No First Use: One Key Step Toward the NWC

Nuclear weapons have the capability to destroy all the creatures of this Earth. As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a danger of accidental or deliberate use with disastrous consequences. Therefore, the negotiation of a NWC is vital to all humanity. However, such negotiations have not started yet because of the opposition of the nuclear weapon states (except China). The NWC negotiations will not make progress without these states’ participation. The main reason for these nuclear states’ objections to NWC negotiations is that they continue to rely on the deterrence role of nuclear weapons, despite there being no rationale for deterrence since the end of the Cold War. To reach the goal of the NWC, therefore, the major steps are to reduce the deterrence role of nuclear weapons and to render such weapons unusable.

To reduce the role of nuclear weapons, we should take some specific and practical steps in the initial phase such as:

1. Taking nuclear forces off alert and removing warheads from delivery vehicles. The US and Russia should accept a workable de-alerting option at first. Then the system can be extended to other nuclear weapons states under a condition of deeper cuts;
2. Committing to further reduction of nuclear weapons. The US and Russia should implement the START-II and START-III as soon as possible and commit to deeper cuts in their arsenals to a level comparable to that of the other three nuclear weapon states, at which time the latter will join in nuclear disarmament. Also it is necessary to maintain the ABM treaty because without it deep cuts will not be possible;
3. Accepting a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons.

A global agreement on no first use (NFU) should be a key step to decreasing the role of nuclear weapons and eventually realizing the goal of the NWC. Among the five NWS, however, only China has adopted the NFU policy (China is also the only nuclear weapon state supporting the NWC); that is, it undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstance and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear weapon free zones at any time or under any circumstance. France, the UK, the US, and now also Russia maintain policies that permit first use of nuclear weapons even when nuclear weapons are not used or threatened against them. In practice, in the post-Cold War era, there is no rationale for these states holding the first-use policy, and NFU would be not only beneficial to international security but also in their national interests.

A no first use policy would be an important measure to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and to promote further reductions of nuclear weapons. As far as non-proliferation is concerned, as long as nuclear weapon states rely on their use for any purpose, other nations will be tempted to develop or acquire such weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in response. Inversely, NFU would discourage other states from seeking nuclear weapons while the role of such weapons is decreasing

More important, NFU would facilitate the nuclear disarmament process. Under NFU, the military strategy of each state will be switched from offensive to defensive. The size of the operational nuclear arsenal whose only purpose is for retaliation should be much smaller than that intended for first use. This would make the deeper cuts more feasible; NFU would ban all tactical weapons to reduce the risk of first use; NFU could limit the deployment of silo-based MIRVs intended for first nuclear attacks; NFU would require taking nuclear forces off alert and removing warheads from delivery vehicles; NFU would also require not deploying a national missile defense system, because such a system could encourage a country to use nuclear weapons first. Consequently, as an important confidence-building measure, the policy of NFU would make the NWC much easier to implement.