Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace: The Rise, Demise, and Revival of Arms Control

Michael Krepon’s book Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace: The Rise, Demise, and Revival of Arms Control comes at the perfect time. On the one hand, 2021 was a relative boon for arms control compared to the past five years. In January, U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years. Following a summit in June, they also committed to hold strategic stability dialogues to “lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures.” On the other hand, the past 20 years have seen a steady erosion of arms control agreements due to Russian violations and U.S. withdrawals. This trajectory raises questions about how this era should be viewed in the context of arms control history and how arms control could contribute to future security. Enter Krepon, who provides both a comprehensive historical narrative and a call to action.

Krepon’s book takes a decidedly U.S. and nuclear focus. It begins with the image of a mushroom cloud and tracks the evolution of efforts to control the bomb’s massive power from the 1946 Acheson-Lillienthal Report through New START and to today. At first glance, the book is intimidatingly long, possibly the longest book solely dedicated to arms control; but in the end, this proves to be justified. Krepon draws on original sources, including dozens of interviews with decision-makers and his personal experiences, to offer an unprecedented level of detail covering multiple cases. One feature that makes the book particularly worth the length are the personal vignettes of the key actors about their origins and family backgrounds. This had an overall humanizing effect on arms control negotiations and helps to avoid the trap of arms control becoming an abstract phenomenon. Rather, arms control is practiced by individuals with unique perspectives and experiences, all of which they bring to the business at hand.

The book makes three important contributions. First, it should become the definitive text on the topic of arms control and the volume of choice for university courses on arms control, deterrence, and nuclear policy more broadly. Although it does not dwell too long on arms control theorizing—for this, I recommend Strategy and Arms Control by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Anatomy of Mistrust by Deborah Welch Larson, and The Revolution that Failed by Brendan Rittenhouse Green—it provides a comprehensive history that puts today’s arms control challenges in context. Second, in telling such a detailed history, Krepon, albeit indirectly, provides a playbook for understanding when, why, and how arms control has succeeded in the past. This is a timely contribution. Finally, Krepon’s vision for the future of arms control is an ambitious one that may face practical challenges but should inspire scholars to engage with the first principles of arms control.

Familiar Challenges

Many of the challenges, opportunities, and experiences examined by Krepon are familiar. Perhaps the most pressing is the impact of domestic politics on potential arms control agreements. For example, the U.S. Senate seems highly unlikely to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has languished since its signing in 1996. Krepon notes the historical importance of building blocks to achieve arms control, including bipartisanship in Washington, an acceptance of “sufficiency,” an acknowledgement of mutual vulnerability, and respect for national borders. Although Russia challenges the last of these, Congress is unlikely to acquiesce in the others.

Emerging technologies are another familiar theme throughout the book. Advanced technologies such as cyberweapons, artificial intelligence, and quantum physics have the potential to create strategic asymmetries and undermine strategic stability, thus requiring new thinking for the future of arms control. Nuclear weapons themselves were once a novel development that required rethinking the strategic landscape and inspired the first arms control agreements. During the 1950s, Krepon notes, the United States and Soviet Union carried out, on average, one nuclear test every two weeks.