The Saudi-Iranian “Cold War” and the battle over Yemen’s strategic worth

The complexity of the situation in Yemen transcends merely the sectarian explanations inside Islam and opens up a new front for the “Cold War” between Saudi Arabia and Iran over supremacy in the Middle East. Engaging in a comprehensive dialogue and reaching a common political understanding between the two countries on regional issues could unlock the several impasses that inhibit a peaceful resolution.

First, it is important to highlight that the nature of Yemeni divisions are not based at their core on a sectarian tension between Sunnis and Shi’as. The makeup of Yemeni society is built upon a tribal base instead of a socio-religious cleavage.  Yemenis identify to a much larger degree with their tribal associations than their religious leanings; much more for example than in countries like Lebanon and Iraq, where this Sunni-Shi’a divide has similarly boiled over into violent conflict.

Initially, Abd-Rabbu Mansur al-Hadi’s rise to power in Yemen was part of a political arrangement led by the Saudi kingdom as a transitional condition to reduce the internal pressure of the opposition movements in Yemen and to work on the construction of a democratic order in the country by organizing general elections. The proposal, established in 2012 through the Gulf Cooperation Council, was based in the formation of a multi-representative government composed of the diffused Yemeni forces in a power sharing system.

While support for democratic elections was happening overtly, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies were quietly attempting to systematically obstruct the possibility of a truly democratic transition in Yemen, with the clear intention of ensuring Hadi’s hold on power. Saudi Arabia developed a narrative with its Gulf partners that a democratic government in Yemen could prove susceptive to the influence of rival nations, such as Iran, arguing for Hadi’s hold on power. To this Saudi-led group of Gulf monarchies, old autocratic models are far superior to democratic transitions, in ensuring a counter to Iranian influence. 

On the eve of what was to be the end of Hadi’s stop-gap presidency, three fundamental variables within Yemen emerged: 1) increased discontent within opposition groups; 2) the rise of political groups of Houthi denomination – a tribal group primarily composed of Shiite Zaidi Muslims (or Fivers) – that have wrestled control of significant portions of Yemen; and 3) the apparent inability of the provisional president to win majority support, even with the support of the Gulf nations. The effort to buttress Hadi’s hold on power lost traction, and the anticipated “fait accompli” came crashing back down to earth as the Houthi’s took control of Sana’a.

Hadi’s resignation from office and his subsequent reversal was likely part of a Saudi strategy to shuffle the Yemeni political cards in a manner that could provide the Saudi Kingdom the right to intervene. With the Houthi takeover, the Saudi led Arab states were left with meager options to reverse the course of events in Yemen, and intervention remained a last, desperate option to stave of what Saudi Arabia viewed as an Iranian victory in Yemen. This desperation has only grown as the Houthis have expanded their political and geographical control over areas considered vital in Yemen, like the city of Aden.

One of the major oversights of Saudi foreign policy has been the absence of an economic recovery and development plan for Yemen – a bastion of poverty compared to its neighbors, fostering an environment prime for recruitment and training by terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). In general, the monarchies of the gulf have rejected the inclusion of Yemen as a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (CGC); the Yemeni state remains the only country in the peninsula excluded from this economic and political forum. The Iranians, in turn, have attempted to fill the vacuum left in Yemen, subsidizing the opposition Houthis in an attempt to counter Saudi influence over the nation.

The official narrative of the Saudi intervention is that intervention was necessary to protect Yemeni institutions and the Yemeni people. Further observation shows a different story, however, with the intervention exposing alternative motives that serve as keys for decoding the real factors that led to the Saudi bombing of Yemen, namely Saudi Arabia’s proxy war with Iran. As part of the Saudi-Iranian clash for regional supremacy, the cardinal points of the equation are intrinsically tied to three essential denominators: 1) the progress of nuclear talks between Washington and Tehran; 2) Iranian control of maritime operations in the Gulf, from the Strait of Hormuz, to the east, and Bab-al-Mandeb, to the West; and 3) the considerable growth of Iranian power, in the last two decades, with special consideration to the geostrategic structure of the Middle East. This is especially true after Tehran prevented the breakdown of the Syrian regime and proceeded to make inroads in important areas under the influence of the Saudi Kingdom, in places like Lebanon, Iraq, and now Yemen.

