, much of the narrative around middle powers focuses on their positioning between China and the U.S. In Africa, however, these nations are developing their own economic, military, and diplomatic relations, sometimes in partnership with the U.S. and China, sometimes in opposition, but often bilaterally. We hope our research sheds light on this less-examined dimension.

Four Analytical Lenses

We analyze the roles of our selected middle powers in Africa through four lenses. These are not comprehensive but rather provide an overview of the nations’ strategies toward the continent.

1. Historical Context: This analysis considers historical ties and significant trendlines in relationships. It focuses on the period after decolonization but also includes pre-colonial ties, if applicable.
2. Diplomatic Efforts: This area focuses on diplomatic relations, including the establishment of embassies, the frequency of bilateral visits, soft power projection, involvement in educational exchanges, and participation in regional and international organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and BRICS.
3. Security Engagement: This encompasses military training and joint exercises, arms sales, specific interventions, and contributions to UN peacekeeping forces.
4. Economic Ties: This includes metrics on public and private foreign direct investment (FDI), loans, infrastructure projects, participation in economic summits, and overall trade and development initiatives.

^[i]  For a traditional, 20th-century definition of “Middle Power,” see Cooper, Andrew F., Higgott, and Nossal. In Between Countries: Australia, Canada, and the Search for Order in Agricultural Trade. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997. Additionally, middle powers have often been characterized by three core characteristics: “international in focus, multilateral in method, and good citizens in conduct.” Quoted from Robertson J, Carr A. “Is anyone a middle power? The case for historicization.” International Theory. 2023; 15(3): 379-403.

A Needed Emphasis on Middle Powers

With Africa’s share of the global population projected to reach 25% by 2050, many nations considered “middle powers” recognize the continent’s growing role in their quest for increased geopolitical influence. This primer examines eight countries—Brazil, India, Japan, North Korea (formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or simply DPRK), Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar—that are significant due to their political, economic, or geographic importance to Africa, yet are often under-analyzed in discussions about external powers acting on the continent.

By predominantly focusing on Russian and Chinese actions on the continent, Western policymakers miss opportunities to view these middle powers as potential allies or counterweights. These states act independently of great powers’ foreign policies, suggesting that long-standing partners of African nations—the U.S., China, and European states—should reevaluate Africa’s dynamically evolving foreign political environment.

An Alternative to Great Powers

With Chinese loans to Africa declining and Western aid becoming sparser, middle powers are beginning to fill such vacuums, offering a “third option,” distinct from alliances with superpowers. These nations have the potential to profoundly reshape the continent, driven by national interests that align with those of many African countries. For one, many middle powers and African states share a mutual geopolitical interest in reshaping the global order and international institutions to better represent voices from the Global South. As middle powers pursue diverse agendas, these partnerships are poised to fuel further shifting geopolitical realities.

Some observers assume that middle powers must choose between alignment with the U.S. or China. In Africa, some actions by middle power states are driven by their relationship with great powers; for example, Japan’s naval participation in U.S.-led counterpiracy efforts off the Horn of Africa augments the U.S.-Japan security relationship in the Pacific. However, most actions by middle power states in Africa serve defined national interests and are agnostic to great power actions. Additionally, there are spaces in Africa where middle power states hold the upper hand, compete directly with larger states, or are the intermediaries that bring great powers like the U.S. or China to the table.

Geography Supports Geopolitical Freedom

While the U.S., Russia, and China maintain regional spheres of influence, Africa lies further afield and lacks a regional hegemon. Therefore, it is somewhere a non-African nation can grow its influence without directly antagonizing a great power. Moreover, as superpowers remain preoccupied with competing priorities— including wars in Ukraine and Gaza, domestic political turmoil, or economic slowdowns—middle powers have a growing window of opportunity to exert influence in Africa without provoking conflict with a great power.

No Middle Powers Consensus

The eight nations examined in this report do not form a unified bloc; instead, they often compete directly against one another and other countries. In the security domain, Gulf states and Turkey back opposing factions in conflicts in Libya, Sudan, and Somalia. Economically, our eight nations compete for African commodities, while airlines such as Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Turkish Airlines vie to be the air carriers of choice, linking the continent to Asia and beyond. While India and Brazil favor deeper diplomatic ties through established international institutions, like the UN or AU, others prefer bilateral agreements with specific African partners.

Historical Ties Shape Present Policies

Three distinct types of historical legacies define the contemporary relationships these middle powers maintain with African states:

• Acting as an alternative or counterweight to colonial powers (Turkey, DPRK, Japan).
• Cultivating “South-South” ties, built on a shared anti-colonial legacy or Cold War-era non-aligned movement (India and Brazil).
• Sustaining a legacy of ancient trade networks (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE).

Diverse Diplomatic Engagement Strategies

Middle powers are deepening diplomatic ties with Africa through three general approaches:

1. Multilateralism: India and Brazil are pushing for international institutional reform to expand their influence across the Global South. To do so, they are elevating African voices and multilateralism in forums such as the Global 20 (G20), UN Security Council (UNSC), and BRICS. As African populations and markets grow over the coming decades, they hope this ever-increasing geopolitical weight can advance their broader foreign policy aims.
2. Bilateralism: The Gulf Countries and Turkey are expanding bilateral ties with governments across the continent by increasing their diplomatic presence and foreign offices of development agencies or backing security forces. As countries historically excluded from international institutions, bilateral ties are a continuation of past policy. For middle powers and African states that balance relationships with competing Great Powers, bilateralism offers flexibility and a degree of ambiguity, helping to avoid antagonizing the U.S., China, or Russia.
3. Targeted Engagement: Japan and DPRK pursue narrow, often project-based strategies rather than broad regional diplomatic agreements. Further afield from the continent, their primary security concerns in Asia dictate their limited engagement with African states. Tokyo and Pyongyang can leverage American or Chinese relationships, respectively, with African partners if desired, avoiding the need to develop their own distinct ties.

Security Exporters

Middle powers are increasing their military ties with African countries, although they continue to lag significantly behind former colonial and other established powers.

• Some middle powers are willing to pursue direct involvement in African conflicts, such as in Sudan, Libya, and Somalia, where they compete for regional influence by arming warring factions. They are on opposing sides in some places; in others, they find common ground and even broker peace.
• Other states—including the UAE and Qatar—who are involved in African conflicts, do not act with the same interventionism in their own backyard. These nations view Africa as their near abroad, where they can jockey for influence precisely because the U.S. and China do not prioritize this part of the world.
• Middle powers geographically further from the continent, such as India, Brazil, and Japan, favor maritime involvement, while the Gulf States and Turkey are involved in land-based conflict.
• Turkey provides an alternative to the U.S., France, and Russia for arms sales, offering weapons without diplomatic or political strings attached.
• Many middle powers have been actively involved in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, either to increase their global influence, boost their clout within the organization, or maintain security in their near abroad.

Varied Economic Portfolio

Middle powers’ investments are often diversified across the continent and across industries, not just in large economies like South Africa or Nigeria.

• Middle powers have joined Western countries and China in offering development financing, hosting high-level summits, boosting trade, and providing loans to African governments. Private firms and non-profits have followed, launching joint ventures to build infrastructure, expand energy networks, and erect schools and mosques.
• Commodity and food imports from Africa remain high, especially for Gulf nations.
• Africa’s energy sector draws engagement from middle powers as a source of critical minerals needed to power the green transition and as an export market for oil-rich states.
• Sports and tourism revenues have increased rapidly as regional entertainment conglomerates expand beyond the Gulf. At the same time, state-backed airlines such as Emirates, Qatar, and Turkish Airlines link the continent to Europe, Asia, and beyond.