Pakistan's Jihad Culture

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This spring the U.S. State Department reported that South Asia has
replaced the Middle East as the leading locus of terrorism in the world.
Although much has been written about religious militants in the Middle
East and Afghanistan, little is known in the West about those in Pakistan
-- perhaps because they operate mainly in Kashmir and, for now at least,
do not threaten security outside South Asia. General Pervez Musharraf,
Pakistan''s military ruler, calls them "freedom fighters" and admonishes the
West not to confuse jihad with terrorism. Musharraf is right about the
distinction -- the jihad doctrine delineates acceptable war behavior and
explicitly outlaws terrorism -- but he is wrong about the militant groups''
activities. Both sides of the war in Kashmir -- the Indian army and the
Pakistani "mujahideen" -- are targeting and killing thousands of civilians,
violating both the Islamic "just war" tradition and international law.

Pakistan has two reasons to support the so-called mujahideen. First, the
Pakistani military is determined to pay India back for allegedly fomenting
separatism in what was once East Pakistan and in 1971 became
Bangladesh. Second, India dwarfs Pakistan in population, economic
strength, and military might. In 1998 India spent about two percent of its
$469 billion GDP on defense, including an active armed force of more
than 1.1 million personnel. In the same year, Pakistan spent about five
percent of its $61 billion GDP on defense, yielding an active armed force
only half the size of India''s. The U.S. government estimates that India has
400,000 troops in Indian-held Kashmir -- a force more than two-thirds
as large as Pakistan''s entire active army. The Pakistani government thus
supports the irregulars as a relatively cheap way to keep Indian forces
tied down.

What does such support entail? It includes, at a minimum, assisting the
militants'' passage into Indian-held Kashmir. This much Pakistani officials
will admit, at least privately. The U.S. government believes that Pakistan
also funds, trains, and equips the irregulars. Meanwhile, the Indian
government claims that Pakistan uses them as an unofficial guerrilla force
to carry out "dirty tricks," murders, and terrorism in India. Pakistan, in
turn, accuses India''s intelligence service of committing terrorism and
killing hundreds of civilians in Pakistan.

Pakistan now faces a typical principal-agent problem: the interests of
Pakistan (the principal) and those of the militant groups (the agent) are
not fully aligned. Although the irregulars may serve Pakistan''s interests in
Kashmir when they target the Indian army, they also kill civilians and
perform terrorism in violation of international norms and law. These
crimes damage Pakistan''s already fragile international reputation. Finally,
and most important for Pakistanis, the militant groups that Pakistan
supports and the Sunni sectarian killers that Pakistan claims it wants to
wipe out overlap significantly. By facilitating the activities of the irregulars
in Kashmir, the Pakistani government is inadvertently promoting internal
sectarianism, supporting international terrorists, weakening the prospect
for peace in Kashmir, damaging Pakistan''s international image, spreading
a narrow and violent version of Islam throughout the region, and
increasing . . .