The harbinger of a nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran has become a nightmare for the Saudi monarchy. The prospect for a potential agreement between the West and Tehran is damaging to the Saudi strategy towards the Middle East, since any agreement will offer Iran relief from international isolation, repositioning the Iranians in the global and regional contexts.

 In many ways, however, by electing to intervene in Yemen, the Saudis chose the right piece in this regional balance of power struggle to fight for, with the understanding that the Iranians are willing to sacrifice the Houthis in order to avoid the frontal clash for more valuable pieces on the regional chessboard. The dominion over Aden is also strategically important for Saudi Arabia in a way that it is not to Iran, as it offers control over one of the most pertinent maritime routes in the world in the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, connecting the Red Sea to Indian Ocean through the Gulf of Aden.

The strait is considered the third most important maritime passage in the world, behind the Strait of Hormuz and Malacca in Asia. Through this maritime route, 3.5 million barrels of oil pass every day, representing approximately 5 percent of the world’s daily production. Almost 21,000 commercial ships navigate Bab-al-Mandeb every year, the equivalent of 10 percent of global commercial vessels. Furthermore, the control of the two maritime flanks of the Arab peninsula, the Strait of Hormuz to the east, and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb to the west, would be in Iranian hands, which ultimately means that Saudi access to the sea could be blocked. From a strategic perspective, then, the Saudis have chosen the least risky battle to recover a piece of little value for Tehran, but, of considerable worth for Riyadh.

The United States, on the other hand, is playing a role centered around tactical flexibility as they simultaneously negotiate with Iran on the nuclear matter and support the Saudi intervention in Yemen, a clear signal to the Arab world that they do not accept the advance of Tehran on the regional chessboard. Washington’s gesture is focused towards Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in order to quell Riyadh’s skepticisms and rebuild the alliance with the Egyptian military. The Obama administration is signaling that the negotiations with the Iranians do not distract Washington from its responsibility to stop the expansion of Iranian power at the expense of Washington’s allies, thus appeasing the Saudi discontent with the advancement of nuclear negotiations.

On top of the symmetry of interests between Riyadh and Cairo, the fact that pushes the Sisi government in Egypt to support Saudi Arabia’s interventionist policies is the creation of a precedent within the Arab League to legitimatize any ensuing military incursion by Egypt into Libyan territory. This thinking, following the Summit of Sharm-el-Sheik, led to the creation of an Arab military coalition under the leadership of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian plan for Libya is to enforce the continuity of the current government, protect its borders from the Islamic State, and constrain the aspirations of any political-religious movement aligned with Muslim Brotherhood, as to not have a situation like that of the Houthis in Yemen. 

The effect of the current narrative and the emergency meeting of the Arab League personified by the speech given by President Sisi, underlines a view that Iran, not Israel, is the main enemy of the Arab world. This fact emphasizes the need for the establishment of clear lines of contention against Iranian power, and displaces the Palestinian cause from the epicenter of the political picture of Arab countries to a peripheral role due to the assertion that the collective national security of Arab States is under its utmost historical threat.

Since 1980, the Saudi foreign policy has failed to counter Iranian influence in the Arab countries. This failure is a result of a blurred strategic interpretation, a deep political vacuum of leadership in the Arab world, and a heterodox modus operandi in the field of diplomacy. Regardless, the ultimate goal of the Saudi military operation in Yemen, the return of Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi to office, is unfeasible.

The Riyadh Conference on Yemen taking place in Saudi Arabia is not strictly focused on reaching a political consensus but rather on imposing a political order with regard to Yemen. Likewise, the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement indicates that the resoluteness of the Obama administration’s foreign policy to the Arab World centers on support to Gulf nation claims over Yemen, while the Syrian and Iraq issues linger without decisive action.

All signs suggest that Riyadh and Tehran will remain reluctant to establish a balanced dialogue in the bilateral relationship with the outlook of minimizing distrust and asymmetries. The standing Saudi foreign policy of reliance on coercive dollar diplomacy to align artificial allies has done little to move the needle in the Saudi’s favor with regard to countering Iranian power.  It is yet to be seen if the turn to the Saudi Defense Doctrine and Saudi military intervention will be any more effective.